“I am a tariff man standing on a tariff platform.”[1] Being a tariff man was an important building block both for William McKinley and for Donald Trump to be elected U.S. President. But why are tariff men so appealing to voters and policymakers alike? And why, in the century between McKinley and Trump, did countries around the globe, led by the U.S., decide to impose restrictions on the behaviors of tariff men? In his most recent book, The Lure of Economic Nationalism: Beyond Zero-Sum, Kenneth A. Reinert aims to answer both questions. Reinert, a PhD economist and long-time professor at George Mason University’s School of Policy and Government, is an avid supporter of multilateralism. Prior to teaching, he served as a Senior International Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and many of his previous works already embraced multilateralism as a necessary tool for achieving social and economic development goals. Now, by pleading against the broader concept of economic nationalism, which is characterized “[…] by protectionism, domestically supported manufacturing and technology, the rejection of multilateralism, the deployment of zero-sum narratives […]” (p. 6), he advocates for a world where tariff men have their hands tied.

The geopolitical and historical context in which Reinert wrote this book is essential to understanding its urgency. In the years prior to the launch of the book in 2023, the author witnessed Trump’s first administration undermining international institutions and inflaming American nationalism; the U.S.-China trade war; the political and economic consequences of Brexit; the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the Covid-19 pandemic; and the broader de-globalization of value chains. To put it briefly, in contrast to the globalization and multilateral cooperation trend after World War II, there is a growing perception that multilateralism is fragmenting and international institutions are losing legitimacy and effectiveness.[2] Many of these events are narrated in the book and articulated to demonstrate why multilateralism is so important. In the Afterword of the book, Reinert notes that “as of early 2023, the trends outlined in this book appear to be solidifying” (p. 174). Two years later, this observation has only become more accurate: the nationalism trend appears to be consolidating even further and expanding its global effect – spanning from Trump’s 2025 tariff shock and the escalation of the U.S.-China technology war to the nationalization of lithium by Latin American countries to geopolitical instability in the Middle East and in the Kashmir region.

In the 21^st century such economic nationalism is even more peculiar considering that several of society’s most pressing challenges – in the areas of economics, health, climate, technology, innovation, and immigration, among others – have become increasingly complex and interconnected, often beyond the ability of any individual country to address them on its own. However, paradoxically, these global issues are being met with a resurgence of nationalist sentiment and the growing popularity of political figures with nationalist agendas. This myth is the “lure” of economic nationalism that Reinert seeks to debunk.

A.    The Case for Multilateralism

I.          Hirschman’s Response to Power and Plenty

In Chapters 1-3, Reinert traces the historic roots of economic nationalism back to mercantilism. During the mercantilist era, the struggle for wealth was seen as a zero-sum game. Reinert describes the almost inseparable relationship of power and plenty that marked the politico-economic thinking of the time. The aim of countries was to exert monopoly control over a given trade, thus gaining monopoly profits (plenty), which in turn would increase the state’s financial ability to successfully wage war (power), thus enhancing its mercantilist trade objectives (power and plenty). As examples of the disastrous outcomes this school of economic thinking leads to, he mentions the three Anglo-Dutch wars, which were due to these countries’ mercantile economic rivalry. Moreover, he describes how colonies like India were “looted” in the attempt to gain power and plenty. Reinert continues to describe industrialization as key for mercantilist ideas because it is the basis of military power and central to national security. He mentions Friedrich List as one of the most prominent proponents of such a theory. List envisioned not only “economic warfare for national gain” but also “warfare for national economic gain.” At the same time, Reinert acknowledges that List’s plan of protecting the German industrial sector from foreign competition resembles infant industry protection as we understand it today and that List’s suggestions in this regard are quite valid. Having said that, he explains that Germany’s development in the 19^th century was largely due to technological diffusion from inventions made in Britain and the German education system rather than to protection. Additionally, Reinert refers to Stephen Broadberry’s analysis that the successful long-run economic performance of both the U.S. and Germany relative to Britain is mostly due to improvements in productivity in services rather than manufacturing.

