Battle of the Sections: 307 vs. 337 (and a Little 301 Too) on Forced Labor Issues

Over the last few years, we've seen a surge in import prohibitions under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (which targets imports made with forced labor), after changes to the statute led to stronger enforcement by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). There are now a growing number of Withhold Release Orders in place against imports of specific products.

And then recently, we saw a Section 301 investigation into how U.S. trading partners were dealing with imports made with forced labor. After finding that other governments either failed to effectively enforce a prohibition on imports made with forced labor or did not have a prohibition in place at all, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on a number of these trading partners.

Now there is a new contender in the forced labor import restriction game: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. This provision is typically used to address infringements of intellectual property rights, but the language in the statute is fairly broad, and someone decided that it was worth trying to apply it to imports made with forced labor, bringing a case to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that forced labor in the supply chains of a seafood producer constitutes an unfair trade practice that harms U.S. shrimp producers.

In this post, I'm not going to do much analysis, but instead will just set out: (1) the key language in Section 337, (2) some of the arguments on each side as part of the Section 337 complaint, and (3) a bit of the history of the relevant statutes. At some point, others are likely to do a deeper dive on all this, but I wanted to kick things off because this seems like a potentially important development.

Section 337

First up, let's look at Section 337. The ITC, which is in charge of these cases, explains Section 337 as follows:

Unfair import (a.k.a., Section 337) investigations conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission most often involve claims regarding intellectual property rights, including allegations of patent infringement and trademark infringement by imported goods. Both utility and design patents, as well as registered and common law trademarks, may be asserted in these investigations. Other forms of unfair competition involving imported products, such as infringement of registered copyrights, mask works or boat hull designs, misappropriation of trade secrets or trade dress, passing off, and false advertising, may also be asserted. Additionally, antitrust claims relating to imported goods may be asserted. ...

The key to the expansion of the provision beyond intellectual property and antitrust is the following language, which appears to allow for a broad scope of application:

(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions

(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of law, as provided in this section:

(A) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles ... into the United States ...

On its face, it's easy to see how "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts" could be interpreted broadly, and might include products made using forced labor.

The complaint and the response

Picking up on this possibility was the Corporate Accountability Lab (CAL) and the law firm Picard, Kentz & Rowe. A CAL press release explains the complaint they filed:

... The Section 337 complaint asks the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to determine whether forced labor in the supply chains of major seafood producer Nekkanti Sea Foods constitutes an unfair trade practice that harms domestic shrimp producers. 

The complaint alleges that Nekkanti Sea Foods, a major Indian shrimp producer, uses forced labor to produce shrimp that reaches U.S. consumers via importers like Eastern Fish Company, and grocery stores including Aldi, Meijer, and Ahold Delhaize (the company behind well-known supermarkets Food Lion and Hannaford) – all of whom are also proposed respondents in the case. The complaint argues that forced labor decreases Nekkanti’s costs, allowing the company to sell its shrimp to U.S. retailers at lower prices. These imports unfairly undercut U.S. shrimpers like Versaggi Shrimp and W & W Dock, who play by the rules and respect fundamental labor rights – and, as a result, have higher production costs.

Recalling what I said about Section 307 at the beginning of this post, there is an obvious argument that Section 307 covers the field in terms of a remedy for imports made with forced labor, and thus Section 337 should not be applied in these circumstances. The complaint is well aware of the possibility of such an argument, and it argues the following in anticipation:

37. Complainants’ request for relief under Section 337 complements but does not contravene CBP’s authority under Section 307. Under Section 307, CBP is charged with excluding imports tainted by forced labor from U.S. commerce, just as CBP is charged with administering border measures arising under other statutory provisions. Section 307, by its very terms, does not purport to restrict agencies other than CBP from making forced labor determinations. This lack of any indication of exclusive jurisdiction leaves open the possibility that agencies not named in Section 307, like this Commission, might act under their statutes to adjudicate claims of forced labor in U.S.-facing supply chains under the standard enunciated in Section 307.

38. The absence of any exclusive jurisdiction under Section 307 is underscored by specific language governing the jurisdiction of another U.S. agency, USTR. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows USTR to grant trade remedies, including “duties or other import restrictions . . . notwithstanding any other provision of law . . ..” 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B). Under Section 301, USTR may take action against acts, policies, and practices that are deemed “unreasonable,” 19 U.S.C. § 2411(B)(1), which includes any act, policy, or practice that “permits any form of forced or compulsory labor.” 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii)(III). The consequence of this is that Congress has made it clear that more than one agency can make determinations about forced labor with respect to imported goods, which negates any inference that Section 307 is meant to confer exclusive jurisdiction on CBP.

