International Economic Law and Policy Blog

Notes from the Jamieson Greer Hearing

Jamieson Greer had his Senate nomination hearing yesterday. Here are a few exchanges that I found to be of interest.

Historical Examples of Successful Universal Tariffs

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) asked a great question about the historical record of universal tariffs, which is something that Trump has talked about:

Wyden: I thought I'd start by asking you, can you give us an example ... in the country's history, where there were universal tariff hikes and where somehow the country benefited? Where are the examples that you cite for this Trump approach in American history?

Greer: Senator Wyden, thank you for that question, and I think it's indeed instructive to think about our history with respect to trade policy. As many on this committee likely realize, until about 1913 the United States government was entirely funded, almost entirely funded, from tariff revenues, including during the latter part of the 19th century, when America truly was exploding as an international industrial powerhouse and we had a relatively high tariff rate. At the same time, we saw countries like the United Kingdom lowering their tariff rates and actually falling out of industrial competitiveness. I would say also, you have instances in the past where we have seen what happens when the reverse happens. For example, when we gave China permanent market access to the United States ...

Wyden: What I'm asking about is an example for the idea that the President has made number one on the trade policy list: a universal tariff. I like a tool box. I'm prepared to put a tariff in there, and there are instances where it's valuable. But I'd like to see some kind of lode star here that shows us why we ought to go in the direction the president's going, because I haven't seen one.

Greer: Certainly. Well, when you look at the trade policy memo that the Administration released, they have a part about fair and balanced trade, and a part of that, they discuss what you've mentioned, Senator, which is the possibility of a universal tariff, and it's talked about in the context of our trade deficit, which is over a trillion dollars. And part of the question is, how large of a trade deficit do we want? Because the trade deficit represents in large part manufacturing jobs that have gone overseas and other things like that. And a universal tariff is something that should be studied and considered to see if it can't reverse the direction of that deficit and the offshoring that I don't ...

Wyden: I'll hold the record open. I've asked three times for an example of where there was history that the President's approach, the across the board tariff approach, rather than the targeted one, made sense. We'll keep the record open. Let the record note that I asked it three times and there were no examples.

It will be interesting to see if Greer comes back with anything on this as part of the questions for the record.

I will also note here that additional U.S. tariffs aren't likely to deal with the trade deficit (which Greer brought up), if you consider that to be a problem. If the deficit is a real concern, the Trump administration should look at the macroeconomic causes.

WTO Dispute Settlement vs. Section 301

Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) brought up the issue of using WTO dispute settlement for market access:

Cassidy: You have ... expressed skepticism about the need for binding dispute mechanisms at the WTO. But my rice producers and others have won decisions at the WTO on commitments by other countries on agricultural subsidies, and yet they're not enforced. And so are my agricultural people out in the cold? There are disputes that they win, but they now don't even have a dispute, and if they get the dispute it's not enforced. Help my rice producer, how are they going to handle it.

Greer: Senator, I think you're exactly right, and that's part of the reason why I show skepticism sometimes about the WTO, because we win a case, we get a result, and then it's not fixed, or it's fixed on the surface ...

Cassidy: There's two different issues, though. One, you got to win the case, and then you got to enforce it. But the first step is winning the case, and that I said, there's been some progress in. It's a lack of enforcement, which is critical. But that doesn't necessarily throw out winning the case, if you follow what I'm saying.

Greer: Certainly. I mean, listen, if you're trying to get rid of a trade barrier, there are a few ways to do it, right.  You can try to negotiate it, which is, on its face, not always successful if you don't have the leverage behind it. If you have a case, you have some legitimate authority to go to them and say to change it. We also have domestic laws like Section 301 and others that can identify and detect unfair trading practices.

Cassidy: Now those are, 301 and all those are kind of like economic necessity. Are you saying that we would use other mechanisms, abandon, if you will, WTO IDR, to use a bunch of abbreviations, and rely upon existing laws domestically to provide a tariff relief?

Greer: So I think we need to use any tools we have available to get relief so we can have the market access ..

