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By Simon Lester in U.S. Trade Politics —

AOC on Foreign Policy and Trade Policy

Will Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) run for president in 2028? Could she be a good choice for VP if she doesn't get the nomination? Who knows! And anyway let's have the midterms first!

I bring all this up because AOC was on a couple panels last week at the Munich Security Conference, and also spoke at the Technische Universität Berlin, and this European trip was widely seen as a move to establish some foreign policy credentials for a presidential run (reports indicate that she is being advised on foreign policy by former Bernie Sanders adviser Matt Duss). With that in mind, while this may be getting a little ahead of possible future events, let's take a look at some things she said on foreign policy and trade policy. (At the bottom of this post, there is a transcript of the comments I thought people would be most interested in.)

On trade, at one point she criticized NAFTA as "a failed policy for many rural and working class communities." Of course, NAFTA has been replaced by USMCA, so this is a pretty safe criticism to make of past U.S. trade policy. It would be great if someone would ask her what she thinks about how USMCA has been working, whether it should be extended as part of the upcoming review, and if it needs revisions as part of that.

On tariffs, she was critical of the impact of Trump's tariffs: "Tariffs, of course, have hurt Americans, and it has hurt and had a negative impact on the United States globally as well." I take that as opposition to Trump's tariffs specifically, with a focus on the IEEPA tariffs, rather than to all tariffs as a general matter. However, it would be good to get more clarity on exactly what scope she sees for using tariffs. When asked directly about trade policy at one point, she mentioned tariffs briefly but then moved quickly to a detailed criticism of non-tariff policies in trade agreements (more on that in the next paragraph).

And then more broadly on trade, she said: "we have an opportunity to explore what a world would look like if we upheld democracy, human rights, trade that actually centers working class people, instead of accruing overwhelmingly the benefits of trade to the wealthiest." Relatedly, perhaps, in response to the question "[what] does a worker centered trade policy look like to you," she focused on the "hundreds of pages of non-tariff related policies that are included in these trade agreements that amount to corporate protectionism." In this context, she pointed to the 20 year patent term requirement in the WTO's TRIPS Agreement as a particular concern, as well as trade rules that affect the ability of governments to regulate. She concluded here by saying:

And so all too often, global trade is used as a back door for major corporations and industries to get away with policy changes that they would not be able to otherwise. And these need to become much more central pieces of our focus, especially now as tech companies seek to erode all protections on privacy and user data so that they can commodify our personal information, and I would not be surprised if they use trade agreements in order to advance that as well.

All of this leaves her plenty of room to maneuver on trade policy going forward. I have no expectation of big new trade liberalization initiatives from her, but there are ways she could support the core of existing trade rules as well as positive trade relations with other countries while still suggesting tweaks (scaling back the IP rules or revisiting what we mean by "discrimination" in trade agreements, to pick up on the examples she gave).

Speaking of rules, she emphasized her support for the "rules-based order" in international relations. While there is uncertainty about what that order is exactly, using the term seems like a way to signal some degree of support for the system as it has existed (pre-Trump, anyway). Her big objection to the existing system was interesting, because it focused on how the U.S. and other wealthy countries have carved out exceptions from the rules. It sounds like she would want the U.S. to be more bound, or at least more heavily influenced by, international rules rather than less bound.

On China, she was careful and nuanced. She noted that it is an "an ascendant global power ... , acting in its own self interest." One concern she has is that Washington rhetoric on China "can get a little conflict driven." In terms of competing with China, her focus seemed to be on making domestic improvements, such as "investments in science and technology." She noted that China has "invested dramatically in wind and solar and in energy innovation," which she sees as "a question of competition and ... trade," and said "we have to make sure that we are having, I think, a reflection and a reflective conversation about, how are we positioning ourselves to offer, to continue to offer the world the best of what America has to offer." I took that to mean that, as a way to compete with China, she would focus on using policy tools that promote U.S. industry, but I'm not totally sure about the scope of this. What mix of subsidies, tariffs, or other measures would she use here?

A couple other tidbits:

  • She is a big supporter of international aid
  • She is strongly against imperialism, and that applies regardless of who is doing it
  • Whereas the Biden administration had a foreign policy for the "middle class," AOC wants a foreign policy for the "working class" (I'm not convinced that this sort of political messaging means much, but it has become pretty standard)
  • I don't think trade rules had the impact on Glass Steagall that she suggests (see the transcript below)

Anyway, her statements here lay the foundation for a discussion that is sure to pick up next year, and I'll come back to the AOC trade policy tea leaf reading then.

