China's appeal in the U.S. - AD/CVD on Chinese Products (DS379) dispute is here: http://www.worldtradelaw.net/na/ds379-6(na).pdf Some key issues in the appeal:
Double Remedies
This is the one I blogged about here. (In the comments on that post, I mentioned I would have further thoughts on the issue. They are in our Dispute Settlement Commentary for the case). Here's China's appeal on this point (footnotes omitted):
9. China seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel's conclusion that, in respect of the imposition of countervailing duties, the covered agreements do not require the United States to take into account the extent to which it simultaneously offsets the same subsidies through the manner in which it calculates anti-dumping duties under its non-market economy (NME) methodology. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation include:
(a) The Panel erred in finding that Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement do not require the United States to take into account the extent to which the use of its NME methodology in a parallel anti-dumping investigation affects the existence and amount of the subsidy that remains attributable to the imported product under investigation.
(b) The Panel erred in finding that Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement does not require the United States to take into account the extent to which the use of its NME methodology in a parallel anti-dumping investigation affects the appropriate amount of the countervailing duty to be levied.
(c) The Panel erred in finding that Article 10 of the SCM Agreement does not require the United States to take all necessary steps to ensure that it does not offset the same subsidies twice through the imposition of two different duties, and in finding that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 10 in imposing the challenged countervailing duty measures.
(d) The Panel erred in finding that the United States did not act inconsistently with Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement in imposing the challenged countervailing duty measures.
(e) The Panel erred in finding that it was China's obligation to "conclusively establish[]" that the USDOC offset the same subsidies twice in the investigations at issue.
Benchmarks in countries with market distortions
This is the issue Julia blogged about here. Here are some of China's points of appeal (footnotes omitted):
7. China seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel's interpretation and application of Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement as it relates to the USDOC's rejection of in-country private prices for hot-rolled steel as a benchmark in the CWP and LWR investigations. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation include:
(a) The Panel erred in interpreting Article 14(d) to permit the rejection of in-country private prices as a benchmark where the only evidence relied upon by the investigating authority is that the government is a predominant supplier of the good in question.
(b) The Panel erred in interpreting Article 14(d) to permit investigating authorities to reject private prices as a benchmark based exclusively on evidence relating to government market share, so long as the investigating authority "consider[s] … arguments and evidence" relating to factors other than government market share.
(c) The Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by appearing to attribute to the USDOC a rationale for its rejection of private prices that differs from the rationale that appears in the USDOC's published determinations.
8. China seeks review by the Appellate Body of the Panel's interpretation and application of Article 14(b) of the SCM Agreement as it relates to the USDOC's selection of loan benchmarks in the OTR, LWS, and CWP investigations. The Panel's errors of law and legal interpretation include:
(a) The Panel erred in finding that the benchmark used by the USDOC was "a comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market" within the meaning of Article 14(b).
(b) The Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by failing to assess the conformity of the benchmark used by the USDOC with the legal requirements of Article 14(b). To the extent that the Panel's findings and conclusions in respect of the USDOC loan benchmark were based on its assessment of the facts, that assessment was not objective as required by Article 11 of the DSU.
(c) The Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article 14(b) in finding that observed interest rates for loans denominated in a particular currency can be rejected as a "distorted" benchmark, and in finding that the USDOC had a legal basis to reject observed RMB interest rates as a loan benchmark.
