International Economic Law and Policy Blog

"How to Stop the Global Subsidies Race": Policy Forum on Oct 9

For those in the DC area, Cato will be holding a policy forum on subsidies, on Oct. 9.  Here are all the details: 

Countervailing Calamity: How to Stop the Global Subsidies Race

POLICY FORUM
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
4:00 PM (Reception To Follow)

Featuring Tim Carney, Washington Examiner; Scott Lincicome, White and Case, LLP; and John Magnus, TradeWins LLC; moderated by Dan Ikenson, Cato Institute.

The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001

Solyndra, Government Motors, and the tens of billions of dollars transferred annually from U.S. taxpayers to America's wealthy agribusinesses—including the occasional farmer living in Manhattan. Worldwide, government subsidies to chosen industries and favored companies are out of control, bankrupting treasuries, breeding cronyism, misdirecting and deterring private investment, distorting market signals, and undermining support for capitalism and free trade. Always demanding more, domestic subsidy recipients cite foreign subsidies as grounds for yet more largesse, and the cycle continues. How will this global subsidies race end? "Very badly," according to experts who argue that policymakers must find a way to rein in this economically and politically corrosive process.

Cato events, unless otherwise noted, are free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email [email protected], fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by 4:00 PM, Monday, October 8, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.

The registration form is here.  Many of you probably know Scott from his blog.  Scott has a forthcoming Cato paper on subsidies, which is the basis of the forum.

I'm going to use my power and privileges as a blogger (there are not many of these) to pose a question in advance of the event, for the participants to mull over beforehand.  Here goes:

I argued here that WTO subsidies rules should be thought of as targeting "protectionist" subsidies.  Is that the best way to characterize subsidy rules?  If not protectionism, what should subsidies rules target?

Unsustainable fishing: EU Fisheries Committee backs sanctions deal with Council

MEPs insisted in the negotiations that to ensure the long-term sustainability of fish stocks of common interest to the EU and third countries, the EU should take a hard line on third countries that fail to live up to their responsibilities.

"I strongly believe that the agreed text will deliver both workable and effective trade sanctions, which will act as a real deterrent to countries who engage in unsustainable fishing practices now and in the future", said rapporteur and head of the Parliament's negotiating team Pat the Cope Gallagher (ALDE, IE).

"The mackerel dispute in the North East Atlantic is the moving force behind these new measures. However, I am still hopeful that the measures may never be used against Iceland and the Faroe Islands and I call on all four coastal states to immediately resume talks with a view to resolving this long running dispute", he added.

Wider ban on fish imports

The agreed text empowers Commission to restrict EU imports from countries that allow unsustainable fishing of fish and fishery products from stocks of common interest (i.e. fish stocks available to the fleets of both EU and third countries whose management requires cooperation between them) and of "associated species."

To make the sanctions tougher whilst complying with WTO rules, MEPs insisted on a much broader definition of "associated species" then originally proposed by the Commission. It will now cover all fish from the same ecosystem as the stock of common interest that prey upon it, are preyed on by it, compete with it for food and living space or occur in the same fishing area.

Should these sanctions prove ineffective, the Commission may adopt additional measures such as restricting the use of EU ports by vessels flying the flag of a non-compliant country or by vessels carrying fish from the overfished stock to the EU, banning exports of vessels, fishing equipment and supplies from the EU to the third country and also banning sales of vessels from the the third country to the EU.

One month's leeway before imposing sanctions

The country concerned will be given a reasonable opportunity to respond before the sanctions are enforced and will be given no more than one month, as originally requested by the Fisheries Committee, to remedy matters.

The sanctions would be preceded by an evaluation of their possible environmental, trade, economic and social impacts.

Next Steps

The agreement, approved unanimously in the Fisheries Committee by 22 votes, still needs to be endorsed by Parliament as a whole and the Council. The vote in plenary is scheduled for September with the Council to follow soon after.

Alan Beattie: "a widespread suspicion remains that [international IP] rules are mainly being written by their beneficiaries"

Speaking of IP related issues, as I was in the last post, the FT's Alan Beattie has a good article on international IP rules.  Here's the full paragraph containing the quote in the title:

As the global economy shifts online and more of its value-added comes from research and design rather than fields and factories, few doubt the need for rules allowing the creators of valuable content to be properly rewarded. But acceptance and adoption of those laws may depend on their flexibility over time and between different countries. For now, a widespread suspicion remains that such rules are mainly being written by their beneficiaries.

Are the lines for the current set of international IP rules being drawn in the right place?  Are we negotiating the rules in the right forum (trade agreements)?



Trade and Investment in French Chateau Wine

French wine producers are outraged that American producers might be able to sell "chateau"-type wine in the EU. See here, here and here for all the details.  According to the French producers, the American standards for using the term "chateau" are much lower than the French ones, and thus it would not be appropriate for American products to have "chateau" on the label.

The EU was supposed to reach a decision on this today, but delayed it.

One thing I found interesting was that foreign ownership of French chateau production was less of a concern:

Wealthy British bought Bordeaux chateaux in the 19th century and even before. Then came rich Americans seeking to buy into tradition, followed by Japanese in the 1970s. More recently, it is the turn of Chinese. During the past three years, about 30 chateaux in the Bordeaux region have been purchased by Chinese, out of a total of 7,400.

The most recent was Chateau Bellefont-Belcier, a prestigious first growth gobbled up by a rare metals tycoon. On the other side of the country, a Chinese firm recently bought a prestigious Gevrey-Chambertin vineyard, Chateau Gevrey, for China’s first big move into high-end burgundies.

