Simon Lester

The idea of an "institutional balance" between the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the WTO came up in the India - Quantitative Restrictions and Turkey - Textiles cases.  On this issue, see Frieder Roessler's piece entitled "The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs

Well, for the most part he doesn't.  He says: When international cooperation does “succeed,” it spawns rules that are either toothless or reflect the preferences of only the more powerful states. The Basle rules on capital requirements and the World Trade Organization’s rules on subsidies, intellectual property,

I've mentioned the NAFTA-WTO dispute settlement conflict aspect of the U.S. - Tuna II (DS381) case before (see here and here).  Unfortunately, I'm in a little over my head on that issue.  I prefer to focus on the substantive aspects (DSC subscribers only) of the

Here's post #2 on the current account imbalances issue.  Martin Feldstein thinks these imbalances will, for the most part, take care of themselves, without any grand international plan to fix them.  He leads off his paper this way: The high level of current account imbalances has been a

There is lots of talk about trade imbalances these days, with surplus countries pitted against deficit countries.  There is the U.S. versus China, of course, but there is also Germany versus Greece.  The U.S.-China issue gets more press attention (at least here in the U.S.), and

Here's an excerpt from an old post by economist Don Boudreaux (via recent posts from Mark Perry and Scott Lincicome): Ifintra Indeed, such an objective scholar should be open also to the possibility that residents of Nashville can be made wealthier if their leaders restrict their ability to