A guest post from blog reader Perry Bechky:
Where does the trade language in the two G20 summit declarations fall on the famous soft-to-hard spectrum in international law?
The November declaration says, “[W]ithin the next twelve months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.” (para. 13, emphasis added). The April declaration describes this sentence as a “commitment,” which the G20 leaders “reaffirm” and add to as follows:
• “we will rectify promptly any such measures,”
• “we extend this pledge to the end of 2010,” and
• “we will promptly notify the WTO of any such measures….” (para. 22).
This “commitment” seems deliberately “less soft” than other trade-related language in the declarations (which may also evince a range of “softness”), such as:
• “we recognize,”
• “we underscore,”
• “we shall strive,”
• “we instruct our Trade Ministers to achieve this objective and stand ready to assist directly, as necessary,”
• “we also agree … that each [country] must make the positive contributions necessary to achieve such an outcome,”
• “we will not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras,”
• “we will minimize any negative impact on trade and investment of our domestic policy actions,”
• “we will take … whatever steps we can to promote and facilitate trade and investment,”
• “we remain committed to reaching an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Development Round,” and
• “we will give renewed focus and political attention to this critical issue … and will use our continuing work and all international meetings that are relevant to drive progress.” (November Declaration, paras. 12-13; April Declaration, paras. 22-24).
Finally, it seems that the G20 leaders must regard the following language as pretty soft (and/or subject to a narrow definition of “necessary”): “We have today therefore pledged to do whatever is necessary to … promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity.” (April Declaration, para. 4).
So, what does this “commitment” amount to? Apparently, it is already subject to a TPRM-like compliance review by the WTO and the World Bank. (See Inside US Trade, 3 Apr. 2009). Should we expect to see efforts by the G20 to bring other WTO Members into it? Further efforts to expand its scope or duration? Diplomatic or other pressures to enforce it? A consultative or other mechanism to interpret it and resolve disputes about it? Is there any evidence that such pressures have started already in international discourse – perhaps, for example, in the escalation since November of the longstanding U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute – or in domestic political consideration of existing or proposed measures arguably in tension with this “commitment”?
