It's hard to know what to make of the reporting on who might be the next U.S. Trade Representative, which has mentioned a wide range of possible candidates, but I've seen two Politico articles describing support for Katherine Tai, the Chief Trade Counsel for the House Ways and Means Committee ("A group of ten Democratic representatives wrote to Biden’s transition team late Tuesday, urging him to nominate ... Katherine Tai"; and "Multiple members of Congress, including members of both parties in the Senate, have suggested Tai as the potential leader of USTR in conversations with the President-elect Joe Biden's transition team"). Will she get the U.S. Trade Representative position? A Deputy slot? Who knows! But as she seems to be a leading candidate, I thought it might be interesting for people to read more about her views on trade. She spoke recently about trade policy at two separate events: "Progressive Visions for Trade," at the Center for American Progress, on August 5, 2020; and Int’l Law and the 2020 Presidential Election, Engaging the Global Economy: International Law, Trade & Investment, at ASIL, September 2, 2020. Here is a transcript of some of the things she said. I bolded a few passages that I thought people might find particularly informative.
Progressive Visions for Trade Event:
U.S.-China Trade
Mara Rudman (Moderator): (30:28) I’m going to ask you to focus particularly on China-related issues given your experience and vantage point at Ways and Means in the House as well as at USTR handling China trade enforcement. How would you characterize how the United States has approached economic and security competition with China, given the very strong competitor that China is at this point, and then would you have any kind of specific commentary on the current administration's approach in that respect as well, and how should we be thinking about this going forward? It's a big and challenging topic but we'd really like to get your perspective. (31:15)
Katherine Tai: (31:15) Thank you so much Mara, and thanks to CAP for having me and allowing me to participate alongside these really wonderful colleagues. I also want to preface my remarks to say that unusually for me today, I'm not speaking for my boss Chairman Neal or Subcommittee Chairman Blumenauer, but I am really glad to have this opportunity to share thoughts and observations that I have gathered from the incredible privilege of working with our members on committee and in the caucus.
So, on your question on China, let me just start with also saying that I so appreciate that we are having this conversation. And to me, this is an important indication that we are on a good path because we are talking about what a progressive vision for trade is.
I think, with respect to China, as a part of our trade landscape, what I would say about the dynamics on U.S.-China competition, which has both economic elements and also strategic elements, which make it very challenging but also incredibly important, is that the lessons that we have had over these most recent years in trying to formulate, articulate, and advance a progressive trade agenda should also be taken into consideration in the approach to China.
And I think one of the most important lessons is to have robust political support and that is within the Congress and also with the American people in terms of what you're going to do on trade. With the China issues, one of the really special aspects of the U.S.-China trade dynamic is that traditionally, you have really broad robust bipartisan support on the issue of China and U.S.-China competition. What I would say is you know we need to apply the same progressive principles to the U.S.-China competitive aspect, which is to think hard about where the political support is, in terms of rising up to all of the different China challenges, and also to be inclusive, which I think is a key part of a progressive trade policy in our strategy. And I think that also gets at the most critical part is we have to be really smart about what we are going to do here.