Cassidy: The question is, why would we be tossing a tool out? If we want any tool, but we're tossing out the tool, the IDR, even if there's been faulty commitment, it seems to me like we're taking a tool, and we're getting rid of it, when we just said we want every, any tool that we can. 

Greer: Senator, I think, part of the problem we've had with with the WTO, and this has been, you know, bipartisan, I've seen letters from the chairman and the ranking member talking about how we need to make sure that the WTO doesn't undermine our trade rights and our trade laws. Listen, if we can use the WTO effectively to negotiate rules or to get a good panel result, that's fine, but we need to, to your point, we have to have enforcement. And at the end of the day, what that means is USTR has to go to the country and enforce the law, and sometimes that means imposing tariffs on them. We say trade enforcement, that means tariffs.

I'm glad Cassidy raised this, although I'm not sure the conversation got at the points I was hoping would be discussed. (And I wasn't sure what he meant by "IDR" -- if I even heard that right. Maybe International Dispute Resolution?)

On the substance, a key issue here is this: How effective is WTO dispute settlement for the U.S. in opening foreign markets, as compared to the use of Section 301 as an independent tool? This is a difficult thing to quantify, but my impression is that WTO dispute settlement is somewhat effective in many if not most cases, whereas Section 301 on its own is not very effective at all (using Section 301 to enforce adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings is something different). However, my impression is also that Greer and the Trump administration disagree with that view, and plan to use Section 301 on its own a lot more. As a result, in four years we should have some new data to analyze for this comparison.

Digital Trade and Discrimination against U.S. Companies

Several Republican Senators brought up concerns with foreign digital taxes and regulations, and Greer shared their concerns, so I think the rest of the world better get ready for a U.S. offensive here. Here were the exchanges:

Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID):

Crapo: Let's move to digital trade. We lost ground during the last administration because we turned our back on digital trade rules, including promoting data flows, combating forced technology transfer and promoting non-discrimination. A number of jurisdictions, including the European Union and South Korea, utilized that opportunity to advance measures that target US technology companies with special requirements or taxes while exempting their domestic companies or even Chinese companies. Do you agree that ensuring US technological leadership means that we need to confront these types of measures?

Greer: Yes, Chairman, I strongly believe that we need to do that again. This is an area where the United States is very competitive, and I understand that ... we are having a domestic conversation about how to regulate digital trade and technology companies, etc. And my view is, that is where the conversation should be happening. We should not be outsourcing our regulation to the European Union or Brazil or anyone else, and they can't discriminate against us, and it won't be tolerated.

Senator Todd Young (R-IN):

Young: Mr. Greer, if confirmed, how will you work to prevent the discriminatory treatment of US companies in key global markets and ensure they're competing at a level playing field when it comes to digital trade?

Greer: Senator, in the first Trump administration, we took action under Section 301 to combat discriminatory digital services taxes. I know there are many jurisdictions in the world right now that are doing this and other measures to try to control the business models of our digital champions, and I want to make sure that if anybody's regulating our digital companies, it's going to be us, and they can't discriminate against it. And I think that we need to explore using Section 301, and other measures to make sure that we're able to stay competitive global.

Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC):

Tillis: I would like, with unanimous consent, to submit this commentary from Mr. Greer just recently on the posture that we should have towards South Korea.

...

South Korea, you've very articulately, in your commentary, have identified the threat there, and the way that they're trying to counter unfairly, I believe, our big tech, and high tech in general, businesses, and some in their own country, and silent on China.

I assume the Greer commentary referenced by Tillis is this one.

With regard to all of these digital trade concerns, I'll just mention the issue that I've brought up many times: What does everyone mean by "discrimination"? Is this about the intent of the regulation, or is disparate impact on U.S. companies enough to qualify? These are very different approaches, with a much different effect on regulatory autonomy/sovereignty.

