Recently on this blog, Ruti Teitel and I suggested some ideas for persuading Iran's leaders that economic sanctions relief in return for restored nuclear curbs can be of durable economic benefit for the country-even on the nightmare scenario of a future Administration breaking America's word and reimposing economic sanctions. While we and others are searching for ways to make diplomacy work through positive incentives, some commentators have suggested that the path forward is not through economic incentives but threats of military force.
Thus in a newly published essay in Foreign Affairs, Eric Brewer and Nicholas Miller argue that now is the time for the Biden Administration to draw a "redline," commiting to the use of force against Iran's nuclear facilities if it begins to enrich urananium to 90%. The theory here is that enrichment to that point is not compatible with any intent other than to produce nuclear weapons, and that President Biden has promised that on his watch Iran will never have a nuclear bomb.
A careful look at the Brewer Miller "redline" thesis suggests several key weaknesses if not delusions in their thinking.
First of all, Iran might continue to enrich to greater levels not because of a plan to build a bomb but because it wants the deterrence value and strategic leverage from being a nuclear threshold state. This is the best interpretation of Iran's current intentions in light of the advances in its nuclear program. The more that Iran sees itself as threatened, for example by Israel's attempts to sabotage its nuclear program, the more Iran perceives the need to be able to deter security threats through the possibility of building a bomb should such threats become more intense and compelling. So far neither the International Atomic Energy Agency nor the CIA has found any evidence that Iran has already decided on the course of actually weaponinzing its nuclear program.
Second, Brewer and Miller merely presume that the "redline" threat they propose is credible. In other words, a strike on Iran at a scale that would permanently prevent the weaponization of its nuclear program would be effective, at reasonable cost to the United States, and to international and regional security. To recommend threatening the use of force by the United States without analysing its likely effectiveness and costs seems to me, with respect, to be utterly reckless. Briefly, the only scenario that has been discussed here (albeit not mentioned by Brewer and Miller) would be attacking Iran with with the MOP (Multiple Ordnance Penetrator) bomb, which would have to be delivered by B-2 Spirit aircraft. The MOP bomb has never been used in combat and to the extent that one can make inferences from published information, some of the glitches in its systems (e.g. fuzing problems) have never been decisively fixed. The B-2 aircraft may also need further modernization-the last crash during a routine flight was this September. What can go wrong? Just about everything. In addition to the untested in combat ordnance and the issues with the delivery aircraft, Iran has been significantly upping its game in air defenses. It is very unclear that at the future point that Brewer and Miller call their "redline" is crossed, the existing stealth technology in the B-2 would be able to overcome those air defenses. And that still leaves the little matter of starting a war in the middle east and the possible impacts on the region. And no, I still haven't mentioned targeting error, which we know has repeatedly occured in US strikes in far away locations.
As for effectiveness, as at least one well-informed Israeli commentator pointed out recently, you can't bomb knowledge. Iran once attacked will be more determined than ever to rebuild its nuclear program and move to weaponization. Until then, one can only imagine what kinds of Israeli and US targets Iran might hit in retaliation for a military strike in egregious violation of the United Nations Charter.
Third, there is the challenge of knowing exactly when the "redline" has been crossed. Remember Saddam Hussein and the Weapons of Mass Destruction? Already, the Israel deep state tried putting about a story that Iran was getting ready to enrich to 90%, something that Rafael Grossi, the head of the IAEA, quickly pointed out had no basis in fact. Doubtless, the neocon hawks who are back on the Iran warpath will find leaks or secret Israeli "intelligence" to prove that the 90% threshold has been reached.
Time to move back from the kinds of empty fantasies of American bullying and threats purveyed by Brewer and Miller to the hard work of diplomacy, seeking a deal that supports security and prosperity for Iran, for the region and for the United States. That deal is the restoration, however laborious, of the JCPOA that Trump trashed with such perilous consequences.