So, you know, on the China issue, I think that it's not for fractured political support for taking steps. I think that there will be really robust, and we are seeing it, really robust political support for taking aggressive and bold steps with respect to how we compete with China. But what we need to do, and this will be my sort of oblique commentary on this administration's approach, is we have to be really strategic about it. We have to think about the fact that yes, we are facing very stiff competition from China, but China is not going away. And so, I think that critically a good and progressive trade policy has to have both offensive and defensive elements. And on this, I would say that in terms of what we've experienced over these most recent years with this administration, they have been very strong on confronting China, very aggressively. But I would characterize those measure as actually largely defensive. And again, you must have both defensive and offensive. But with respect to counteracting unfair trade practices and enforcing our trade rights, I see those primarily as defensive maneuvers that is to make sure that China is playing by the rules or if not playing by the rules that we are taking countermeasures.I think the offense has got to be about what we are going to do to make ourselves and our workers and our industries and our allies faster, nimbler, be able to jump higher, be able to compete stronger, and ultimately be able to defend this open democratic way of life that we have. It is about more than just economics and economic values; it is also about our political and our broader values. But there's a lot at stake, and I think that there is a lot of opportunity. There is clearly also a very very great challenge. (36:21)
Supply Chains
Mara Rudman (Moderator): (46:21) I would like your views on what is the most, what is the smartest approach for the United States now in dealing with the supply chain concerns we have and looking at that as an opportunity for domestic manufacturing. Do we need a domestic industrial policy? Have we been lacking that, for example? What's the best way to frame how we go forward on these issues. (46:47)
Katherine Tai: (48:15) I just wanted to say you know, we've obviously been in the thick of the supply chain revisitation and thinking really hard about it along with everybody else, I think, for the past several months. And I just want to say I think that the idea of the policymaker who wants to bring everything home is a bit of a straw man, and I just want to say from my vantage point of being in contact with a lot of our members in the House, there's not a single one that I have encountered on, you know, either end of the spectrum or anywhere in between who is saying “let's bring everything home.” I think it is very instinctive for them that to the extent that what we're experiencing right now is vulnerability from concentrated sourcing, unregulated, over-complicated supply chains that bringing everything home creates the same kind of vulnerability. I think, Fred, you know, the other thing that you said which is something that we have been thinking a lot about with our members and talking a lot about also is that, you know, resilience requires us also to be trading. Resilience also requires us to be versatile and to be able to pivot. You're right. You know whether it's masks or ventilators, those ended up being the key things that we didn't have enough of this time around. We know there will be another national emergency, we don't necessarily know the contours of it, but in our consultations with our friends in labor, our friends in the manufacturing community, our friends who rely on globalized supply chains, one of the things that's become very clear and very powerful to me is that it is critical for any nation, it is critical for us because I think we've lost quite a bit of this, to have a critical mass, if you will, of ongoing manufacturing activity to maintain the versatility and also the innovation ecosystem that we need to be able to pivot and to be able to respond. And Mara to your question about whether or not this is something we call a domestic industrial policy, I know that there are friends of ours who are very comfortable with that terminology and that are friends in this greater family that we live in who are very allergic to that particular terminology. I don't know what we call it. Do we just call it an industrial strategy, do we just call it strategic thinking, whatever it is, yes absolutely, I think we need to be thinking ahead. The future is everything that lies ahead of us. And you know, we need to make sure that our policies, our broader economic policies, our social policies, our safety net policies, all these things are not only working in concert but that they are working towards making sure that the beneficiaries are the American people in all of the different ways that we mean the American people. (51:27)
Biden Administration Trade Policy
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (3:22) To start with the first question about general direction, let me just say that the Trump Administration seems to have broken with the global liberal consensus of the last three decades in a variety of issues. The Administration withdrew from TPP, renegotiated NAFTA. It has adopted a challenging stance towards the WTO. It's engaged in a tariff war with China, and it is taking national security measures related to trade. So, to kick off the discussion and given this background, I'd like to start with Katherine, asking her, “what would be the overall vision and agenda for trade and investment of the Biden Administration?” What would it seek to accomplish and in what ways would it differ or continue the direction of the last four years? (4:22)