Security Exceptions

Senator Tina Smith (D-MN) was worried about how Trump's recent tariff threats/tariffs might affect negotiations of trade agreements, and Greer cited the essential security exception in response:

Smith: How do you go in and try to negotiate in good faith with potential trading partners when we have a president who appears willing to tear up agreements on a whim, on an issue that might be completely unrelated to trade?

Greer: It's important to remember that when we have trade agreements, they all contain an exception for measures related to essential security. And if dealing with illegal migration of criminals or dealing with fentanyl or issues like that come up, this is very clearly an issue of essential security.

Not that there was much doubt, but this confirms that the Trump administration will take a broad view of invoking the security exceptions in trade agreements.

Values-Based Trade

Senator James Lankford (R-OK) brought up some non-trade issues such as religious liberty:

Lankford: Countries want to trade with the United States, because we produce great products, and our manufacturers are tremendous at what they do, and they put out a good product there, but the whole world wants it. But that also means when you sit down with them and people say, we want to open up a trade agreement, people are going to want to talk about, me and my colleagues are going to talk about, labor agreements and how we're making sure there's not unfair labor practices, what we're doing to be able to make sure that we're not having unfair competition. But we also have standards in there for things like religious liberty and a free press and all those things. So I would just encourage you, you are an ambassador in many ways, on many issues. And when you sit down on trade agreements, you have the ability to be able to sit down to be able to press countries around the world that are oppressing their people on issues like religious liberty, and to say, if you want to trade with us, we want to trade with you. We want to be fair trade, but we also want to see some action in your country as well that begins to balance out our people trading with your people, that we also know that you're respecting things like labor rights or free press or the freedom of religion. So I'd encourage you just to be able to take that action as well, while you're also watching out for American workers.

Greer: Thank you, Senator, we'll be sure to align with the State Department, who is very good on these issues, to make sure that all of our messaging is aligned to encourage the kind of standards and values we would expect.

On this issue, one of the problems I see is that the "standards and values" promoted by the U.S. vary a lot by administration. As a result, what happens is, the U.S. pushes one set of standards and values for four years, and then pushes a very different set for the next four years. My sense is that many U.S. trading partners may be treating this as a short-term exercise that they should pay lip service to until the U.S. administration changes, but I confess I haven't really looked into this deeply.

Trade Promotion Authority

Senator Tillis asked about a variation of using TPA:

Tillis: Given the limitations of executive agreements, they only last for the duration of a president's term, in this case, it would, of course, be four years, and then the necessity of congressional approval for binding market access deals, do you believe USTR would be in a stronger position if Congress provided a clear legislative framework similar to TPA, but tailored for sector specific agreements like those for critical minerals?

Greer: Senator, I want to think about that, because I think that's creative. I think that any trade agreement that the USTR might bring to Congress, ... I want to have full support, right?  I mean, with USMCA, we had 89 Senators vote for it. We had almost 400 folks in the House vote for it. That's the level of support I want. And if Congress thinks that a legislative framework will help with that, I'm happy to talk about what makes sense.

I didn't get the sense that Greer was particularly enthusiastic, but he didn't reject it either, so who knows, maybe this might go somewhere.

Sociological Inquiries into International Law in a Polarized World: Markets, National Security, and Democracy (Utrecht University, November 13-14, 2025)

Call for Papers 

Sociological Inquiries into International Law in a Polarized World: Markets, National Security, and Democracy

The Sixth Workshop on Sociological Inquiries into International Law will be held at Utrecht University on 13–14 November 2025. Participants will explore how sociological perspectives can deepen our understanding of the range of current challenges for the international legal system, their effects within and beyond legal institutions, and the potential responses offered to these challenges.

Background 

We live in an era marked by heightened polarization. International lawyers and actors are increasingly confronted with a wide array of challenges, stemming from populist politics, migration, climate change, supply chain disruptions, economic inequality, disputes over resources, and armed conflicts. In turn, attempts to address these issues are frequently criticized for being inadequate, for serving the interests of a privileged few, or as illustrating the unequal application of legal norms. These demands place significant strain on actors and institutions in the international legal system.