Quotes from AOC at the Munich Security Conference, February 13, 2026

On NAFTA "as a failed policy" and on a "working class centered politics"

What we are seeing over the last eight years, I think, has been a growing recognition that of those past errors, that go back, that include military interventionism in the Iraq war, that include a recognition of NAFTA as a failed policy for many rural and working class communities. And now I think we are moving in this direction of increased recognition that we have to have a working class centered politics if we are going to succeed, and also if we are going to stave off the scourges of authoritarianism, which also provides ... political siren calls to allure people into finding scapegoats to blame for rising economic inequality, both domestically and globally.

On Democrats and the transatlantic partnership / the "rules-based order"

I think this is a moment where we are seeing our presidential administration tear apart the transatlantic partnership, rip up every democratic norm, and really calling into question, as was mentioned by ... [Prime Minister] Carney at the World Economic Forum, the rules based order that we have, or question mark, do we have? And so I think one of the reasons why, not just myself, but many of our colleagues here, in fact, Democrats, many Democrats that are here as well, is because we want to tell a larger story, that what is happening is indeed very grave, and we are in a new era, domestically and globally.

There have been many leaders who said, we will go back. And I think we have to recognize that we are in a new day and in a new time. But that does not mean that the majority of Americans are ready to walk away from a rules based order, and that we're ready to walk away from our commitment to democracy. I think what we identify is that in a rules based order, hypocrisy is vulnerability, and so I think what we are seeking is a return to a rules based order that eliminates the hypocrisies around when, too often in the West, we look the other way for inconvenient populations to act out these paradoxes, whether it is kidnapping a foreign head of state, whether it is threatening our allies to colonize Greenland, whether it is looking the other way in a genocide. Hypocrisies are vulnerabilities, and they threaten democracies globally. And so I think many of us are here to say, we are here and we are ready for the next chapter, not to have the world turn to isolation, but to deepen our partnership on greater and increased commitment to integrity to our values.

In response to the question, "Are there any particular institutions that a Democratic administration would want to save ... is it NATO? Is it the climate accord? Is it the Iran nuclear ... ?"

First and foremost, I think we need to revisit our commitments to international aid. Not just USAID, but the dozens of global compacts that this current Secretary of State and President Trump have withdrawn from. They are looking to withdraw the United States from the entire world so that we can turn into an age of authoritarianism, of authoritarians, that can carve out the world, where Donald Trump can command the Western Hemisphere and Latin America as his personal sandbox, where Putin can saber rattle around Europe and try to bully around our own allies there, and for essentially authoritarians to have their own geographic domains. And it actually is the trans pacific partnership*, it is our global alliances that can be a hard stop against authoritarian consolidation of power, particularly in the installation of regional puppet governments.

[*She later explained that she meant to say "transatlantic partnership"]

On whether the United States is stronger or weaker on the world stage than it was five years ago, and tariffs

I think that the United States is very much in a compromised position compared to where we were five years ago. Our relationships with our allies are strained, our commitment and demonstrated consistency on democratic values, human rights also incredibly strained. And our domestic situation, I think, is reflecting globally as well, particularly economically. Skyrocketing inflation. Tariffs, of course, have hurt Americans, and it has hurt and had a negative impact on the United States globally as well.

On whether we are in a new world order

I think that Prime Minister Carney's remarks at the World Economic Forum were words that rung around the world in raising this question. But I think that also in his remarks, as well as part of this larger conversation, there was this undertone, this undercurrent, this suggestion that it was a rules based order sometimes. And I think that that is the issue that lies before us, is that in a so called rules based order, the rules for whom. Because for all too long, the rules only apply to the United States, Europe, its allies, and we would carve out exceptions for the Global South. And I think that when you have a rules based order where you carve out exceptions to our values, exceptions to our rules, eventually the exceptions become the rules. And I think that to your original point, over the last five years, we've seen such a breaking and such a fraying of these alleged western values that people wonder if it ever existed in the first place. So I don't know if it's necessarily that we are in a post-rules based order, I think it's possible that we were in a pre-rules based order, and we have an opportunity to explore what a world would look like if we upheld democracy, human rights, trade that actually centers working class people, instead of accruing overwhelmingly the benefits of trade to the wealthiest. But if we reoriented a new era that could actually help people and show how foreign policy and healthy foreign policy can show up and help them in their lives.

On relations with European allies

I know that the Democratic Party is here for our allies. We are shocked at the President's destruction of our relationship with our European allies. His threatening over Greenland is not a joke. It is not funny. It threatens the very trust and relationships that allow peace to persist. And so I believe what I can say is that unequivocally, the majority, the vast majority of the American people do not want to see these relationships frayed, and they are committed to our partnerships and our relationships and our allies.

