I have previously expressed skepticism about the use of CVDs to induce changes to other countries' subsidy policies. My sense is that, generally speaking, when countries are the target of CVDs (or AD measures), they see these measures as biased and protectionist, and are unlikely to change their behavior in response. I suppose you could argue that Deese's proposed coordination among a number of countries could change how targeted governments see things, but I still have doubts. Governments don't like to be bullied (and China particularly doesn't like it), so this will probably not induce the changes people are hoping for.

It's worth noting here that there have been extensive AD/CV duties in place on Chinese steel and other products for a long time, and they don't seem to have had much impact on Chinese policies. As the Commerce Department described it a few years ago in relation to steel, "[a]s of April 19, 2017, Commerce has 152 antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) orders in place on steel from 32 countries," and "[t]wenty-eight of the 152 orders (18%) are on steel products from China – 16 AD and 12 CVD." Importantly for Deese's international coalition argument, this long-standing use of AD/CVD against China is not unique to the United States. Deese highlights Brazil's new investigations, but Brazil's most recent report to the WTO on its anti-dumping practices shows that it has been using anti-dumping measures against China for a while now (see the Annex at the end).

Fortunately, there is an alternative to AD/CVD: complaints filed at the WTO, against either subsidies or broader non-market practices. What you get with WTO complaints is an objective international ruling that often leads to some degree of compliance by the responding party. It's not perfect, but it seems like the best option that exists for discouraging Chinese subsidies and protectionist/non-market practices.

(Just to state the obvious, WTO dispute settlement is not an option for the U.S. right now because it has blocked Appellate Body appointments, but (1) the U.S. could change course here and (2) other countries have signed on to the MPIA and could therefore use WTO dispute settlement to file complaints of this sort against China).