Katherine Tai: (4:26) Thank you so much, Alvaro, and thank you for having me. And it's wonderful to see Kelly Ann. We go back quite a long way and have worked together quite a bit. To your question, I think if I'm going to go to the bottom line immediately and to be very very honest, my answer is I don't know, right? Because this is a speculative exercise, but that's what makes this entire discussion I think very interesting. I think, you know, let me also start off with a disclaimer that for purposes of today's discussion, I'm speaking only for myself based on my personal views. Obviously, my personal views are informed by my day job, advising and working for the committee Democrats and the caucus on trade. But you know, let me give you my best guess in terms of what a Biden Administration would bring in terms of a vision for trade and investment. You know, as a reader of policy papers and the discussion pieces that are being populated in the general public right now, if you look at the Biden plans, I think there are a couple things that you can glean from those plans. The first one is that as you read through the plans, there's a very very clear emphasis placing a priority on the American worker, on the building up of and prosperity for individual Americans and different American communities. So, I think there's a very very clear theme in terms of an inclusive prosperity that Biden is working toward. The other thing I would note is that if you're looking at the plans that the campaign has put out, there is one on building back better. There's one on, I forget the precise title, but essentially making things in America and manufacturing, having Americans manufacture. And there's another one on supply chains. What I think is quite interesting about this is that there are trade implications in each of these plans. But you don't see a plan specifically dedicated to trade itself. And so, what that tells me as well is that the Biden Administration's posture on trade and investment policy is to approach it in a more holistic manner, so that's what I would expect. And I think that they're very promising ideas and I would love a chance for all of us to see what the Biden administration would bring on trade. (7:15)
USMCA as a Model
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (12:26) Do you see the USMCA as a new model, as a template for your trade policy and future trade agreements? And I'm particularly interested in the question of labor and investment, but feel free to add anything that you like there. But is this, can we expect that this will be or could be what a potential Biden or Trump Administration would continue? And so, let me turn again to Katherine for this question. (13:00)
Katherine Tai: (13:01) Thank you, Alvaro. I think that's a really important question and a really good focal point for talking about trade as we're looking forward to the next couple years. I would say this in terms of working on trade with the Democrats in the past three and a half years, which is perhaps unique or different from colleagues of mine who work on other policy areas. There has been in the past three and a half years a huge amount of growth and exercise that those of us who work on trade have been forced to do. And that is that the Trump Administration has a brand of being a rule-and-norm breaking, of being really in-your-face, confrontational, provocative. But on trade I think that the number one takeaway that I have from the past three and a half years is that the Trump Administration has not been 100% wrong on trade policies and push in terms of the substance that we've really had to work through and think through and that there has been opportunity for a commonality of purpose between Democrats on the hill and this administration. And I think that is actually quite unusual for the policy landscape over the past couple years. So with respect to your question on whether or not USMCA serves as a model or as a template, the one thing I wanted to do is just say, I think I like your framing as a model better than as a template. I think that in the past in U.S. trade policy we have gotten very used to this idea of doing our free trade agreements by template. And over time, one of the problems that we have encountered is that with respect to these trade agreements and trade partnerships, one size does not fit all. And I think that in this moment where we have approved and entered USMCA into force and there are two currently ongoing trade negotiations, what you see is, how do you adapt what was accomplished in USMCA to new agreements that are being formed: one in discussions with the United Kingdom one in discussions with Kenya, two very very different countries, two very different economies with different contexts and with different opportunities presented? So that's a long way of saying, not as much as a model but as an important block or foundation to build off of. And to your point about the really high levels of bipartisan, bicameral support for USMCA, for me, I think the biggest lesson from this exercise is that our trade policies and the trends in globalization over the past couple decades have hit or, let me put it this way, have come to a crossroads where there are serious questions being asked about the wisdom of the policies, whether these policies still serve the public interest. And what is most critical in my mind about USMCA is that it was the first attempt to revisit or reimagine how our trade policies, how our globalization policies can be modified and meet with more robust support, not just with the Congress, but the Congress as a proxy with the American people. So, I think you know it's not a one size fits all: you can't just take this and go stamp it in the UK and Kenya. But I think that you know, the right lesson to take from it is that our policies deserve a revisitation and some new ideas. And I don't know that all of the new ideas are going to work, but we really do need to try them. (17:18)
ISDS
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (19:50) I just wanted to follow up on the USMCA question to get a little bit more focus in the details, and particularly on the investment front. So, the Trump Administration's position has been that the investor-state dispute settlement system is encouraging outsourcing that, you know, American companies go abroad and this serves as a kind of insurance for them, if something goes wrong. And there's a lot of emphasis in trying to keep production in the United States, right? So, there's this link between what the U.S. policy has been up to now in terms of promoting the bilateral investment treaties or investment chapters in trade agreements and this retreat in some ways. USMCA shows it by first having no ISDS with Canada and then having a reduced form of investor rights with Mexico, right? Do you think that, so maybe this is a question for Katherine first, but do you think that the Biden administration would continue with that policy? ... (21:11)
