Anti-dumping investigations in times of geopolitical tensions
by Carlo M. Cantore*
On 18 September 2026, the European Commission issued Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2088 “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain alkyl phosphonic acids and their sodium salts originating in the People’s Republic of China”. The anti-dumping duties range from 156.7% to 192.2% ad valorem.
The product concerned (“PBTC”) is produced in only three countries in the world: China, Germany, and India. During the investigation period, PBTC was manufactured by one single producer in Germany (Lanxess), which also acted as the complainant in the investigation (Provisional Regulation, para. 190). Imports from India accounted for only 0.1% of the Union consumption during the investigation period (Provisional Regulation, para. 251). As regards Chinese imports, the Commission found that their volume and total market share increased during the investigation period, while import prices decreased (Provisional Regulation, paras. 197 - 203).
Total Union production of PBTC during the investigation period – that is, the total production of Lanxess – was established at around 7,200 – 9,600 tonnes (Provisional Regulation, para. 190). During the same period, Union consumption was estimated at around 11,300 – 15,000 tonnes, a level therefore much higher than domestic production. Nevertheless, contrary to the arguments advanced by users, the Commission found that the complainant had sufficient spare capacity to absorb a contraction in imports (Provisional Regulation, para. 283). It is also worth mentioning that, during the injury period, not only did the Union industry lose market shares to foreign competitors in the European market, but it also experienced a sharp contraction in its exports to third markets (Provisional Regulation, paras. 252 – 254), showing signs of declining competitiveness.
When examining whether (high) anti-dumping duties were in the Union interest, the Commission dismissed all the arguments advanced by interested parties. Specifically, the Commission concluded that PBTC price increases for European users would not be a problem, as they would “merely be a manifestation of the fair-trade restoration” (Definitive Regulation, para. 80). In addition, the Commission held that, in the absence of measures, the very existence of a manufacturer of the product concerned in the European Union would be endangered (Definitive Regulation, para. 80).
The Commission concluded its analysis with the following enigmatic passage: “[T]he current geopolitical tensions only underscore the importance of local supply sources” (Definitive Regulation, para. 80). This last assertion is not backed by any analysis, nor is it followed by an explanation. Neither the Provisional Regulation nor the Definitive Regulation clarifies whether arguments in this respect were raised by any of the interested parties.
This investigation is illustrative of the Commission’s attitude towards politicizing trade remedy investigations and their outcomes. In an investigation concluded earlier this year, the Commission found that, whereas anti-dumping duties could force users of the product concerned to shut down production facilities or relocate outside of the European Union, anti-dumping measures were still in the interest of the Union, as supporting domestic producers would contribute to preserving the “strategic autonomy” of the European Union. We examined that determination elsewhere, pointing to contradictions and flaws in the Commission’s analysis. Recently, references to “strategic autonomy” were also included in the Provisional Safeguards Regulation on GOES (para. 73), showing that the Commission is willing to rely on these considerations in trade-remedy investigations on imports from all third countries, not just China. In the present case, the Commission merely made an unsubstantiated remark concerning “geopolitical tensions”. As such, we do not know how the Commission considers the product concerned (mainly used in water treatment processes and industrial and institutional cleaning) to be linked to geopolitical interests and, ultimately, to the security interests of the European Union.
In the specific circumstances of this case, the reference to “geopolitical tensions” was an unnecessary additional element in an analysis that already saw the Commission conclude in favour of imposing anti-dumping duties. Nevertheless, the increasingly assertive attitude of the Commission deserves close scrutiny, as geopolitical or strategic autonomy considerations, if not substantiated by a robust, fact-based analysis, may lead the Commission to conclude in favour of remedies even where other elements of the Union interest analysis would suggest otherwise.
Geopolitical tensions are real and will not dissipate any time soon. In view of their importance, they should be handled with care. If the Commission considers that geopolitical considerations should inform its trade remedy decisions, it should spell out the parameters of this analysis ex ante and in clear terms, so as to ensure due process and promote transparency in its decision-making processes. When geopolitical considerations are not necessary, either because there is already enough evidence on record or because there are no elements to suggest that the product under investigation is strategic, the Commission should exercise restraint and limit itself to the core features of trade remedy investigations.
*International Trade Lawyer (ccantore@pm.me).