What happens to all the frameworks, deals, and agreements negotiated by USTR since April 2, 2025?
With the Supreme Court ruling (6-3) that the President lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA, the question is what happens to the trade/security deals (informal and formal agreements) negotiated in the shadow of the IEEPA tariffs? This post explains how the US has sought to separate the authority to negotiate agreements from the authority to impose IEEPA tariffs, in terms of statutory basis and EOs. This does not change the fundamental concern about recognising the statutory basis of these deals. However, it does suggest that the executive branch anticipated that the deals could outlast the IEEPA reciprocity tariffs, to the extent that companies or trading partners did not challenge the underlying emergency in effect.
What are the statutory bases available to the executive to declare emergencies and negotiate these trade/security deals? We can begin by examining the relevant EOs and the terms of each concluded deal to determine the statutory basis. Kathleen Claussen and Tim Meyer have sought to unpack the different potential authorities, including IEEPA (Kathleen raised this point on IEEPA authority for the deals last summer). Claussen and Meyer note that the last three administrations have “entered into international agreements that lacked explicit congressional consent and rested on at best shaky claims of ex ante delegations of authority.”
Inu Manak’s CFR team tracks all the trade/security deals. The first few deals are rooted in Executive Order 14257 (Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits). This seems to be the case for Indonesia and Japan, even though the US issued EO 14345 on September 4, 2025, to implement an agreement with Japan. The US modified Japan’s reciprocal tariff rate to 15 per cent per EO 14326, drawing on the authority granted to the President by the Constitution, IEEPA, (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code. These executive actions connect back to the determination of a national emergency declared in EO 14257.
There seems to be a similar situation for Taiwan. The US modified Taiwan’s reciprocal tariff rate to 20 per cent, again drawing from the authority of the US Constitution, IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, section 604, and section 301 (links above). On February 12, 2026, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. This Agreement rests upon Taiwan applying the reciprocal tariff within the meaning of EO 14257 (this no longer exists).
However, after the EU negotiated with the US, the EO 14346, Modifying the Scope of Reciprocal Tariffs and Establishing Procedures for Implementing Trade and Security Agreements reflected the EU deal and all other subsequent ones. For Taiwan, actions committed by the US, including exemptions for select products from the reciprocity tariffs, are pursuant to EO 14346, not a specific EO concerning Taiwan’s deal.
EO 14346 rests on the emergency declaration issued by EO 14257, which led to the executive decision to impose IEEPA reciprocity tariffs. Other deals that see the US modify the trading partner’s reciprocal tariff rate connect to EO 14346. For example, for Vietnam:
The United States will maintain the 20 percent reciprocal tariff rate for imports from Vietnam and will identify products from the list set out in Annex III to Executive Order 14346 of September 5, 2025, Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners, to receive a zero percent reciprocal tariff rate.
Another example:
Consistent with Executive Order 14346, the Secretary and the Trade Representative have determined that the additional ad valorem rate of duty applicable to any article the product of Switzerland or Liechtenstein shall be determined by the article’s current ad valorem (or ad valorem equivalent) rate of duty under column 1 (General) of the HTSUS (“Column 1 Duty Rate”). For an article the product of Switzerland or Liechtenstein with a Column 1 Duty Rate that is less than 15 percent, the sum of its Column 1 Duty Rate and the additional ad valorem rate of duty pursuant to this notice shall be 15 percent ad valorem. For an article the product of Switzerland or Liechtenstein with a Column 1 Duty Rate that is at least 15 percent, the additional ad valorem rate of duty pursuant to this notice shall be zero.
There is no mention of EO 14346 in the February 20, 2026 EO Ending Certain Tariff Actions. However, the emergency declaration that linked these agreements to EOs imposing reciprocity tariffs remains in effect. Is this the statutory basis for these agreements? No. Yet if we did not probe this closely enough, we might simply assume the continuation of these powers, for the emergency preserves them and vests the executive with authority to enter into these trade/security deals. The perpetuation of the emergency and threats to US economic security could grant the executive the power to establish these deals under IEEPA and section 232 (as well as other authorities identified). Does the Supreme Court ruling that IEEPA does not authorise the President to impose any tariffs included in these trade/security deals? The executive branch has maintained the EOs that implement these deals, with some deliberate efforts to treat them separately from the IEEPA tariffs. But is this just a matter of degree?
In EO 14346, the President noted that the EU and the US have agreed to a tariff bargain arising from the initial imposition of reciprocity tariffs (EO 14257), making it “necessary and appropriate to implement the tariff modifications described in the Framework Agreement.” The agreement becomes the means to “deal with the national emergency.” Likewise, all agreements with other trading partners rest on the same logic. The subsequent implementation of these agreements was to address the national emergency that gave rise to the IEEPA tariffs and threats to national security pursuant to Section 232 of the 1962 Expansion Act. The mixed objectives make it difficult to disentangle the now non-existent reciprocity tariffs from the other necessary actions taken to continue addressing the purported emergency and US security interests.
In sum, the EOs on the establishment and implementation of the trade/security deals do not resolve the fate of the negotiating trade/security deals that impose tariffs and implement a variety of economic security commitments. It does seem, however, that the executive has tried to quarantine its trade/security deals from the IEEPA reciprocity tariffs, for the executive can argue that the deals remain in effect as long as the emergency that gave rise to them persists.
One year ago, former USTR Robert Lighthizer outlined a tiered system with variable tariff levels, negotiated with other governments. The durability of these trade/security deals raises questions about how close we are to this proposal. Will US trading partners see these agreements as powerful diplomatic tools, regardless of US legality? Or will the EU and other partners walk away (perhaps even collectively)? There are political questions about whether governments can make the most of their current circumstances, even while remaining subject to a woolly emergency, and hoping any promises made do not break the multilateral trading system.