Katherine Tai: (21:17) So, is a really neat question and thanks for letting me have a first go at it. I will let Kelly Ann fill in the details in terms of the Trump Administration's vision. Before I go there, I do have a follow-up on Kelly Ann's references to the accomplishment of USMCA by the President and Ambassador Lighthizer. I think that from our perspective it was very much a joint effort, and this is a baby you know that was created with bipartisan effort. And you know, all credit to Ambassador Lighthizer for having the credibility with Democrats in particular in the House to have the trust to make something like that happen. But certainly, there's a lot of ownership about that from our side too. Alvaro, to your question on investment and what we might see from a different administration and the Biden Administration in the future, I guess a couple things. Now you've taken us the starting point the revisitation of ISDS in USMCA. I might take it back a couple years further, back to TPP times and when there was an active TTIP negotiation going on. ISDS has been red-hot in some places radioactive for quite a while now. I think there was a real moment when John Oliver dedicated most of an episode to the topic of ISDS when I thought, “wow, trade policy has really arrived.” Now that's before the Trump Administration. I feel more relevant now than I certainly did in earlier phases of my career. But you know, if you recall during the negotiation of TTIP, there were massive demonstrations in Berlin, I believe it was, where hundreds of thousands of people I think came out. I think that should create, that should be a reason for us to pause, and you know the policy lessons we take away from it, I think will be important. I think it is worth looking at the logic that has driven how ISDS has landed in USMCA. Again, I'll let Kelly Ann speak to that, but I may have additional thoughts to add. But let me take a slightly different tack, which is if you look at critiques of world trade rules and the rules in our FTAs. The FTAs and BITs are really where ISDS has come into play. There has been an increasing discomfort with the outcomes from this liberalization and globalization program, which is to look at the balance between the interested stakeholders in our economies and the sense that, you know, the trade agreements that we have are between governments but beneficiaries and cost bearers are outside of those governments, right? And you have workers who are an important piece of that puzzle, you have firms who are an important piece of that puzzle. I would argue that the environment is a piece of that puzzle as well. But if we look at firms in particular, there is a sense that multinational corporations have done very very well under the current program. And that's fine, except that I think the increasing discomfort is that the multinational corporations have done so well and others have done not so well. In fact, there are others who have done and maybe even harmed by the programs. ISDS is an interesting element of the modern free trade agreement that we've seen in that not only in ISDS are firms not on this side of being held accountable, they are in a part of the agreement where firms are given extra private rights of action that no one else has. And so, you know, I think that with respect to ISDS there are other ways of looking at it. There are other ways of trying to understand the discomfort around ISDS that are going to be very very important to thinking about how these investor rights, you know, play out in new agreements and how we think about investor and firm responsibilities as well. (26:14)
WTO
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (34:24) What would be a position of the potential Biden Administration on multilateralism, particularly, how do you approach the WTO? (34:30)
Katherine Tai: (34:32) I mean, I think you know, I want to revisit something I said a little bit earlier in terms of Democrats have found common ground with this administration on trade. What I would also say is that I don't think that there's many Democrats, I haven't met a single Democrat but that's not to say that there might not be some out there, who would have done things in the same way that the Trump Administration has. That said, with respect to the WTO, and this is the point that I want to make, if you look at the substance of the concerns and issues that this administration has been raising in Geneva and here at home, I think that you find very little difference in the substance from the kinds of concerns and interests that previous administrations from both parties have made. And so, this is one of those issues where I really, as I said, it hasn't been a partisan issue, and I really hope that it doesn't become a partisan issue. The WTO is a great idea. It has done really important things and I would argue that the WTO has been very effective in accomplishing a number of things. I would say that it is now 25 years old, and to Kelly Ann's point, the world is quite different now than it was 25 years ago. We just went through this whole exercise with USMCA where, you know, there were supporters of the renegotiation of NAFTA because of just the passage of time and the need for modernization. But there also was importantly an element of revisitation and a course correction in the spirit of being a little bit provocative for purposes of this audience, you know, I would posit that NAFTA and the WTO agreements are from the same era of our economic history, our global economic history. And you know, in addition to digitalization of our economy, of changes in technology, and the way that we communicate with each other in the way that we transact commerce, the one incredibly important development has been the economic growth and rise of China in the global economy. And that too so far has not been a partisan issue. 2020 is really giving everybody a run for the money in terms of dynamics around China and China trade. But this is an issue where I really hope that it doesn't become partisan because it really is so important, not just for the United States but for our global economic community in terms of dealing with the ways in which the WTO has disappointed expectations, or the ways in which the WTO has not been effective over the course of the past 25 years. (37:44)