Lastly, he finds a parallel between List and Albert Hirschmann. Reinert prominently describes Hirschmann’s book National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade in Chapter 1, with the central argument being that “given the power aspects of international trade, trade autonomy must be limited and placed in an international institutional framework” (p. 2). According to Reinert, Hirschmann had anticipated the benefits of the WTO system, namely a rules-based structure for trade relations. This legal order supports Ricardo’s theorem of comparative advantage, i.e., that trade based on relative efficiencies creates mutually beneficial non-zero-sum outcomes that grow the pie of global economics. Against this background, Reinert calls for a commitment to multilateralism to improve the ability of countries to provide the necessary basic goods and services to their citizens. Contrastingly, economic nationalism often leads to public policies that are harmful even for the very people that it claims to defend, undermining national and global prosperity. Moreover, he calls for civic nationalism as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and principles.

II.       Zero-Sum Thinking and the WTO

Reinert continues to explore the reasons why, irrespective of its shortcomings and the advantages of multilateral cooperation, people engage in zero-sum thinking (Chapter 4). His central theory is that regarding international trade, there exist “heuristic substitutions” – the tendency to replace a difficult question with an easier one. This applies to, first, Ricardo’s theory as a not obvious and difficult one; second, imports being seen as harmful because they bring change; and third, trade balances as perceived measurements of successful trade policies. In addition, Reinert contends that zero-sum thinking has its place in the corporate strategy of private firms. Specifically, “it should not be forgotten that companies and not nations sell goods“ and “[c]ompanies export and import not for the benefit of their nations of origin but for the sake of their own profit.“[3]. Hence, companies tend to focus on exploiting absolute advantages instead of utilizing comparative advantages. This means that the expansion of one company takes place at the expense of another’s – a zero-sum calculation. Therefore, Reinert asks multinational corporations to employ greater sensitivity to comparative advantages in their corporate strategy.

Zero-sum thinking is countered by the WTO’s legal framework providing certainty in international trade relations. In Chapter 5, Reinert examines the reasons for the WTO being under fire by the U.S. The central point of contention is the impact of China’s WTO membership on labor markets in the U.S. One-quarter of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment is attributable to import competition from China. Reinert does not regard this as a valid reason for criticism by alluding to “general equilibrium effects,” i.e., that U.S. exports significantly increased at the same time and that the employment gains from this increase make up the employment losses on the import side. Regarding the 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs, he points out that the steel sector composed one-fifth of 1 percent of total U.S. employment. Hence, protecting the steel industry was merely “economic nostalgia, a type of heuristic substitution” (p. 68).

However, Reinert acknowledges that some of the U.S. concerns about China are legitimate. This includes “theft of IP, subsidies to SOEs [state-owned enterprises], and forced technology transfers” (p. 70). To address these issues, he envisions the U.S. making use of the dispute settlement system of the WTO with China’s Protocol of Accession being justiciable and engaging in discussions on new agreements regarding SOEs and forced technology transfer instead of dismantling the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB).

III.    Four Recent Examples of Economic Nationalism

Following these broader observations, Reinert opted for a deep dive into some recent events affecting the global political economy to unpack the different facets of shortcomings and harmful consequences of economic nationalism. This includes, among others: (i) the rise of ethnologic-driven nationalist regimes such as Modi’s India and Orbán’s Hungary, along with anti-refugees policies in several Western countries (Chapter 6); (ii) the populist rhetoric of the Brexit campaign and the economic and political consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (Chapter 7); (iii) nationalist responses in trade and health policy that unfolded in many countries under populist leadership during the Covid-19 pandemic (Chapter 8); and (iv) techno-nationalism in the form of restrictions in technology sharing and adoption by great technological powers, including U.S. opposition to Chinese information and communication technologies and escalating trade barriers in the global semiconductors industry (Chapter 9).

Reinert argues that economic nationalism is frequently driven by performative policymaking, led by populist leaders who dismiss science, economics, and reason in favor of emotionally charged, us-versus-them narratives. These policies are often justified in the name of protecting the “nation” (construed as an imaginary collective by exclusion of outsiders) but fail in their own terms in a self-defeating logic, harming socio-economic interests of the members of the “nation.” Reinert supports this argument with compelling case studies about this self-defeating logic of nationalist policies in each of the topics in Chapters 6-9 referred to above.

