Some nuggets from a recent Economist article, followed by my brief comments.
The effectiveness of trade rules on non-tariff issues:
Multilateral agreements provide little insurance against domestic subsidies, fiercer use of anti-dumping or the other forms of creeping protection.
I'm not sure I agree with this one. Perhaps the agreements do not provide "total insurance," but I do think they provide more than "little insurance."
Creative protectionism that has been used in recent months:
Indonesia has specified that certain categories of goods, such as clothes, shoes and toys, may be imported through only five ports. Argentina has imposed discretionary licensing requirements on car parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes and leather goods; licences for all these used to be granted automatically. Some countries have imposed outright import bans, often justified by a tightening of safety rules or by environmental concerns. For example, China has stopped imports of a wide range of European food and drink, including Irish pork, Italian brandy and Spanish dairy products. The Indian government has banned Chinese toys.
This is the first I've heard of the Indonesian port issue. I'm curious to hear more about it because the legal issues should be quite interesting.
The problem of challenging subsidies:
However, WTO action against subsidies is not straightforward. To complain successfully, a country has to show that a subsidy meets several criteria. Then there is a pots-and-kettles problem: having subsidies of your own does not stop you from challenging someone else’s, but if you pick a fight they may have a go at yours. This uncertainty and ambiguity only adds to subsidies’ attraction. Governments can aid their carmakers and at the same time criticise others for their protectionist ways.
Very well-stated, I think.
Proposals for next steps in trade negotiations:
Whatever they think about Doha or about the idea of a crisis round, most economists will agree that a simple promise to resist protectionism will not suffice. Some thing more specific is needed. A good start would be for governments, beginning with the leaders of the G20, to draw up a comprehensive list of protectionist measures that goes beyond tariffs and export subsidies. They could then agree to go no further with these than they have already.
Next, an agreement on co-ordinating fiscal policy would go a long way towards making such a standstill commitment credible, because it would alleviate worries about leakages abroad. Finally, empowering the WTO to name those who break the standstill would help to underpin it. The threat of embarrassment may make some countries think twice.
With regard to the "comprehensive list," I think that many such measures will be in violation of WTO rules, which are quite broad. And when you include the non-violation remedy, perhaps virtually all of these are covered.