U.S.-China Trade
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (45:29) The next question I'd like to raise here is the central one of the U.S.-China trade relationship. And so, what would be the goal of a potential Biden administration regarding this this relationship and how would it seek to accomplish it? (45:50)
Katherine Tai: (45:59) I think this is not a controversial statement that China's growth and development in recent decades has presented new challenges, a new dynamic around the world that we are all orienting to. You know, I think that given our experience that Kelly Ann referenced at the WTO with China and overall in terms of thinking through, for instance, the debate and discussion in Congress when China PNTR came up in 2000 and 2001 normalizing permanently relations with China as part of China's accession to the WTO, I think that there was a lot of hope and expectation that the reforms that the Chinese leadership at the time were willing to undertake was a signal that China would not only be joining the WTO but would over time also become part of the community of the norms, the economic norms, and maybe even, and hopefully even the political norms that a lot of the WTO membership had in common. What we've seen over the course of the past 25 or years in the WTO and China's actually been a member for just shy of 20 years is different from what people had expected. Now has China experienced enormous economic development and growth? Yes. But what has been the implications of that growth, and what are the impacts on our economic system and our growth? That I think runs into a lot of disappointment of expectations that our members of Congress for instance had 20 years ago. There were obviously a lot of naysayers at the time who would tell you now, that folks were naive to expect something different from China. But I think what I would say about where we are with China now and where we have to go next is, we do have to recognize with very clear eyes the nature of the China challenge. And to the extent that China poses risk and threat to the way that we operate, to the way that we compete, to the way that, you know, our ideals, in terms of the way we live our lives and the way we operate our society and our economy, those are things that we need to be very very attentive to. What I would say in terms of what a Biden administration will hopefully do is come in and really crystallize the questions that we are asking which is “what is the nature of the Chinese challenge and the threat?” And then, have that lead us to conversation around what are the measures then that need to be taken to manage the risk and the threat. I think that without that clear process in place part of what makes me nervous about the China dynamics that we're experiencing in 2020 is that reactions become highly emotional, highly political, and risk becoming either ineffective at addressing the risk or threat which is bad but even worse the threat is that the actions and the measures that we take are not just ineffective but are actually actively harmful to the goals that we have. So that's one piece of it which is to ask the right questions that will lead to the right kinds of measures. The second piece I would say is build a partnership with Congress. Again, this should not be a partisan issue, and in the past, it has not been a partisan issue. And the third piece is that then, you know, take effective action. Do what you need to defend against anti-competitive practices, but then also do what you need to both here and with others who should share your interests to take the active affirmative measures to make yourself stronger to withstand the competition. (50:57)
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (50:58) Thank you so if you don't mind let me press you a little bit to try to see if there is, if you see there is a difference. So, I really like the way you lay out the different steps that administration would need to follow to engage with China. So, in the case of the Trump Administration it's done its diagnosis it's decided that China represents a threat, that it's a threat for the model of the Chinese economy in several respects in the way it translates to trade competition, it's affecting certain U.S. industries, and so it's taken effective action in the way of raising tariffs, for example, or using mechanisms to try to block those imports. Is that something that you think a Biden Administration would continue or would it do it in a different way because its diagnosis is perhaps different and the kind of instruments or tools that you'd like to use would also differ. (52:03)
Katherine Tai: (52:04) I think I would like to make this observation which is we have in the past in the U.S. had a tendency to conduct our trade policy in a silo that trade policies have been disconnected from other policies. Now not entirely disconnected I know that there have been critiques that our trade policies have been driven too much by foreign policy considerations. The origin story for USTR, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, is that it was taken out of the State Department to ensure that trade policy would be driven more by economic interests and less be an appendage of the foreign policy establishment. So, I will acknowledge that. But I think that one of the things that we've seen, and this is with respect to China and also I think more across the board as well in the past three and a half years of the Trump Administration, is that this administration came into power with a very very strong mandate that it perceived that it had on trade. And that mandate primarily was to rebalance trade relationships. You see that play out with respect to China and with respect to Mexico and NAFTA. That's just my observation. But one of the things that we've seen is that in taking measures to rebalance those relationships this administration has continued this kind of siloed approach in activating trade tools only to address or correct for these imbalances and these dynamics and trade that have been criticized over time. I think that my concern is that, and