While skepticism about the effectiveness of international law is not new, we suggest that there is something different about the current developments. The quickening turn to a multipolar world, combined with heightened polarization between and within national societies, present two sources of pressure on international legal institutions, and on everyday practices within them.

The point of departure of this workshop is the recognition that international law operates within - and is shaped by - diverse social processes and factors, such as social identity, formal and informal hierarchies, socialization, collective memory, and socio-cognitive frameworks.

Against this backdrop, the Sixth Workshop on Sociological Inquiries into International Law will be held at Utrecht University.

Submissions and topics

We invite submissions employing diverse sociological tools, frameworks, and theories to examine topics including, but not limited to:

• The rise of populism, government responses to popular movements, and threats to democratic practices and the rule of law

• The impact of double standards on the legitimacy of international law and the authority of those enforcing or seeking to reform it

• The role of international courts and tribunals, the politicization of international institutions, and their potential to transform the legal system

• The expansion of sanctions and the increasing use of economic and financial restrictions

• Economic unilateralism aimed at de-risking and protecting national security

• The proliferation of economic nationalism and new industrial policies

• Domestic and international efforts to address climate change and their effects on global trade and development

• Technological advancements, including hybrid warfare, digitalization of products, artificial intelligence, digital surveillance, and emerging international legal regimes 

• Immigration and debates over border control

We encourage submissions on these and related themes focusing on sociological approaches to international law. The workshop will be held in person on 13-14 November 2025, in the Johanna Hudig Gebouw building at the Utrecht University School of Law.

Details for submissions

To apply, please electronically submit an abstract of maximum 300 words and your CV using the following Google form by 31 March 2025. If you have any questions, please contact Alexandra Hofer ([email protected]).

Applicants will be informed of the results of the selection process by 30 April 2025. If selected, we will ask you to submit a discussion paper of no more than 3,000 words by 13 October 2025.

Scholarships

Unfortunately, we cannot cover participants’ expenses related to travel and accommodation.  However, Utrecht University may offer a limited number of scholarships to contribute to the travel and accommodation expenses of selected early career researchers who do not have access to sufficient funding. To apply for a scholarship, please include in your application, in addition to your abstract and CV, a short motivational letter stating why you are not able to cover your travel expenses, how much funding you would need, and how participation in the workshop fits your research plans. 

Timeline

Please take note of the following timeline:

• 31 March 2025: deadline for submission of abstracts and scholarship applications
• By 30 April, applicants will be informed of the results of the selection process
• 13 October: submission of discussion papers (about 3,000 words)
• 13-14 November: in-person workshop

Steering Commitee and organisers

Steering Committee: Alexandra Hofer, Birte Böök and Luca Pasquet (all from Utrecht University School of Law), Sungjoon Cho (Chicago-Kent College of Law), Moshe Hirsch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Ron Levi (University of Toronto), and Mikael Rask Madsen (iCourts, University of Copenhagen).

The workshop is organised by Centre for Shared Regulation and Enforcement in Europe (RENFORCE) in cooperation with the newly established Utrecht University Research Platform on Peace Security and Human Rights, the Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Liability Law (UCALL), and the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM).

Some Questions for Jamieson Greer

Jamieson Greer is Trump's nominee for U.S. Trade Representative, and he will have a Senate confirmation hearing on Thursday, February 6. This is a great opportunity and honor for Jamieson, and along with it comes his own tag on the IELP blog. I hope he appreciates/tolerates this! If his predecessor Katherine Tai's experience is a good indication, this is the first post of many with that tag.

In anticipation of the confirmation hearing, I have come up with some questions for Jamieson. Any Senators participating in the hearing are welcome to adopt these questions as their own. (Given recent events, I can imagine much of the hearing will focus on the IEEPA tariff threats/tariffs related to Canada, Mexico, and China, even though it's not something USTR is responsible for.)

1. In recent years, Section 301 has become a more frequently used tool to address foreign trade barriers. Do you have any data on its track record of achieving market opening? Are there any success stories you can point to?

