Jamieson Greer is Trump's nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, and he will have a Senate confirmation hearing on Thursday, February 6. This is a great opportunity and honor for Jamieson, and along with it comes his own tag on the IELP blog. I hope he appreciates/tolerates this! If his predecessor Katherine Tai's experience is a good indication, this is the first post of many with that tag.
In anticipation of the confirmation hearing, I have come up with some questions for Jamieson. Any Senators participating in the hearing are welcome to adopt these questions as their own. (Given recent events, I can imagine much of the hearing will focus on the IEEPA tariff threats/tariffs related to Canada, Mexico, and China, even though it's not something USTR is responsible for.)
1. In recent years, Section 301 has become a more frequently used tool to address foreign trade barriers. Do you have any data on its track record of achieving market opening? Are there any success stories you can point to?
2. During Biden's four years in office, the U.S. government did not file any WTO complaints. Do you anticipate using the WTO dispute settlement process to address unfair trade practices by U.S. trading partners?
3. What is your view of the WTO dispute settlement reform process that is currently underway? Do you plan to make concrete proposals to help re-establish a functioning system that eliminates the problem of appeals "into the void"?
4. What is the Trump administration's position on ISDS? Will you include ISDS in any future agreements? Will you try to revise it in, or remove it from, current trade and investment agreements?
5. The Biden administration used the USMCA's Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) for labor rights enforcement extensively. How frequently do you anticipate using the RRM? Will you push for including a similar mechanism in other trade agreements?
6. What tools would you use to encourage China to become more market-oriented (in the sense of, for example, reducing its tariffs and subsidies, as well as ensuring that its SOEs behave in a commercial rather than political manner)?
7. The enforcement mechanism of the U.S.-China Phase One deal states that "The Appeal and any information and matters related to it are confidential and shall not be shared beyond the Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution Office, absent the agreement of the Parties." Will you push for public disclosure of as much information as possible regarding these appeals?
8. Is Chinese investment in the United States -- for example, a Chinese company building an EV factory -- something the Trump administration would support?
9. Many people have raised concerns about foreign digital regulations and taxes that discriminate against U.S. companies. How would you determine whether such measures are discriminatory? Would you look at the intent/purpose of the measure as part of this assessment, or solely at the impact?
10. Do you see any possibility of the Trump administration negotiating a trade agreement that involves liberalization of tariffs by both the U.S. and a trading partner?
11. If the Trump administration imposes a "global supplemental tariff," as mentioned in the America First Trade Policy memo, what would your approach be to dealing with retaliatory tariffs from U.S. trading partners?
12. In your view, would increasing the private and public savings rates in the U.S. help lower the trade deficit? If so, is increasing savings a policy you think the Trump administration should consider?
13. At the confirmation hearing for Scott Bessent, he mentioned optimal tariff theory. Do you have any views on the practical relevance of this theory? Can you point to any real world "optimal tariffs" that have affected the terms of trade to the benefit of the U.S. economy?