my hope is that, in the next administration, what you have is a much better coordinated policy between trade and international economic policies and domestic economic policies. Now, that doesn't mean that you just take the template of, you know, sort of the past trade trajectory and then, you know, hook it into other things. I think it means that you have to take a holistic view to what you're trying to accomplish and the trade doesn't exist in its own silo. So bringing it back to your question on China, what I would say is this administration has effectively built a wall, a tariff wall, in the name of China trade enforcement. That's a fact, right? And you know, whether it's a term two for the Trump Administration or you know, a new Biden Administration, the next couple years are going to have to deal with the landscape that has been created over this time. I think that my main point is that if we perceive that there are national security concerns in the way that we relate to China economically, if we perceive that there are competitive concerns, if there are concerns with respect to our ability to maintain our leadership in the innovation economy, if there are concerns around what happens to U.S. user data, that all of this needs to be taken together but put through a very rigorous intellectual process, so that what we are doing makes sense. Because I think that what is at stake and this goes to the title for this discussion is what is at stake is the ability of the U.S. to maintain its leadership position in the global economy. And that leadership position has to be earned, and that, you know, I think what will be critical is to harness what I know is a very deep bench and what I hope will be a bipartisan bench in bringing really strategic thought to how we manage our relationship and our competition with China. (56:30)
Katherine Tai: (60:28) I'll just do one follow-up, and it's unfair of me because I know it's an area where Kelly Ann can't go. But you know I think that there is a tremendous amount of energy and policy energy around the U.S.-China relationship right now. I think a really critical piece to this, and I feel I have more confidence in the Biden Administration than what might happen in a continued Trump Administration, which is that I really do think it is important for this China policy to be driven by policy and to be driven by U.S. national interests rather than by politics. And this is where I'm going to take my advantage because I know Kelly Ann can't go here, I would say this. I don't exclude the possibility that there are national security implications and concerns with respect to TikTok and WeChat, but I feel quite confident that if what we are trying to deal with are national security implications of our trade relationship with China, that those would not be the number one and number two executive orders that we would start with in addressing that relationship and addressing that risk. So that goes back to my initial point about trying to keep the bipartisanship around the approach to China and really focusing on the strategy short, medium and long term. (61:52)
Domestic Policies
Moderator Alvaro Santos: (64:57) What would be an agenda that could really be linking this trade policy to domestic change in the U.S.? (65:11)
Katherine Tai: (65:13) Thank you, Alvaro. That's another critical question. I actually have a lot of hope here for the Biden Administration. I would say, in looking at the plans, I really like the build-back-better plan. And part of the reason is it takes into account the economic dysfunction and the economic recession really that we're in right now. It takes into account that Covid-19 is having an impact on our economy and that there will need to be a rebuild from what happens. I think that the landscape is quite complicated. We don't know what it will look like I know people have talked about a V-shaped recovery, path to recovery U-shaped, a K-shaped. I still can't quite visualize how the K-shape makes sense, but I do understand what the point is in terms of the K-shaped recovery. But I think you're right, and I guess once again I'd like to come back to theme of not thinking about trade in a silo. I think that not only for the United States, but I think for the world economy, right, there's going to need to be a rebuild from a very serious public health crisis that we've been in that has had very serious economic implications. And I think that this presents an opportunity and I think that you do hear this very clearly from a Biden Administration which is what you do is that you need to build back, but you need to build back better. And that there is a real focus on workers, on empowering workers, on workers and inclusive prosperity through this program. And what I would say also is in my own thinking about this is to go back again about 12 years to the start of the Obama Administration where the U.S. economy and the global economy similarly had gone through a quite traumatic period and there was a need to build back. And I think that what was quite successful in the years that followed was a resumption of prosperity that GDP levels that you know, these economic metrics recovered and that you had further growth. But, and I think that this is a really important issue that explains quite a bit of what we've been through since then, the prosperity that was created in the build back was concentrated in parts of our economy and that there were significant parts of our economy including regular people, people mid-career, people at the start of their career, at the ends of their career, who over the course of that build back didn't ever feel like they re-achieved the levels of prosperity or the hopes that they had prior to that crisis. And so to your point, and this is taking a slightly bigger picture view beyond trade and trade adjustment assistance, I think that it is going to be critical and I feel very confident that this is the focus of the Biden campaign's thinking, based on what I'm reading from the campaign that it is going to be and require a whole, holistic policy approach to building back and that trade has a job in all of this but that the other policy areas economic policies need to be seriously revamped and built out in order to accomplish what needs to be accomplished. (69:06)
