Last year the European Union (EU) imposed countervailing duties (CVDs) against imports of glass fiber originating in Egypt. Nothing shocking so far, other than the fact that the EU measure was counteracting subsidies granted by … China. How should we think about this and similar issues?
Facts of the Case
Commission regulation 2020/870 of June 24, 2020 raised a few eyebrows, even though, as Evenett et al. (2020) have argued there is an emerging trend in this vein, and we should not be surprised that the EU has adopted this attitude once again. Still, it is not every day that a WTO member countervails FDI (foreign direct investment). Jushi China, an SOE (state-owned enterprise), provided Jushi Egypt, a subsidiary headquartered in the Suez Special Economic Zone, with funds at preferential rates. Jushi Egypt then exported glass fiber products that had benefitted from Chinese subsidies to the EU, only to see their exports countervailed through the above-mentioned regulation.
Is the EU Approach Lawful?
No dispute has been lodged so far before the WTO. But it would be hard to see how the EU could prevail in light of the unambiguous wording of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement (Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), and the legislative intent that gave rise to these provisions. Clearly, it is subsidies paid to producers operating within the territory of the subsidizing government that can be counteracted. It is quite telling that the EU authorities relied on public international law to attribute behavior to Egypt, and when doing so, they have most probably overstated their case.
The legality of the EU approach is a minor concern, we submit. There is a wider policy that is of concern, to which we will return later on.
Of course, one might legitimately wonder why the EU did not choose another path. It could have invoked for example, that it was facing a particular market situation here. This is an amorphous concept, infrequently only used (US has recently invoked it). To the extent that the EU could have shown that a particular market situation exists affecting price comparability because of the Chinese subsidies, then it might have had a legitimate shot when defending its policies. Arguably this is a sleight of hand, but so is a lot of lawyering in antidumping practice.
Another argument that could, probably, be mounted here is that China is violating MFN here. Subsidies are excluded from national treatment (III.8), but not from MFN. No one of course had anticipated extremely generous governments when the GATT was signed. To the extent that the disbursements in the present case were viewed as “rules in connection with exportation”, then they would have to be extended to all glass fiber products produced around the globe (and probably bankrupt OBOR, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative). Assuming successful complaint, MFN could prove to be the tombstone of a lot of OBOR, at the very least, of the part of OBOR that is linked to specific goods markets. And the challenged measures could not be justified under one of the exceptions to the MFN either: neither Article XXIV nor the Enabling Clause (which explicitly requires nondiscriminatory granting of benefits) would condone this measure.
Anyway, the EU seems willing to take a firmer stance on foreign subsidies, OBOR being probably the prime target, as the recently adopted White Paper on Foreign Subsidies[1] evidences. The imposition of duties against Jushi Egypt is probably a notch in a belt that European authorities are slowly putting together around the One Belt initiative.
Incidentally, Egyptians enacted a law claiming that goods produced in the Suez zone are of Egyptian origin. Without entering into legal details regarding the conformity of this initiative with WTO, in the absence of this law, the origin of fibers produced in Egypt could have been an issue as well.
But there is a Wider Policy Issue
Unlike the Antidumping Agreement, the SCM protects not only the domestic market from subsidized goods, but also export income impaired by others’ subsidies. If Foreign dumps its goods to the world, Home can protect its market only through antidumping duties. But if Foreign subsidizes its exports to the globe, Home can protect its income everywhere. That mush is true. To this effect, it can introduce a complaint and ask from Foreign to stop subsidizing or else … Else, means of course, that eventually Home will retaliate following permission to this effect. One might of course, legitimately wonder why the threat of retaliation was not perceived as credible by Foreign in the first place, but this is another story. What we care about here is the legislative gap, and not the wider WTO remedies system.
What can one do in a case like the one we discuss here under the SCM Agreement? Nothing much, and this is a paradox. Jushi China profits from increased exports by Jushi Egypt, it might thus have an incentive to subsidize them, safe in the knowledge that it runs no risk to be countervailed under the SCM Agreement.
Yes, there might be a risk that it pays antidumping duties under the Antidumping Agreement, if the claim under particular market situation succeeds. But the trigger effect there, is dumping of the final good. The argument in that case, of course, is that, because of the particular market situation, the imposition of antidumping duties will be facilitated. True. But what if Egypt had investigated Chinese imports and decided that there was no reason to impose CVDs, or if the outcome of the investigation was duties at a low level? And of course, the MFN challenge remains for now a theoretical possibility as no one has gone this way so far. All this to suggest that there is high likelihood that practices like the one discussed in this brief Note, pass the WTO legal regime by stealth. Why is that the case?
The SCM was negotiated with the economy of the late ‘80s in mind. A lot has changed since then. GVCs (global value chains) make wholly-obtained goods an illusion. The very existence of GVCs requires a different thinking about the regulation of conditions of competition in the global market. Is Jushi China, when investing in Jushi Egypt, subsidizing its own production as well? Should not corporate links matter somehow? Can the trading community continue to pretend that national frontiers suspend corporate links? The SCM Agreement needs to be rethought to account for this (different) perspective, otherwise the WTO risks seeing its policy relevance eviscerated even further.
References
Evenett, Simon J., Juhi Dion Sud, and Edwin Vermulst. 2020. The European Union’s New Move Against China: Countervailing Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Global Trade and Customs Journal, 15: 413-422.
[1]https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/overview/foreign_subsidies_white_paper.pdf