In examining ethnonationalism as a form of economic nationalism, Reinert introduces the concept of an “ethnicity trap” in which restrictive anti-immigration and discriminatory policies aimed at preserving jobs and national identities usually lead to a shortage of skilled and non-skilled labor and hold back a country’s economic growth and development. Contrary to ethnonationalism mandates, Reinert notes that 20-40% of U.S. economic growth between 1960 and 2010 can be attributed precisely to the removal of racial and gender discrimination in human capital development.

Economic nationalism can also take the form of techno-nationalism, where governments foster the development and adoption of national R&D and technology while restricting access of foreign technology to domestic markets and users. While such strategies may be framed as tools of national self-reliance, Reinert shows that they are often counterproductive. Scientific and technological progress benefits vastly from the access and joint combination of multinational resources such as raw materials, technical expertise, and foreign intellectual property. For this reason, when countries raise trade barriers or isolate their innovation ecosystems, they weaken their own technological competitiveness, despite nationalist efforts to foster it.

Among the book’s most detailed case studies are Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic, which are two pivotal events that Reinert uses to illustrate how populist nationalism can directly contribute to crisis. In the Brexit campaign, voters were promised greater economic prosperity and immigration control. In practice, the UK has experienced labor shortages, a decline in foreign investment, and enduring economic uncertainty since its departure from the EU. Similarly, during the pandemic, many populist governments imposed trade restrictions on essential medical supplies and dismissed vaccines developed abroad, prioritizing nationalist narratives over sound economic and scientific guidance. These decisions not only compromised public health outcomes but also exacerbated global supply shortages and delayed recovery efforts.

B.     A Sense of Cherry-picking

Combining a historical-interpretive method with a contemporary policy analysis, Reinert’s case for multilateralism rests on two pillars: the disastrous outcomes of economic nationalism as exemplified by mercantilism as well as his contemporary case studies and the benefits of international economic cooperation as exemplified by debunking most of the criticism of the WTO system.

His historic examination builds an impressive background to plead for multilateralism instead of economic nationalism that brings war and misery. From a narrative standpoint, concentrating on individual stories of people like Thomas Mun or George Downing contributes to a lively description of mercantilist thinking. However, early on the reader gets the impression that Reinert is selective in choosing sources to support his case. He dedicates less than a page (p. 21) to intellectual achievements of the mercantilist era. Irrespective of this, Reinert’s narrative style greatly conveys the massive downsides of economic nationalism from a historical perspective.

Regarding Reinert’s contemporary policy analysis, the sense of cherry-picking – very selective storytelling – becomes increasingly strong.

I.                    Behavior of Private Corporations

First, concerning the argument that private firms should utilize comparative advantages instead of absolute ones, Reinert does not address the question of why corporations would do that. Specifically, “[a] nation has other aims than a firm.”[4] Corporations make use of their existing market power when entering a new market.[5] In addition, corporations utilize, e.g., low health and safety standards in one country to produce more cheaply. This may be regarded as a comparative advantage[6] but it creates the incentive of a race to the bottom to become the single most attractive country.

II.       Distributional Effects

Second, by citing “general equilibrium effects,” Reinert does not fully account for the distributional effects of international trade. Ricardo assumes that productive resources (labor and capital) can move freely across economic activities, but “[i]n reality, this is not the case: factors of production cannot take any form as it becomes necessary.”[7] Hence, even if the winners of trade liberalization gain more than the losers lose, the compensation is not automatically made through the workings of the market, which means that some people will be worse off than before. “Trade liberalization will benefit everyone only when the displaced workers can get better (or at least equally good) jobs quickly, and when the discharged machines can be re-shaped into new machines – which is rarely.”[8] This phenomenon was empirically proven in regard to the China shock on the U.S. manufacturing labor market.[9] Reinert only briefly mentions this work and then refers to overall net effects. However, the study demonstrates the immobility of workers in geographical and sectoral regards. Workers did not move to new regions or different companies to find a job. Consequently, unemployment within the affected communities increased significantly, the group of non-college educated workers being most severely affected.[10] It is exactly this uneven distribution of impacts that leads to discontent with trade liberalization. When “better-educated, more economically diverse regions of the United States were affected far less by the surge in imports from China”[11] for all the others, “general equilibrium effects,” are not a satisfactory answer.