39. In sum, Congress did not vest exclusive authority in CBP to make determinations of forced labor in U.S.-facing supply chains and to assess the impact of forced labor goods on U.S. entities. This Commission, like USTR and CBP, possesses the authority to make such determinations.

40. The Commission’s jurisdiction to make determinations in enforcing Section 337 is distinct from CBP’s Section 307 authority for three reasons. First, Sections 307 and 337 are not mirrors of one another in their application to this kind of issue. While Section 307 bars the importation of goods made with forced labor—with no other statutory prerequisites—Section 337 addresses the competitive injury to a U.S. domestic industry caused by unfair methods, including forced labor.

41. Second, the Commission’s remedial authority under Section 337 extends beyond barring importation, the sole remedy available under Section 307. Under Section 337, the Commission may grant cease-and-desist orders, prohibiting the domestic sale or distribution of infringing goods, often alongside limited or general exclusion orders. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). Section 337 also permits complainants to name as respondents U.S. entities that participate in the tainted supply chain. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1357–59 (Fed. Cir. 2008). These remedies are designed to address ongoing competitive harm in the U.S. market, not merely to block unlawful imports at the border.

42. Third, Section 337 provides a speedy, transparent, and adversarial process, allowing evidence to be tested in trial-type procedures before an administrative law judge, unlike the ex parte process of Section 307. The Commission resolves Section 337 investigations quickly, on average completing its process within seventeen or eighteen months.54 In contrast, investigations under Section 307 can take years and, in many cases, never become public or lead o any action. With only eight Withhold Release Orders (“WROs”) issued in the past twelve months, Section 307 as currently applied leaves U.S. producers with hollow recourse.55

43. Accordingly, as a matter of statutory interpretation and institutional capability, there is no basis for the Commission to defer to CBP as the proper forum for the claims asserted in this Complaint. As will be further demonstrated infra, Proposed Respondent Nekkanti employs forced labor in its operations. Both the legislative and executive branches have reiterated that forced labor is an unfair practice, and this Commission has full authority to determine whether such a practice took place. Therefore, because Proposed Respondents’ use of forced labor violates Section 307 and confers an unlawful cost advantage that distorts competition, it constitutes an unfair method of competition and unfair act under Section 337.

Not surprisingly, the respondents disagree. Here's the response of Nekkanti on this point:

II. COMPLAINANTS’ ATTEMPT TO CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 307 SHOULD BE REJECTED

The only unfair act Complainants allege is a violation of Section 307. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30, 36, 43, 58, 66. But that statute has a specific enforcement mechanism that has been delegated to CBP, not the Commission.1 Complainants’ attempt to circumvent that mechanism to create a private right of action via Section 337 is improper and fails under established precedent.

For instance, in Certain Disposable Vaporizer Devices, the Commission declined to institute an investigation predicated on alleged violations of the Customs laws, including 19 U.S.C. § 1484. See Inv. No. 337-TA-1381, EDIS Doc. ID 810442 (Dec. 15, 2023). The Commission found that an alleged violation of Customs law and regulations “does not allege an unfair method of competition or an unfair act cognizable under Section 337 as required by the statute and the Commission’s rules.” Id. at 3. The Commission noted that “enforcement of the Customs laws is within the province of CBP’s authority and there is no private right of action to enforce the Customs laws.” Id. That is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. ITC, 923 F.3d 959, 965–68 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (affirming non-institution where the claim depended on proving a violation of a statute enforced by another agency), and with the Commission’s earlier decision in Certain Trolley Wheel Assemblies, Inv. No. 337-TA-161, Initial Determination, 1984 ITC LEXIS 142, at *8 (Aug. 29, 1984) (failure to comply with customs country-of-origin statute not an actionable unfair act). Complainants may not simply ignore the congressionally approved procedure because they prefer the regulatory framework under Section 337. See Compl. ¶ 42.

Complainants’ “predicate statute” examples in the Complaint also do not help them. See Compl. ¶ 29. The Lanham Act, the Sherman Act, and the PACT Act each expressly authorize suits by injured competitors or permit holders. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (giving a civil action to “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by the false designation or false advertising); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (authorizing treble-damages suits by “any person” injured by an antitrust violation); 15 U.S.C. § 378(d) (permitting any permit holder to bring a suit in an appropriate United States district court). The Customs laws do not.