2. During Biden's four years in office, the U.S. government did not file any WTO complaints. Do you anticipate using the WTO dispute settlement process to address unfair trade practices by U.S. trading partners?

3. What is your view of the WTO dispute settlement reform process that is currently underway? Do you plan to make concrete proposals to help re-establish a functioning system that eliminates the problem of appeals "into the void"?

4. What is the Trump administration's position on ISDS? Will you include ISDS in any future agreements? Will you try to revise it in, or remove it from, current trade and investment agreements?

5. The Biden administration used the USMCA's Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) for labor rights enforcement extensively. How frequently do you anticipate using the RRM? Will you push for including a similar mechanism in other trade agreements?

6. What tools would you use to encourage China to become more market-oriented (in the sense of, for example, reducing its tariffs and subsidies, as well as ensuring that its SOEs behave in a commercial rather than political manner)?

7. The enforcement mechanism of the U.S.-China Phase One deal states that "The Appeal and any information and matters related to it are confidential and shall not be shared beyond the Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution Office, absent the agreement of the Parties." Will you push for public disclosure of as much information as possible regarding these appeals?

8. Is Chinese investment in the United States -- for example, a Chinese company building an EV factory -- something the Trump administration would support?

9. Many people have raised concerns about foreign digital regulations and taxes that discriminate against U.S. companies. How would you determine whether such measures are discriminatory? Would you look at the intent/purpose of the measure as part of this assessment, or solely at the impact?

10. Do you see any possibility of the Trump administration negotiating a trade agreement that involves liberalization of tariffs by both the U.S. and a trading partner?

11. If the Trump administration imposes a "global supplemental tariff," as mentioned in the America First Trade Policy memo, what would your approach be to dealing with retaliatory tariffs from U.S. trading partners?

12. In your view, would increasing the private and public savings rates in the U.S. help lower the trade deficit? If so, is increasing savings a policy you think the Trump administration should consider?

13. At the confirmation hearing for Scott Bessent, he mentioned optimal tariff theory. Do you have any views on the practical relevance of this theory? Can you point to any real world "optimal tariffs" that have affected the terms of trade to the benefit of the U.S. economy?

Some Initial Thoughts on Discordia Americana

Why Discordia Americana Is a Poor Replacement for Pax Americana

Steve Charnovitz

3 February 2025

Over the past 75 years, the US role in Inter-American and world affairs has been largely beneficent and has contributed to a great deal of global peace and prosperity. With a handful of very painful exceptions, the US has used its military strength in a fruitful way.  Through its various treaty alliances and support for multilateral organizations, the US has exercised its leadership in a manner to make US prosperity and global economic development go hand in hand.

Unfortunately, in recent years, US foreign policy has become less generous, less cooperative, less effective, less imaginative, and less predictable.  The resources and goodwill toward the US have sometimes been squandered and many opportunities to prevent and solve conflicts have been missed.  Important global goals, such as communicable disease control and environmental protection, have been stymied by lack of US leadership and resources. 

Modern Pax Americana promoted a relatively open US economy to allow the US and other countries to benefit from trade and trade rules.  Trade has always been good for the US, but the failures in US adjustment policies have left many US workers and communities as victims of imports, their voices seemingly not listened to.

President Trump has just imposed trade sanctions in the form of tariffs against Canada, Mexico, and China. Such economic warfare is Discordia Americana because it undermines the US reputation as a dependable, fair-minded, and law-abiding partner.  (Some commentators might not view China as a partner, but that is narrowminded since successful cooperation with China is important for achieving just about every US global goal.) Because of the disproportionately large size of the US economy, the threat and imposition of tariffs on other countries may succeed in bullying those countries to adopt, in the short run, particular policy changes demanded by the US.  But such transactional victories will be ineffectual in the long run because victim countries may adapt through both government policies and market changes to counteract the US leverage. 

Discordia Americana has two prominent features of exporting disruption to other countries and doing so through internal US processes that lack the rule of law. Although ambitious Executive Action by a newly elected US President is hardly anti-democratic, when President Trump takes actions that violate the US Constitution and US laws, that becomes anti-democratic and will make the US government seem more like the maligned dictatorships around the world.    

Chrystia Freeland on Global Imbalances and Fiscal Deficits

In a recent interview, Chrystia Freeland -- former Canadian trade minister and finance minister, and currently a candidate for leader of the Liberal Party -- made the following argument involving a connection between global macro imbalances and the U.S. fiscal deficit (starts at around 11:20 of the video): 

Scott Bessent is an incredibly sophisticated global economic thinker. He is a man who has a very well worked out view of the global macro, not just environment, but the global macro system. And he is someone who spent his career thinking about moments when that system changes. In fact, you could say that his investing strategy has been, figure out where the imbalances are and invest there. Figure out where the changes are going to be and invest there. And I do believe that it's right to point to there being global macro imbalances, which are a problem for the whole world, but particularly the US. The fact is, the global economy today is run based on the US consumer. It is run based on incredibly strong US domestic demand, and what that is requiring is that you guys run just like eye popping fiscal deficits, which at a certain point surely are going to become unsustainable. In the meantime, China has been running, notwithstanding frequent protestations this is going to change, an economic system that is based on selling stuff to the world and not having strong domestic demand and China, over and over again promises and fails to have strong domestic demand in China. I think it is entirely possible that the historic role that Scott Bessent has signed up for is to be the guy who rights those global financial and trade imbalances, a kind of Plaza Accords for our time. And Canada can be a valuable and intelligent partner for the US in the effort to rebalance the global economy. We're chairing the G7 this year. We get it and that is where I see too kind of quite new and important wins for Team Trump that Canada can offer, so continental security, national and economic, help you guys with this great and essential project of rebalancing the global economy.

(emphasis added)

This reminds me of the Michael Pettis view of global imbalances, which I think is mostly wrong. One key aspect of the issue is U.S. fiscal deficits, where Pettis has said: "The rising US fiscal deficit, in other words, is not a freely-chosen policy. Until the US reverses income inequality and stops allowing massive capital foreign inflows into the US, debt must continue to rise to prevent the alternative of rising unemployment." Freeland seems to hold a similar view, suggesting above that U.S. fiscal deficits are driven by global imbalances. But that's just not correct. In fact, U.S. fiscal policy is based almost solely on internal decision-making. Our fiscal deficit is high because U.S. politicians choose to spend more than they take in through revenue. These fiscal decisions are not influenced much at all by external factors and "maintaining global demand" is not a consideration.

One effect of these large fiscal deficits is that overall U.S. consumption is increased, which, of course, is likely to contribute to a higher trade deficit. Thus, to the extent there is a cause and effect relationship between the two deficits, the causation arrow actually runs the other way: A larger fiscal deficit can lead to a larger trade deficit. Following that logic, if we wanted to reduce U.S. trade deficits, reining in fiscal deficits could be helpful. Bessent has said some things that suggest he would try to tackle these fiscal deficits: "The United States also needs to tackle its own contribution to global imbalances by reducing its unprecedented budget deficits. Given that federal spending is both anomalously high and inefficient, whereas tax revenues are consistent with historical levels, spending cuts are the appropriate mechanism." However, people often say these things and it ends up being more difficult than they expect, and we'll have to see where the Trump administration's tax and spending levels end up in practice.

On the other side of the equation, I also don't expect big changes in Chinese consumer demand. From what (little) I know of the issue, this seems like a very difficult thing to move. (You could probably make some progress on Chinese subsidies/SOEs, though, with the right approach).

Freeland also mentions the Plaza Accords, which involved a coordinated effort to reduce the value of the dollar. But I also have a hard time imagining the Trump administration supporting a weakening of the dollar, given, among other things, the impact it would have on prices for U.S. consumers.

All in all, I don't see any of this going anywhere in the near future. But who knows! There is, I think it's fair to say, a lot of uncertainty about where things are heading in U.S. policy at the moment.