On SSRN, "Strategic Delaying and Concessions Extraction in Accession Negotiations to the World Trade Organization," by Eric Neumayer:
Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is like no accession to any other international organization. It is extremely demanding on applicant countries and time consuming. This article argues that existing GATT/WTO members select themselves into the Working Party of applicant countries, the body whose members can stall accession and engage in bilateral trade negotiations with the applicant, in order to strategically delay membership by the applicant country and/or extract concessions from it. Existing members will select themselves into a specific Working Party if they fear that they might lose out after the new member enters the exclusive club and benefits from its trading privileges, which will be the case if they are relatively dependent on bilateral trade with the applicant country and if they compete strongly with the applicant in terms of export product or export market structure. An empirical analysis of Working Party membership over the period 1978 to 2005 shows that the theoretically derived determinants of membership are in fact substantively important drivers of the composition of Working Parties in accession processes to the GATT/WTO.
In a nutshell, WTO Members are more likely to join an accession Working Party if the acceding party is an important trade partner and competitor, with the goal of influencing the process. Logically, this makes sense, but it's always nice to see empirical confirmation for the logic.
And in the JIEL, "Collective Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual Opinions in WTO Jurisprudence," by James Flett:
Anonymous individual opinions in World Trade Organisation (WTO) jurisprudence are occurring more frequently. This article describes and critiques the 14 individual opinions expressed to-date; discusses related legal issues; and compares the position in other international courts. It argues that the WTO strikes a balance by permitting individual opinions, if in the report and anonymous; but that 10 of the 14 were incorrect or unnecessary, and the others avoidable. It further argues that different views are adequately recorded in the summary of the parties' arguments or the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) minutes; and that if the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes) is functioning correctly, the collective intelligence of reasonable judges should lead them to common ground. Considering some of the particular characteristics of the WTO compared to other international courts, the article concludes that it is in the long-term interests of the WTO that individual opinions remain exceptional.
