When I think of GSP conditionality, normally I think of conditions by which the GSP program is designed to change an existing situation in a recipient country (e.g., labor rights violations). But what if the program itself leads to the problem situation? From Sara Núñez Évora, this is a GSP situation I never contemplated:
Before [the EU] preferential scheme, the sugar industry in Cambodia was negligible. The data demonstrates that since 2009, sugar exports from Cambodia have increased tremendously and that this sugar is almost fully exported to the EU. Encouraged by the preferential treatment provided to Cambodian sugar exports, high-scale agricultural concessions have been granted to private companies operating in the sugar industry. ... There are allegations that this land was transformed into sugar plantations by forcing Cambodians to leave their land. This allegedly involved bulldozers showing up without notice and alleged campaigns of intimidation and pressure to force Cambodians into giving up the land in question.
There is ample documentation stating that forced evictions are a gross violation of a broad range of human rights. In this particular case, such forced evictions have allegedly led to a series of economic and social rights violations, including the right to adequate housing (the right to food), work, education and health. ...
If your GSP tariff preferences lead to human rights violations, what are your obligations under WTO law? Can you withdraw them? Do you have to withdraw them? She writes:
Some argue that a full or partial withdrawal of tariff preferences could be considered a positive response in order to improve the development, financial or trade needs of a GSP beneficiary country. However, others argue and this is the line taken in this article, that since tariff preferences must be designed to respond positive to the development, financial and trade needs of a GSP beneficiary country, when tariff preferences are no longer providing for a positive response, that is, not improving the development, financial and trade needs of a developing country, tariff preferences should be withdrawn. In this case, tariff preferences granted to Cambodia are not providing for a positive response to the development needs of Cambodia since tariff preferences are allegedly resulting in a negative human impact. Thus, tariff preferences should be withdrawn.
As an alternative, maybe instead of simply withdrawing them, they could be modified so that product eligibility is conditioned on meeting particular human rights criteria? Is that a more "positive" response?
