More Submissions to the ITC on the Meaning of Discrimination in Section 338

A few weeks ago, I did a post setting out the comments I submitted to the U.S. International Trade Commission on the appropriate understanding of the term "discriminatory" in Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. My main point was that the exercise of identifying discrimination can't be based solely on the effect of the measure, because that will intrude too far into policy space/regulatory autonomy/sovereignty. To prevent that from happening, some version of intent has to be considered as well.

The ITC's comment period has now ended, and I wanted to highlight a couple others who made similar arguments.

First up is the Consumer Technology Association (CTA). On the issue of the meaning of "discriminatory," their submission says:

... the Commission should create a process that requires parties to provide evidence establishing discrimination under Section 338, not by mere effects alone, but by analyzing the measures at issue. For example: Do the statutory thresholds or criteria cover only U.S. firms while excluding similar domestic or third-country firms? Do legislative history or official statements show an aim to target U.S. firms? Do authorities apply discretion unevenly to U.S. commerce compared with other countries’ commerce? Does the measure lack a legitimate, non-protectionist goal, or does a less discriminatory option exist? All of this would be evidence that points to discrimination.

In my view, these are all good questions to be asking as part of an inquiry into whether discrimination exists. The "statutory thresholds or criteria" element gets at the design, structure, etc. of the measure; looking into "legislative history or official statements" can help identify subjective motives (more on that later); and the existence of a "legitimate, non-protectionist goal" for the measure helps provide objective evidence of the true intent.

Next, trade lawyer Barry Appleton's submission goes into great detail on these issues, and also responds to my submission directly. Here's an excerpt where he is discussing what I said:

E. Effect is necessary but not sufficient

Different outcomes do not, without more, show discrimination. Simon Lester argues in his comment in this investigation that Section 338 "should not target laws and regulations that merely have a disparate impact on foreign goods and services," and that the question is whether a measure is "designed to protect domestic industries." I agree with the first point. I would not require proof of design, which a documentary record will rarely supply. Lester also accepts that governments "should not use laws and regulations as a means of disguised protectionism," and that phrase points to a more workable test: the distinction the 1924 reading draws between a bona fide regulation and "disguised favoritism," judged objectively from the measure's terms, structure and operation rather than from proof of motive. ...

(footnotes omitted)

To clarify here, when I referred to "design," that was my shorthand for "design, structure, and operation/architecture, etc.," rather than a call to rely on the subjective motives of legislators and regulators. I think of "motive" and "purpose" and "aim" as synonyms in this context, but "design" is something different.

Let me also note, though, as hinted at earlier in reaction to the CTA submission, I don't mind looking at evidence of subjective motives. One of CTA's questions was "Do legislative history or official statements show an aim to target U.S. firms?," and I think that's a fine question to ask. To be clear, however, I would treat this as one factor that is part of an overall consideration of intent, rather than something that is determinative in and of itself as to whether discrimination exists. Generally speaking, the focus of the intent inquiry should be on the terms and structure of the measure, and subjective motives are likely to play a lesser role.