III.    Perspective of Developing Economies – Infant Industry Protection

Third, the case study approach adopted by Reinert allows one to think of counterexamples, i.e., situations in which nationalist policies may have in fact contributed to national prosperity. His analysis of nationalist policies does not deeply enough engage with the differences between developed and developing countries. It may be that such distinction could be irrelevant in some of Reinert’s examples, but it is certainly not irrelevant as a matter of political economy. Policy shifts between nationalist and multilateral approaches have significantly different implications depending on a country’s stage of development. Some protectionist industrial policies in developing countries could arguably fit into that category. These examples don’t necessarily invalidate Reinert’s broader point, but they do suggest that economic nationalism is not universally self-defeating. Leaving aside the question of what it means to favor multilateralism, Reinert only partially explores if and when some calibrated version of economic nationalism might be either desirable or, at the very least, not as harmful as the aspects covered in the book.

Reinert briefly engages with one counterexample, namely, infant industry protection. It is also one of the few times where he does not focus on developed economies like the U.S. or Germany but mentions the fate of Latin American or East Asian countries. In this context too, he is critical of whether tariffs have indeed contributed to a country’s development in the past and whether tariffs could actually address the underlying issues facing developing countries. At the same time, he sees some value in the adoption of tariffs for development purposes and proposes a reform of the seldomly used WTO rules on the issue. However, in contrast to his detailed discussion of, e.g., Germany’s historical development, he does not examine a single case study of a specific developing economy. While he explains that tariffs may not be the right policy tool for developing countries, he does not engage in a discussion of other potential means. An industrial development policy can make use of “direct subsidies or tax credits, public spending on research and development (R&D), or government procurement (goods and services, such as military equipment, that the government buys).”[12] The use of these policies may be inhibited by budgetary constraints faced by developing countries, but omitting that multilateral agreements like the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) constrain the utilization of such tools by developing countries seems to ignore alternative avenues for promoting development.

Finally, Reinert mentions that “participation in global value chains (GVCs), IP and trade facilitation” (p. 36) would greatly enhance countries’ development and advocates for open innovation policies that decrease techno-nationalist barriers. Also in this respect, he doesn’t weigh in on how developed and developing economies should address their distinct interests to achieve this goal.

C.    Remaining too General

This leads to the cases where Reinert’s statements appear to remain too general. For example, by his reference to heuristic substitution, Reinert moves towards a dangerous argument, i.e., that people are simply not educated enough to understand the beauty of international trade liberalization. Dani Rodrik cautions that Ricardo’s argument “is not the whole story” and that “a long list of requirements needs to be in place before we can reasonably be satisfied that free trade improves a society’s overall well-being.” Hence, “[c]ould it be that ordinary people have a better intuitive sense of the complexity of the case for free trade than we give them credit for?”[13]

Additionally, there is a lack of clear guidance on how the law should develop. For example, the use of SOEs by China to bolster its economy is a key concern. Reinert only calls for a new agreement specifically relating to SOEs without outlining any details about the envisaged regulation. It is unclear to which acts of states and their SOEs this relates. In one instance he is speaking of SOEs being captured by the term “public body” in the ASCM (p. 64). This concerns the question of financial contributions by SOEs. In another instance, he acknowledges the legitimacy of U.S. complaints regarding subsidies to SOEs (p. 70). Subsidies by and to SOEs are completely separate questions. Specifically, subsidies granted to SOEs are undoubtedly captured by the ASCM, whereas subsidies granted by SOEs are a highly contentious issue.[14] The AB adopted a very narrow definition of the term “public body,” “which allows a considerable number of SOEs to escape the application of the [ASCM].”[15] This has not only drawn criticism from the EU but is also one of the substantive reasons for the U.S. blocking the AB.[16] By not addressing these deeply rooted concerns, Reinert does not account for the political intricacies and the immense challenge the issue brings with it. He seems to conflate legal concepts and does not engage with the complexities involved but only gives a very general recommendation.

D.    Multilateralism and Climate Change – The Missing Chapter

Lastly, Reinert leaves out one of the most pressing global challenges in which abandoning a zero-sum mindset is absolutely essential: climate change. While he correctly contends that “addressing climate change must be a multilateral effort” (p. 165), this crucial observation appears only briefly in a few paragraphs in the last chapter of the book, along with concerns over food security. Given the existential nature of the climate crisis and the inherently multinational character of both its causes and consequences, this subject deserves much deeper engagement.

