This is a guest post from Anna Marhold, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Public Law and the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies at Leiden University, based on her article, "Externalising Europe’s energy policy in EU Free Trade Agreements: A cognitive dissonance between promoting sustainable development and ensuring security of supply?" recently published in, Europe and the World: A Law Review (UCL Press), as part of the Special Issue on Economic and Non-Economic Values and Objectives in the EU’s International Trade.
It is no secret that while the European Union (EU) has taken up commitments to combat climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement and its own 2020 and 2030 climate and clean energy package strategies, the Union continues to be heavily dependent on the import of fossil fuels from abroad. One may even say that this leads to a cognitive dissonance (i.e. the discomfort which ensues if one holds two contradictory values) with respect to the externalisation of the Union’s energy and sustainable development policy:
On the one hand, the EU aims to become a global frontrunner in the field of promoting renewable energy and sustainable development. This expresses itself through the inclusion of specific chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development in the EU’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (standard since the 2011 EU-South Korea FTA). On the other hand, the EU realises that it is imperative to secure the Union’s security of energy supply, which is still largely guaranteed by fossil fuels. Therefore, the Union in parallel attempts to eliminate discriminatory practices in international fossil fuel trade in its bilateral agreements (e.g. in the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA)). Beyond that, the EU even goes as far as aspiring to include provisions that legally secure access to fossil fuel energy sources (mainly natural gas) in its FTAs with third countries (e.g. in the currently dormant, but nevertheless controversial EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations).
It is therefore safe to say that the behaviour of the Union is, at a minimum, contradictory in attempting to reconcile these objectives. On the one hand, the EU is promoting sustainable development in its relations with third countries. On the other, it continues to be heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, therefore actively attempting to secure the supply of polluting fossil fuels in its external relations. While the Union’s current reliance on energy from imported fossil fuels is understandable from the viewpoint of short(er)-term energy security, it should strive to move away from them in the long run if it wants to ‘practise what it preaches’ in terms of sustainable development abroad.
The shared competences in the field of energy (Article 194 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU)) and the environment (Article 191 TFEU) pose additional challenges in forming a coherent external strategy in this area. The result is that the EU must constantly walk on a tightrope in two directions as regards its external energy policy: not only does it have to balance between promoting decarbonisation and securing its energy supply, it also has to ensure that the internal relationship between the Union and its Member States in this area is reflected adequately in its relations with third countries.
It should be pointed out that the objectives of sustainable development and security of supply are not contradictory per se. However, clearer delineations or coordination between the two objectives would favour EU external relations in general, and the EU’s FTAs more specifically. Moreover, Member States and the Union would themselves benefit from more uniformity and coordination in this area, as would the EU institutions tasked with developing energy, sustainable development and environmental policy.
