Reforming Section 301: What Are the "Unfair Trade Practices" that Should Be Targeted?

At some point in the coming months and years, I'm expecting – or at least hoping for – a discussion by members of Congress on how to reform Section 301. The focus of this conversation may be on issues such as how to give Congress greater oversight of any tariffs that are imposed, but I don't think the scope has to be limited to that. Once people start talking, it's worth considering more foundational issues as well. What I would like to see in this regard is some thinking about the following: Section 301 falls under Title III, Relief from Unfair Trade Practices, but what exactly are the "unfair trade practices" that Section 301 should be targeting?

Here's a spoiler of where I'm going with this. The challenge of determining what constitutes a "trade barrier" is a long-standing one, and when Section 301 was enacted in 1974 (and then later revised at various times), the concept was still not well developed. Subsequent debates in the 1990s and 2000s helped crystallize the issues, and suggest that the older formulations are overbroad and need to be reined in.

I'll flesh that out by starting with some history.

The concept of "trade barriers" around the time Section 301 was enacted

What were the foreign trade practices that the drafters of Section 301 were worried about? The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974 – which I couldn't find online anywhere so I've uploaded here – describes a number of specific practices that were of concern, grouped under the broad categories of "foreign discrimination," "subsidies," and "standards" (the first and third ones seem to overlap):

The Committee intends that these powers be exercised vigorously to insure fair and equitable conditions for U.S. commerce. Foreign discrimination against U.S. commerce includes a multitude of practices such as discriminatory rules of origin, government procurement, licensing systems, quotas, exchange controls, restrictive business practices, discriminatory bilateral agreements, variable levies, border tax adjustment, discriminatory road taxes, horsepower taxes, other taxes which discriminate against imports and many other practices which have been amply documented in studies such as the four volume U.S. Tariff Commission Nontariff Barrier work completed for the Committee on Finance.

Subsidies may also distort trading patterns. They may take a wide range of government and private actions. The principal forms which subsidies may take are generally:

(a) Explicit cash payments (cash subsidies).
(b) Implicit payments through a reduction of a specific tax liability (tax subsidies).
(c) Implicit payments by means of loans at preferential interest rates (credit subsidies).
(d) Implicit payments through provisions of goods and services at prices or fees below market value (benefit-in-kind subsidies).
(e) implicit payments through government purchases of goods and services above market price (purchase subsidies).

Standards – that is, laws, regulations, specifications and other requirements with respect to the properties or the manner, conditions, or circumstances under which products are produced or marketed – may also be highly discriminatory. A classic example of a discriminatory standard involves a European organization called the European Committee for Coordination of Electrical Standardization (CENEL). As this arrangement developed it virtually excluded U.S. products from the European market. According to the Special Trade Representative, the CENEL Arrangement affects $1 billion in U.S. exports. The European Community is expanding its rules-of-origin requirements to cover many more products. If diplomatic efforts and trade negotiations fail to bring about equity and reciprocity for U.S. commerce, the acts and barriers described above should be subject to retaliation.

I'm pretty sure the "four volume U.S. Tariff Commission Nontariff Barrier work completed for the Committee on Finance" they refer to is this report on "Trade Barriers." (It's 2,564 pages long! It also seems to have 11 volumes).

At the same time this work was being done in Washington, over in Geneva trade negotiators were discussing similar issues. As I described in a JIEL piece here, the Committee on Trade in Industrial Products had been established at the GATT in 1967 to oversee the drawing up of "[a]n inventory of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers affecting international trade." Its work carried over into the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the "Standards Code") negotiations in 1974. Thus, GATT negotiators were trying to work out international rules that could govern the issues for which Congress was crafting domestic legislation.

How should we think about trade barriers and unfair trade practices today?

It's interesting to see how the developers of these domestic laws and international rules thought about the issue of trade barriers. This was not totally new policy territory, as the 1920s and 1930s had seen efforts to address "indirect protectionism," and these efforts were carried over into the GATT negotiations. But the late 1960s and 1970s discussions took things further. The conception of the problem of "trade barriers" at this time was a broad one, with little thought given to how to appropriately balance trade policy and non-trade policy considerations. During this period, the implications for domestic policy of using trade law to discipline domestic regulations and other measures did not play a big role in political discussions, as NGO concerns about trade rules intruding too much into "policy space" would not fully emerge for more than a decade.

Today, however, we are more familiar with these issues, and how we define the scope of the "trade barriers" that constitute a problem under domestic and international trade law is an important issue for trade legislators and negotiators. In the late 1980s and 1990s, critics of the GATT/WTO began pointing out problems with how the rules dealt with domestic regulation, arguing that legitimate, non-discriminatory regulations were sometimes being challenged as violations of trade agreements. In response, many people began to think more carefully about the scope of the obligations as well as the public policy exceptions.

Under a modern lens, therefore, Section 301 as currently written may be too broad in some respects, as it does not take the new thinking into account. Here are a few specific examples of potential problems in the context of the "discretionary" part of Section 301 (sub-paragraph (b)).

First, the reference to an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country that is "unreasonable" goes quite far in relation to the scope of domestic regulation it covers. In defining the term "unreasonable," the statute begins with the following explanation: "An act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice, while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable."

All of the key words here – "unreasonable," "unfair," and "inequitable" – are very broad, with the result that the statute has few limitations on what kinds of regulations or other actions it can target. If U.S. industries and/or government officials are bothered in some way by foreign government actions, Section 301 gives them broad authority to investigate and impose a tariff in response. It is not just protectionist policies that are covered; rather, it is any government action that affects U.S. companies financially, as long as something about the action can be characterized as "unreasonable," "unfair," and "inequitable." These terms provide a great deal of leeway for those seeking to impose retaliatory tariffs.

Second, the reference to an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country that is "discriminatory" may go too far as well. If the "discrimination" at issue here only takes into account the effect of the measure, rather than its intent, then non-protectionist regulations that merely have a disparate impact on U.S. goods or services could be covered.

A related problem arises because Section 301 refers to an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country that is unreasonable or discriminatory "and burdens or restricts United States commerce." The problem with "burdens or restricts" is that, arguably, it is solely about the impact of the foreign government actions. There is no inquiry into the intent. Again, that means any government action that affects U.S. companies in some way could be covered, rather than just protectionist actions.

In my view, this approach to addressing foreign trade barriers/unfair trade practices is overly broad, as it has the potential to intrude too far into governments' regulatory autonomy (or policy space, or sovereignty – whichever term you prefer). The Section 301 statute doesn't require a consideration of whether the foreign government was pursuing a legitimate regulatory objective, and the absence of such an inquiry is a problem in terms of maintaining the appropriate balance between trade policy and other policies. Arguably, what is needed here is to update the "discretionary" category of the statute so that it is more carefully calibrated to targeting protectionism and takes into account any non-trade policies that are being pursued.

What would U.S. legislators today think of all this? Do they want to keep the broad conception? Or do they agree with me that this conception could lead to problems? I'm not sure. But if we are in a moment where people are thinking about the operation of Section 301, this is the kind of foundational question that people should be considering.