I was thinking of posting something on the recent U.S. Court of International Trade decision in the GPX case, which deals with the issue of concurrent AD/CVD cases related to non-market economies, and problems that arise with double counting the remedy. I couldn't quite face trying to put something coherent together on this complex issue, though. Luckily, Scott Lincicome has taken the time. Check out his post here: http://lincicome.blogspot.com/2010/08/china-cvd-mess-just-keeps-getting.html
I do have a question about the following sentence in the CIT decision:
Thus, any resulting NME AD margin in theory also captures the competitive advantage that subsidies may provide because the constructed NV is subsidy-free, and presumably higher than a subsidized NV, while the U.S. price presumably reflects in some way the price-lowering benefits of the subsidies.
If the U.S. price reflects the price-lowering benefits of subsidies, what does this say about concurrent AD/CVD measures in general?
