Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp are working on a book about "narratives" in international economic law, and Nicolas has written about this on his own already, so I've been thinking a bit about the role and value of narratives. Generally speaking, I'm suspicious of them, because they often end up being catchy slogans that do not fully capture the nuances of the debate. At the same time, I recognize the reality that catchy slogans are a good way to get people to pay attention to what you are saying, so perhaps I better come up with some of my own! Even before all this talk of narratives, there were certain terms that I tried to play up (e.g. "protectionism") and others I tried to cast aside ("market access"). I did this because I felt that some terms were clearer than others and could better focus everyone on the issues being debated.
However, there are some terms, and resulting narratives, that are misleading and I wish people would stop using them because they make important policy debates less productive. Dani Rodrik used a couple of them in a recent op-ed:
The relationship between markets and the state will be rebalanced, in favor of the latter. This will be accompanied by a rebalancing between hyper-globalization and national autonomy, also in favor of the latter.
...
The neoliberal market fundamentalist consensus has been in retreat for some time now.
First up, let me talk about "hyper-globalization." I'm not sure what the relationship of the market and the state will be going forward (although if I had to guess I would say it will be roughly the same as it is today, with some fluctuations back and forth), but I am fairly confident that there is nothing "hyper" about today's globalization as it relates to international trade agreements and national autonomy. If you look at the various multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements that are out there, the vast majority promote only modest economic integration and leave nations with their autonomy intact. Tariffs have come down, but they are still permitted, and special trade remedy tariffs can and are used regularly by most major trading countries. There are rules on regulatory trade barriers, but there are also exceptions, and only a tiny percentage of national regulations are actually challenged under trade agreements. And services trade has seen only a small amount of liberalization. On top of that, the enforcement mechanisms in these agreements are pretty flexible.
Summing up: Globalization through international trade agreements is far from "hyper," and "national autonomy" is safe. That doesn't mean the current crop of trade agreements is perfect, and I have plenty of objections to specific aspects (many of the IP provisions for a start!). But the narrative of "hyper-globalization" is just plain wrong. It may be a catchy slogan, but we should strive for more nuance here.
Second, there is the alleged "neoliberal market fundamentalist consensus." In general, I have been surprised in recent years at how the term "neoliberal" is thrown around as a general insult towards people who support some degree of markets, and I've been intrigued by people who want to reclaim it and turn it into a positive. (To make it great again, you might say.) I'm not sure this is worth the effort either side is putting into it, but it is interesting to watch.
Then there is "market fundamentalist," which implies that the people in question are not using reason but rather are slavishly attached to markets for the sake of markets. I don't think I've ever come across anyone with this view, but I see why the people who use it think it's a good stereotype to play up as an insult. It reminds me of conservatives who call Obama or the Clintons "socialists." It's a silly exaggeration, but a little hyperbole can be emotionally satisfying. (Amusingly, some of the market skeptics also call Obama and the Clintons "neoliberals"! Can you be a "neoliberal socialist"?)
But putting that aside for a moment, what surprises me even more is the idea that there was a "neoliberal market fundamentalist consensus." Does anyone actually believe that there was a period in recent history where "market fundamentalism" had a consensus behind it? Let's just stipulate that we have had periods of privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and reductions in the social safety net. But in all those periods, the state's role in the economy remained significant. We are so far from laissez-faire that I don't see how anyone can proclaim a "market fundamentalist consensus" with a straight face. When you look at major institutions such as the U.S. government, the World Bank, or the IMF, what percentage of the people there could credibly be called "market fundamentalists"? 1% at most I would think, and probably far less. Just about everyone in the establishment wants a mix of the state and markets, with plenty of the state thrown in there.
I understand that people want to use catchy slogans to support their narrative. But some of these attempts seem completely over the top. We all want to bring attention to our ideas, but we should try to keep the sloganeering within reason.
