As negotiators interrupted the 8th round of talks on restoring the JCPOA for the New Year's holiday, the mood in Vienna ranged from confidence that the bargaining would continue until an agreement is reached, to more cautious statements of hopefulness from the United States. Since until now the American negotiators have not been able to speak directly to their Iranian counterparts, the U.S. reticience to evaluate progress is understandable-the U.S. delegation depends on reports from intermediaries. Notably, and a distinct improvement from the atmosphere in the 7th round, Iran and the United States no longer (whether through anonymous officials on the part of the US or state-connected media in the case of Iran) attack each others' good faith in seeking a neogitated agreement acceptable to all parties. Indeed, the 8th round has been characterized by diligence and seriousness from all sides. The United States and the Europeans have sought a target of the end of January or the beginning of February to wrap up the talks. While Iran has balked at the imposition of a deadline as an ultimatum, at the same time Iran's negotiators have said nothing to suggest that longer is absolutely needed to reach a satisfactory outcome.
As the negotiations are now focused signficantly on economic sanctions lifting, it is worth reviewing the parameters in which the parties are operating-the range of common ground as well as areas where disagreements may need some political-level decisionmaking to work out. The basic premise of the talks, agreed by all sides is the restoration of the JCPOA that was broken by the Trump Administration. The JCPOA entailed the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, a list of which was contained in an annex to the 2015 accord. The JCPOA also contained a commitment not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions. Restoring the JCPOA therefore involves not only lifting once again the sanctions that were lifted in 2015, but also any nuclear-related sanctions imposed subsequently by the Trump Administration.
This is where disagreement may emerge. Abandoning the JCPOA, Trump instead attempted (obviously with complete lack of success) to counter Iran's nuclear development through "Maximum Pressure." "Maximum Pressure" was a strategy intended to intensify the impact of the reimposed sanctions with new ones. From this point of view, all of the sanctions imposed or intensified as part of "Maximum Pressure" could be regarded as nuclear-related, and therefore needing to be lifted to restore the JCPOA. This is regardless of whether the sanctions are explicitly tagged as related to nuclear activities. On the other hand, even in the original JCPOA the US never agreed to remove sanctions connected to terrorism, other security interests, or human rights. Also, there is the matter of financial restrictions and prohiibitions that while more generic than explicitly nuclear-tagged sanctions, would likely impede the ability to engage in transactions that would otherwise be acceptable once nuclear-related sanctions are lifted. The entire sanctions regime is a tangled web, and like other complex exercises of administrative authority, sanctions have their own bureaucracy and lobbies likely to push back against ambitious offers of sanctions lifting by the Biden Administration. An additional constraint on the US side is that sanctions are ultimately based on statutory authority and any sanctions offers have to within the discretion of the Administration under those legislative provisions.
The good news is that the contentious measures are only a very limited subset of the sanctions on which there is agreement by all sides that their removal is essential to the restoration of the JCPOA. If the U.S. understands the strength of Iran's case in principle for viewing all "Maximum Pressure" Trump sanctions as nuclear-related, while the Iranian side is realistic about the genuine bureaucratic and legal constraints that the Biden Administration must work within, then a compromise should be possible. A scenario is possible where, at the end of January, a comprehensive legally and administratively precise list of all the measures the U.S. must take for sanctions lifting has not been entirely worked out. If there is a sufficient range of political agreement, one could in that situation declare a "deal" while providing a limited period of time for expert officials on both sides to finalize a legally and administratively precise list to their mutual satisfaction-perhaps into early Spring. This does still leave the admittedly challenging issue of "guarantees," which Ruti Teitel and I addressed recently on this blog. At stake there is guaranteeing transactions enabled by a restored deal against the economic harm from breaches by a future US Administration reimposing sanctions.
It bears emphasizing that this is a rare opportunity where a diplomatic success is largely in the control of the Administration. Erring on the side of generosity in sanctions-lifting and guarantees and giving Iran the benefit of the doubt in some instances where sanctions aren't formally labeled "nuclear-related," does not compromise any identifiable substantial US interests. After all, the idea is a reset from the failed Trump policy of "maximum pressure," replacing counter-productive bullying with effective diplomacy. The more that Iranians believe they got a good deal not a grudging or minimal one, the greater the seriousness in performing their end of the bargain.
There are broader foreign policy gains for the Administration from concluding a deal. First of all, in a world of considerable geopolitical tensions a renewed JCPOA would send a message that there are areas where the U.S. and the EU can work constructively with China and Russia to deal with a security challenge that is both regional and global-nuclear proliferation. That the Middle East can be a theater not only for great power rivalry but also an area where great power cooperation can enhance stability is a hopeful sign in a dangerous world.
Second, the US and the other major powers delivering a deal on nuclear restraint frames a challenge to the states in the region to take up the moment in assuming their common responsibility for security dialogue. The deal would reinforce the initial steps that, for instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran have already taken to open up such dialogue. Regional arrangements are critical to address the destabilizing impact of conventional weapons build-ups. Obviously, something like the Vienna talks cannot be a forum for that. Why would Iran curb conventional weapons except in a verifiable agreement where the Saudis and others also make such commitments? In sum, by successfully closing the Iran nuclear file with a restored JCPOA, the US is both supporting regional security while also challenging regional powers to use this improved context to take up their own responsibilities for peace and stability. Perhaps, with the conclusion of the Vienna talks, the great powers might even issue a political declaration, articulating in general positive terms such hopes, cogniscent of their own continuing responsibilities as, for instance, providers of armanents and related technologies to the region.
What of US politics? Clearly any renewed deal will be attacked tooth and claw by the Adminstration's mortal enemies-Republican hawks and Presidential hopefuls like Tom Cotton and Mike Pompeo being prime examples. President Biden will look strong and vital, defending against domestic war- mongers agile clear-headed diplomacy that has engaged not only our allies but also our rivals. The argument that Trump's "Maximum Pressure" led to the most alarming advances in Iran's nuclear program is watertight. This leaves the hawks with only one option to propose-bombing. And here even many Republicans today would get off the bus, since what is at stake is all-out war in the Middle East. The GOP has lots of oilmen and isolationists; the neocons scream the loudest, the evangelicals are also shrill, but they aren't the whole story on the right.
Let's take the alternative scenario that the Administration decides it has to leave Vienna empty-handed. There aren't any prizes for getting to No. As suggested, coming back with a deal the President will have powerful arguments against the hawks. Coming back without one, they will set upon him as carrion, tearing into him as incompetent and naive to have thought one could come to terms in diplomacy with a power like Iran. The President will have to choose from a number of options. One would be to do nothing; this would involve admitting the truth that Iran's nuclear program is not an imminent threat to the United States and telling the American people that if Iran were to choose to move toward weaponization the US would have options to handle such an eventuality (and would find support from the other great powers). Cross that bridge when one comes to it. If Israel wants to attack Iran, well let them try-they currently don't have much capacity to set back the Iranians' nuclear program through bombing and of course they are likely to bring on themselves massive retaliation.
But Biden will also be under pressure to consider war even if he hasn't the least interest in creating a conflagration in the region. The real danger is not that he will go to war-it is more a political danger that some of his most cunning enemies will gain traction by portraying him as weak and cowering in the face of diplomatic failure.