And here's the response of Ahold Delhaize:

III. THE SECTION 307 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY REGIME SET UP BY CONGRESS COMMITS FORCED LABOR ENFORCEMENT TO CBP

As a general matter, the ITC should decline to institute an investigation based on the Complaint’s broad and unprecedented attempt here to use Section 337 to enforce Section 307 without a prior ruling from CBP. Section 307 bars entry of forced labor goods and “authorize[s] and direct[s]” the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision.” 19 U.S.C. § 1307; see also 19 C.F.R. §§12.42-12.45. “Any person outside CBP” may raise forced labor-related issues with any port director or the Commissioner of CBP, who then administers a complete process: investigation, a formal finding, and (if necessary) a Withhold Release Order (WRO). 19 C.F.R. § 12.42. Courts have described WROs as “the main method of forced labor enforcement.” Ninestar Corp. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1333-34 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2024). WROs are administered through CBP’s authority to detain and exclude merchandise, with exclusive review in the Court of International Trade. Id. at 1318-19; Int’l Lab. Rts. Fund v. Bush, 357 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2004).

The Complaint seeks to improperly enforce Section 307 through Section 337 and is directly analogous to the situation Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. ITC, 923 F.3d 959 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In Amarin, the ITC declined to institute an investigation—a decision the Federal Circuit affirmed—where a complainant “present[ed] its claims as violations of the Tariff Act” but “in reality those claims constitute[d] an attempt to enforce requirements” of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) via Section 337. Id. at 965-69. The court held because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was the agency tasked by Congress with interpreting and enforcing the FDCA, the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim under Section 337. See id. at 968.

Here, the unfair act identified in the Complaint is an alleged Section 307 forced labor violation, and CBP—the agency tasked with making Section 307-related determinations under the statutory scheme set up by Congress—has made no such finding. Determining whether a violation of Section 337 has occurred here would necessarily require the ITC to adjudicate a Section 307 violation in the first instance, which Amarin forecloses.
Anticipating that their claims belong at CBP, not the ITC, Complainants argue that Section 337 relief “complements” CBP’s authority under Section 307, which allegedly does not purport to restrict agencies other than CBP from making forced labor determinations. (Compl. ¶ 37.) That framing misstates the question, and the contention that CBP does not have exclusive authority over all forced labor issues (id. ¶¶ 38–39) is a red herring. Congress did set up a statutory scheme where CBP alone is responsible for administering Section 307, which is the sole forced labor statute relied upon by Complainants. A complainant cannot use the ITC to prosecute a statute whose administering agency has not itself found a violation. Amarin, 923 F.3d at 968. Here, CBP has issued no WRO under Section 307 or any finding of forced labor concerning Nekkanti shrimp. Instituting here would require the ITC to adjudicate a Section 307 violation in the first instance— exactly what Amarin prohibits. Indeed, the ITC recently declined to institute an investigation where the complaint was based on alleged violations of the Customs laws and regulations. Certain Disposable Vaporizer Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-1381, ITC Letter at 3 (Dec. 15, 2023) (institution denied where investigation would require the ITC to make determination committed to the authority of Treasury and CBP). That same reasoning applies here, where Congress solely granted Treasury and CBP the authority to prescribe regulations to enforce Section 307.

...

Complainants’ arguments about the different harms and remedies addressed by Section 307 and Section 337 (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41) are circular and do not support institution. Broader remedies are available only if a cognizable Section 337 violation exists; the scope of the relief cannot itself create an unfair act. The same bootstrapping failed in Amarin—the availability of Section 337 remedies did not save a claim that was, at bottom, an effort to enforce another statute. Finally, Complainants’ procedural complaints about Section 307 are policy grievances about how CBP administers Section 307, not a legal basis to relocate that enforcement to the ITC. The perceived inadequacy of the designated statutory scheme does not create Section 337 authority.

A bit of history

In the previous section, I set out the basics of the disagreement between the parties on the Section 307 vs. Section 337 issue, and I'm sure this will see some elaboration as the case goes on. In the meantime, let's look briefly at how we got here with Section 307 and Section 337.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) tells us the following about how Section 307 came into being and why its use picked up recently (a development I noted in the opening paragraph):

U.S. customs law has prohibited importing goods produced by certain categories of labor since the end of the nineteenth century. Beginning in 1890, the United States prohibited imports of goods manufactured with convict labor. In 1930, Congress expanded this prohibition in Section 307 of the Tariff Act to include any (not just manufactured) products of forced labor. Although a few Members brought up humanitarian concerns during debate, the central legislative purpose was protecting domestic producers from competing with products made with forced labor. As such, Section 307 allowed products of forced labor if no comparable product was made in the United States or the level of domestic production did not meet U.S. “consumptive demand.”

Over the decades, lawmakers and civil society became increasingly concerned about forced labor in the context of human trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Division A of P.L. 106-386), for example, included forced labor in its definition of human trafficking, concordant with a U.N. anti-trafficking protocol adopted that year. Similarly, Congress removed the “consumptive demand” clause as part of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (P.L. 114-125) in 2015. Since then, and amid ongoing interest in worker rights in trade policy, use of Section 307 has increased.

