In a paper called "The Possible Worlds of Economic Sanctions" that takes a brief look at the history of economic sanctions and speculates about their future, law prof Ben Heath writes the following:
Any attempt to understand the future of economic statecraft is a bit like gazing into a kaleidoscope of fractured worlds, of possible futures bleeding and refracting into each other. In this symposium contribution, I reflect on what it might mean to think of today’s economic warriors as the makers of those future worlds. “Worldmaking” projects, in the sense used by political theorist Adom Getachew, are those which resist the “legal and material manifestations” of the existing world order, and instead posit and work toward alternative “juridical, political, and economic institutions in the international realm.” The “sanctionists” of interwar Europe and America, as Nicolas Mulder shows, certainly understood their project as remaking world order. So too, in their own ways, did the organizers, strikers, and industrial warriors of the early twentieth century’s labor movements, as well as the boycotters and economic warriors of the Chinese diaspora during the same period. By understanding sanctions and boycotts as engines for worldmaking, I want to suggest, we can access important descriptive and normative insights that otherwise would be obscured. But to look forward, sometimes it first helps to go back.
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The foregoing ... also demonstrate that thinking of sanctions as engines for worldmaking has descriptive and normative benefits. As a descriptive matter, worldmaking focuses our attention on whom sanctions empower, rather than the discrete policy goals they seek to accomplish or the values they express. This turns our attention away from specific sanctions programs to the global legal, political, and economic architecture that supports them, and that shapes and is shaped by them. In a similar way, our normative evaluation of a given sanctions program is not limited to the (still very important) question of the program will “work” and the (far less important) question of whether it expresses the “right” values. We are invited instead to ask who is empowered by the order that sanctions create, and whether a change in sanctions practice implies a positive change in the distribution of global power. In other words, worldmaking invites us to apply a “power lens” to the problem of economic sanctions.
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This redistributive vision of sanctions suggests an alternative vision of economic power that is turned to the aim of global economic justice. I cannot think of any cause more worthy of serious reflection, organization, and action. It is a world worth making.
As I understand it, Ben is not arguing that this is where the sanctions regime should go. Rather, he is looking at current trends and thinking about where it might go. I see his point about these trends, which makes me feel compelled to push back against the speculative future he is laying out. In that regard, I have several questions about the idea of sanctions as "engines for worldmaking," with a focus on when states are doing the sanctioning (as they are the main actors doing it).
- Is such a policy fundamentally unequal and unfair?
How many states have the power to do worldmaking? Not many. The U.S., the EU, China, a few others. What that means in practical terms is that sanctions are likely to be a tool of the powerful to push the less powerful around. The powerful are free to do what they want, while the less powerful may be subject to punishments for the very same behavior that more powerful governments are engaging in. Is this approach fair to the people in less powerful countries? It feels like such a system would reinforce existing inequalities, and in some ways would be a return to the world of empire. (Arguably, this is what we have now, but Ben seems to be anticipating an intensification).
- Is anyone really qualified to do worldmaking?
I think most of us have moments when it feels like our policy views are the correct ones, and if everyone just followed them, things would be so much better. The "everyone" could be just your country, but also could be the whole world. But while people in democracies do get a say in "countrymaking", perhaps "worldmaking" is too much. Do we really know enough about the rest of world to say for sure that our preferences should apply there as well? No matter how smart and genuinely good you think you are, maybe humility should lead us to avoid most activities that could be characterized as "worldmaking." There could be some exceptions, such as trying to prevent wars or egregious human rights abuses, but when it comes to most policies, perhaps it would be better to learn to live with differences or to just lead by example.
- How would other countries respond?
If some other government were trying to "worldmake" the United States, how would America respond? Negatively, I would think. So how would people in other countries respond if the U.S. or other powerful governments try to do this to them? I think that, on balance, the answer is negatively as well. Now, there may be instances where particular people in another country want the U.S. to support their cause. But I think the instinct of the majority is usually going to be to oppose this sort of foreign intervention in their domestic affairs.
- Who else would use this power in the future?
Once the power to do worldmaking has been formalized, its future use could go in many different directions. For anyone who thinks their own political views are about to become accepted by the masses and embark on a long and glorious reign, I have a disappointing spoiler for you: They are not. Your political opponents will take power at some point. And they will now have the tools you created. You may want to use U.S. power to encourage other countries to protect gay rights; your opponents may want to use that power to encourage them to protect gun rights. As a result, it's very hard to predict how such power will be used in the future.
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The skepticism I set out above does not mean I would never support government-led sanctions. However, I am wary of using them unless a significant majority of the world agrees that the behavior of a particular government or a non-state actor justifies a response.