Like many people, I have some questions about U.S. trade policy these days. I don't know if asking them publicly like this will get U.S. trade officials to answer, but it can't hurt to try! Here are four areas where I'd like some clarity:
Dispute settlement:
Obviously the U.S. objects to the Appellate Body, but is there any form of appellate review it can live with? Would it prefer a WTO dispute settlement system with just panels and no appeals? Would the U.S. be OK with a system where appellate review was optional, and it could opt out and just use panels?
And perhaps relatedly, will IPEF have a dispute settlement chapter that makes it enforceable?
National security:
The U.S. has made clear its view that once a government invokes national security, WTO panels should not scrutinize the measure at issue for compliance with the terms of the national security exception. But what does the U.S. expect and hope for in terms of keeping abuse of this exception in check? Rely solely on good faith on the part of Members invoking national security? Affected governments should bring non-violation nullification or impairment complaints in these circumstances? At the U.S. Trade Policy Review that just took place, Ambassador María Pagán said this: "I wish to remind Members: the negotiating history of Article XXI(b) confirms the drafters intended this provision to be self-judging, and that the available remedy for such measures is a non-violation claim." That seems pretty clear, but my question then is, how does the U.S. think implementation of successful non-violation complaints should work? Is there the same rebalancing process that you would see with violation claims, or is it just good faith efforts to reach a settlement? And finally, would the U.S. consider my suggestion of automatic and immediate rebalancing after a government invokes national security?
Domestic content requirements:
The conventional wisdom is that domestic content requirements violate GATT Article III:4 and are extremely unlikely to be justified under Article XX. Does the U.S. think that some or all of these measures should be found not to violate Article III:4, or should be considered to fall within the Article XX exception? If so, what standard would be applied here to determine whether a measure is consistent with the rules or justified under an exception?
Tariff liberalizing trade agreements:
Costa Rica said recently that it wants to join the USMCA. Costa Rica-U.S. tariffs are already low under CAFTA, but they are not zero. The Biden administration has seemed skeptical of traditional trade liberalization in the form of tariff reductions, so would the Biden administration agree to Costa Rican accession and to additional tariff reductions?