The 1890 prohibition mentioned by CRS was part of the McKinley Tariff Act. It's also worth noting an earlier version of Section 307 that was part of the Tariff Act of 1922. That version said:

Sec. 307. That all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision.

Note that forced labor is not mentioned in the 1922 version of the provision. When we get to the Tariff Act of 1930, the original version of Section 307 in the proposed legislation still did not mention forced labor, but this term was added during the legislative process. The House version of the bill before forced labor was added is here; during the Congressional debate, "forced labor" was added to the text, and you can read the discussion about this addition starting at p. 4488 of the Congressional Record here. (The Conference Report on the House bill is here.)

Finally, the Tariff Act of 1922 had a precursor to Section 337 as well, located in Section 316 of that statute. In its 1922 annual report, the Tariff Commission (the predecessor to the ITC) described Section 316 as follows:

Section 316.—Protection against unfair methods in importation. On October 4, 1919, the Tariff Commission submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives a report entitled “ Dumping and Unfair Foreign Competition in the United States.” After pointing out the defects in the antidumping law enacted by the Congress on September 8, 1916, the Commission said:

"These defects in the statute somewhat support the contention that administrative remedies to prevent dumping are superior to criminal laws. If the act of 1916 is adhered to, attention should be devoted to the careful revision and strengthening of its provisions. Such amendment would not be inconsistent with the enactment of definite and authoritative instructions to the Federal Trade Commission to deal with dumping as a phase of unfair competitive methods. If preferred, some official body other than that commission might be vested with such jurisdiction. Furthermore, as separate or supplementary legislation, it is practicable by act of Congress to require some Federal body to investigate and report on specific complaints of dumping; also to instruct the President or Secretary of the Treasury to impose additional duties or refuse entry whenever the existence of dumping in any industrially destructive form is established. In lieu of the refusal of entry, bonds to secure the payment of possible dumping duties may be required from importers. Such legislation, which would conform to American precedents and established customs practices, would make possible flexibility of administration, the prevention alike of sporadic and persistent dumping, and some safeguarding of consumers against conceivable efforts artificially and unnecessarily to raise prices."

Following in general these suggestions, the Congress embodies in section 316 of Title III of the tariff act of 1922 provisions which aim to safeguard American industry against unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of goods. Section 316 extends to import trade practically the same prohibition against unfair methods of competition which the Federal Trade Commission act provides against unfair methods of competition in interstate trade. Under this section additional duties may be imposed on importations in cases of unfair price cutting, full line forcing, commercial bribery, or any other type of unfair competition, and duties may be "imposed upon articles imported in violation of this Act, or, in what he [the President] shall be satisfied and find are extreme cases of unfair methods or acts as aforesaid, he [the President] shall direct that such articles as he shall deem the interests of the United States shall require, imported by any person violating the provisions of this Act, shall be excluded from entry into the United States, * * *." These provisions make it possible for the President to prevent unfair practices, even when engaged in by individuals residing outside the jurisdiction of the United States. Summarizing this section, the conferees, who finally shaped the act of 1922, stated that this section makes—

"unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of merchandise into the United States which threaten the stability or existence of American industry.

Investigations of cases arising under this section are to be made by the United States Tariff Commission and its findings are subject to review, on questions of law, by the United States Court of Customs Appeals. The final findings of the commission are then transmitted to the President and he is authorized, in case such unfair methods or acts are established to his satisfaction, to impose additional duties upon merchandise imported in violation of the act, and in extreme cases he is authorized to prohibit the offending person from importing any merchandise into the United States."

And in a 2017 publication, the ITC explained that:

... Work under section 316 of the 1922 Tariff Act (which, as noted above, declared unlawful unfair acts and unfair methods of competition in the import trade) began and continued under its counterpart in the 1930 Tariff Act, section 337. From 1922 to 1929, the Commission received 31 applications under section 316 and instituted 6 investigations (the other applications were dismissed or referred to other government entities). The investigations resulted in orders from the President prohibiting imports of such articles as revolvers, Bakelite products, Manila rope, and laminated paper products. In the 1930s, the Commission received a similar volume of applications under section 337.

Conclusions

Summing up this post, I'm curious to see what the ITC has to say about all this. And however they decide the issue, it seems almost certain their decision will be appealed to U.S. courts.

In an ideal world, Congress would step in and clarify how it thinks the policies in statutes written a century ago should be applied today. But Congress has a lot on its plate right now, on both trade policy and other issues. It may not be able to get to everything, and perhaps this issue is to obscure to generate much political attention. But let's see what the ITC and the courts do with it first.