On consistency in U.S. foreign policy

I think what we are seeing now is this idea that US foreign policy is, and some of our more basic and foundational values based commitments seem to be, enacted based on the partisanship of whoever is elected, that we play hokey pokey with USAID, with the Paris Climate Agreement, with many of our commitments. And I don't think that that is good for the country. I think that what is best is for when we sign an agreement and when we're a part of it, we stay in it, so that they know that our commitments are reflective of our nation's values in a way that transcends partisanship. And so I think that instability is one, but then the other, I think it is hand in hand with the volatility, on one hand, it goes far beyond just agreements, and it goes into real aberrations, I think, in interventionism, in, I think, a turning back on our commitment on human rights, as well as super charging an economic regime that fuels the 1%. And I think that that piece is the most concerning for everyday people.

On China

I think China is, of course, an ascendant global power, growing very quickly, acting in its own self interest. And oftentimes in Washington, there's this frame between conflict and competition. I think sometimes, depending on what's happening, that rhetoric can get a little conflict driven. And I think that it's really a question of competition, and to the governor's point, fair competition. But when I think about that, I think about how the United States, if you want to assert oneself as a global competitor, the kinds of things that one would do in order to really assert that position is investments in science and technology, which we are gutting our NIH, we are gutting our health science research. We are cutting the very things that make us a global power in that respect, in terms of government and public funded research, which is what allows innovation in a more broad sense, as opposed to privatized research. An ascendant global power would invest heavily in innovative energy solutions so that it could be sovereign in that respect. And the United States at this point, instead of expanding our energy mix, we are actively narrowing our energy mix, to become increasingly more reliant on fossil fuels ... in contrast to what you see is happening in China. Yes, they burn a very large amount of fossil fuels, but they have also invested dramatically in wind and solar and in energy innovation. And so to me, I see this as a question of competition and of course, of trade, to the governor's point, but we have to make sure that we are having, I think, a reflection and a reflective conversation about, how are we positioning ourselves to continue to offer the world the best of what America has to offer.

On Ukraine

There's no conversation about Ukraine that can happen without Ukraine. And so they, of course, lead in terms of setting their terms on this. But I think that, overall, as a principle, we shouldn't reward imperialism. And I don't think that we should allow Russia to continue, or any nation to continue, violating a nation's sovereignty and to continue to be rewarded, and whose main lesson and takeaway is that they will gain. And so what that looks like in the specifics, I think is a deeper conversation, but on principle, I think that is what we should be pursuing.

Quotes from AOC at Technische Universität Berlin, February 15, 2026

Question:

Let me move on to the transatlantic relations, and one of the key issues at the core of the fray we have experienced in the past year is the trade policy that the United States has leveled as political leverage against Europe, but also other parts of the world as well. You have called for a trade policy that serves workers, not just the economic elites. The German wealth model is very much based on trade so obviously we're very curious to know, how does a worker centered trade policy look like to you?

AOC:

When we think of trade policy, we think about trying to lower some of the barriers to trade, tariffs, famously, is a central part of that conversation. But oftentimes in our trade agreements, what doesn't get discussed are some of the most important pieces that are hurting working people the world over. There are hundreds of pages of non-tariff related policies that are included in these trade agreements that amount to corporate protectionism. And when I think about this, I think about, for example, in the WTO, there are agreements that every nation, every signatory, must increase their patent year holdings for pharmaceutical companies, for example. And so the United States had 17 year patents – where, of course, we develop many pharmaceutical drugs in the United States, cancer treatments, all sorts of different kinds of treatments – the United States originally had a 17 year patent length for pharmaceutical drugs. We then had to increase that patent length in order to be in accordance with the WTO. And that meant that pharmaceutical companies held onto their patents longer. Drugs could not go generic. That meant that it drove up costs on healthcare systems in the entire world in order to more benefit the bottom line of pharmaceutical companies.

Or in other types of tariff agreements, that you can't discriminate, and you can't have laws against financial institutions that have multiple services, which led to the downfall of the Glass Steagall Act in the United States, which separated banks and kept them small in order to prevent what happened in, ultimately, in 2008 where banks got too big to fail. And that precipitated, not just in America the US housing crisis, but of course, famously, it became a global financial crisis.

And so our trade policies, they call them trade policies, but there's so much that's tucked inside them, precisely because our democracies would never allow these things to happen in your parliament, nor in my Congress, it would be too difficult to pass it on its own. And so all too often, global trade is used as a back door for major corporations and industries to get away with policy changes that they would not be able to otherwise. And these need to become much more central pieces of our focus, especially now as tech companies seek to erode all protections on privacy and user data so that they can commodify our personal information, and I would not be surprised if they use trade agreements in order to advance that as well.