Climate change represents a textbook case of global-scale negative externalities and is potentially the clearest and most urgent example of the failure of zero-sum thinking. For example, carbon emissions costs are not borne only by the emitter but diffused across borders and generations.[17] Zero-sum nationalism often results in collective inaction and counterproductive policies favoring national short-term industrial interests over global long-term environmental preservation. On the very first day of his 2^nd term as U.S. President, Trump withdrew (again) from the Paris Agreement, setting a chilling effect on already threatened multilateral environmental initiatives.[18] Following the erosion of environmental cooperation at an institutional level, climate finance by private actors also declined sharply in recent years.[19]

Going back to the reflection on developing economies, multilateral or plurilateral cooperation plays a key role in resolving potential imbalances in how climate protection and industrialization affect the interests of developing and developed countries and their different capabilities and resources to secure environmental conservation. This is illustrated by the Amazon Fund, the world’s largest REED+ initiative, through which multinational companies and governments (including developed countries, e.g., Norway and Germany) contribute vast sums to forest conservation in the Brazilian Amazon region.[20] Brazil has a significant responsibility in preventing climate change due to its vast rainforest but faces structural limitations to fulfill its role. Responsible funding by multilateral agents contributes to bridging this gap and helps prevent nationalist politicians from increasing deforestation in the region and dismantling current conservation initiatives.

By not exploring more how climate change exposes the failures of zero-sum economics and nationalist logic, Reinert misses a critical opportunity to demonstrate the real-world urgency of the cooperative, multilateral paradigm he advocates for. A more comprehensive analysis of climate-related externalities would have reinforced the book’s main argument while also addressing one of the most consequential policy debates in modern times.

E.     Conclusion

In summary, while we agree with Reinert’s underlying argument that multilateral cooperation is preferable to economic nationalism – especially against the background of the historical record – it would have made for a stronger case to paint the full picture by engaging more deeply with the downsides international trade liberalization can bring with it. Additionally, by only briefly engaging with the dimension of potentially beneficial protectionist measures of developing countries, Reinert misses the opportunity to enhance the relevance and applicability of his arguments, particularly for countries still in the process of industrialization or global market integration. Another important gap worth noting is the absence of any in-depth discussion about climate change, arguably a challenge that is impossible to overcome under a zero-sum nationalist mindset. Lastly, Reinert remains remarkably general regarding the path forward. By falling short of giving guidance on how exactly to counter economic nationalism and providing a clearer vision of multilateral cooperation, he weakens his argument.

[1] William McKinley cited in: America’s Tariff Men: Connecting McKinley to Trump, NYT of 6 December 2018.

[2] Cohen, American Journal of International Law 112 (2018), 47.

[3] Schumacher, World Economic Review 2 (2013), 83 (95 et seq.).

[4] Id., 95.

[5] Chang, Bad Samaritans, 74.

[6] Rodrik, Globalization Paradox, 203.

[7] Chang, Bad Samaritans, 72.

[8] Id., 73.

[9] See: Autor/Dorn/Hanson, Gordon, American Economic Review 103 (2013), 2121.

[10] Id., 2143.

[11] Kennedy/Mazzocco, Has Trade with China Really Cost the U.S. Jobs?, HBR of 10 November 2022.

[12] Siripurapu/Berman, Is Industrial Policy Making a Comeback?, Council on Foreign Relations of 18 September 2023.

[13] Rodrik, Globalization Paradox, 62.

[14] EU, WTO Modernisation, Concept Paper of 29 June 2018, 4.

[15] Id., 4.

[16] Ahn, Global Policy 12 (S3, 2021), 61.

[17] Tol, Annual Review of Resource Economics 3 (2011), 419 (435 et seq.).

[18] US Paris Agreement Withdrawal Threatens Global Efforts to Tackle Climate Change, Human Rights Watch of 22 January 2025.

[19] How Trump’s Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement Changed Climate Politics, Time Magazine of 17 January 2025.

[20] Van der Hoff/Rajão/Leroy, Climatic Change 150 (2018), 433.

* João Felipe Achcar de Azambuja is a recent Stanford LL.M graduate and a Jean Monnet EU Law Research Fellow. He earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in law from Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Brazil.

** Paul Schiering is a recent Stanford LL.M. graduate and a doctoral researcher in WTO subsidy law and EU state aid law under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Christian Tietje at Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg.