With regard to the rigidity of the old appellate Body to overturn its own jurisprudence, I think an "INSTITUTONAL" (instead of cultural) angle of analysis is the most promising path to understand this rigidity.
The old Appellate Body was NOT a standing tribunal as for example the ICJ. From the beginning, its features were intriguing (part-time judges not residing in Geneva, heavy political and geostrategic bias in their nomination, judges continuing their work in their law firms, judges with a sword of Damocles over their head concerning the renewal of their mandate, etc. ).
In such an unconventional context, I would hesitate to overturn a previous ruling emanating from a chamber composed of de facto colleagues (without mentioning that this overturn might be seen as unfriendly from a geopolitical perspective)
In sum, the reform of the old AB must, one way or another, take the path towards creating a standing tribunal.