But foreign ownership is not the issue, Haverlan noted. That, too, is part of the Bordeaux tradition. The problem is that, in France, the word “chateau” on the label has a meaning that the American growers do not respect.  ...

So that leads me to the following convoluted trade and investment law question:  If the EU had let in U.S. exports, and China had a fairly modern BIT with France with all the usual protections (there is a mid-1980s BIT, but I haven't check the contents, and I don't want to let them undermine my hypothetical so I'm not going to), could the Chinese chateau owners have filed an investment claim against France for failing to convince the EU to keep out U.S. exports? 

There's so much going on here I'm not even sure where to begin.  I suggest you professors out there ask this as an exam question and see what responses you get.

(Even less seriously, I'm also wondering if I can still refer to the GATT Article XX "chapeau," or will I have to start calling it the introductory clause?)

The Seal Products Dispute is Going Forward

A press release from the Canadian government:

The Honourable Keith Ashfield, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, the Honourable Leona Aglukkaq, Minister of Health and Minister of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency and Minister for the Arctic Council and the Honourable Peter Penashue, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and member of Parliament for Labrador, today released the following statement:

“Today, Canada, along with Norway, asked the World Trade Organization (WTO) to appoint the panellists to hear the challenge to the EU's ban on seal products.

“Canada and Norway are ready with their legal case and look forward to moving ahead with the WTO dispute settlement process.

“It is Canada’s view that the EU’s ban on imports of Canadian seal products violates the EU’s WTO obligations.

“The Atlantic and northern seal harvests are humane, sustainable and well-regulated activities that provide an important source of food and income for coastal and Inuit communities.

“The Government of Canada is firmly committed to defending our sealing industry and the coastal and northern communities that depend on the seal harvest.”

My speculation in the past was that the complainants wanted to wait until the recent TBT cases (Cloves, Tuna, COOL) were finished, to be able to argue the case properly under a clear legal standard.  I'm not sure if that was behind the decision to hold off for so long, but it does fit pretty well with the timing of this decision to push ahead.

The Ukraine and GATT Article XXVIII

This seems important, but I don't quite know what to make of it:

 Ukraine has told its trading partners it wants to raise maximum tariffs on hundreds of imported goods, a move that could unleash protectionist forces and may even pose a threat to the $18 trillion (11 trillion pounds) global trade system.

In a document marked "secret" sent to members of the World Trade Organisation last week and seen by Reuters, Ukraine says it intends to raise the limit on the tariffs it can legally impose on more than 350 goods. Based on figures in the proposal, Kiev's plan would hit overall imports worth more than $4.6 billion in 2011.

...

Trade ministries have until December 12 to respond to Kiev's proposal, but several diplomats said Ukraine's document had not given them enough information and nobody from Ukraine has yet replied to their many questions such as what new tariff ceilings Ukraine seeks, and what it might offer in return.

...

The latest proposal uses an area of WTO rules known as Article 28 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

...

Two lawyers said it was impossible to challenge Article 28 under the WTO's dispute settlement system. Hoda said he needed to study the case in depth before being sure.

Article 28 dates from the 1940s and was used often until the creation of the WTO in 1995 cemented efforts to liberalise global trade. Since then, it has been used about 30 times, mostly for small or technical adjustments to a country's tariffs, and almost always for fewer than 10 tariffs at a time.

...

Under Article 28, Ukraine should "pay" for tariff increases by lowering tariffs on other goods.

But Clancy said Ukraine's list was so long it could prove difficult to find enough areas where other tariffs could be cut.

Retroactive Law-Making under GATT Article X

Those of you who follow Scott Lincicome's blog have no doubt seen his discussion of the U.S. court appeal relating to the recent U.S. law that retroactively authorizes the U.S. Department of Commerce to apply countervailing duties on imports from "non-market economies" like China and Vietnam.  As one plaintiff put it:

Plaintiffs strongly disagree with the way in which Congress has applied parts of its new law retroactively. This selective retroactivity violates three fundamental principles of justice enshrined in the Constitution. First, the retroactivity provision singles out a particular group, and then condemns and punishes conduct by that group not illegal or punishable at the time it was committed, and in doing so violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I. Second, even if the new law is not so punitive as to trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause, the retroactivity provision imposes wholly new taxes that dramatically burden importers with no notice, going back far beyond the limited period of retroactivity typically allowed with or without notice, and in doing so violates due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Third, the retroactivity provision irrationally discriminates against past importers, refusing to give them the same rights and opportunities given to future importers, and in doing so denies equal protection of the laws also guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Now China has made similar claims against the same aspects of the U.S. law under GATT Article X, in the DS449 WTO complaint:

by its express terms, Section 1 of P.L. 112-99 applies retroactively to actions and events that occurred prior to its official publication.

...

China considers that Section 1 of P.L. 112-99, including the new Section 701(f) of the Tariff Act which it establishes, is inconsistent as such with Articles X:1, X:2, and X:3 of GATT 1994. This is because, inter alia:

•  These provisions of US law were not "published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them";
•  These provisions of US law were enforced by the United States prior to their official
  publication;
•  The United States has not administered its laws and regulations relating to the application of countervailing duties to imports from non-market economy countries "in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner"; and
•  The United States has failed to ensure that the decisions of its domestic courts are
  implemented, and govern the practice of the US authorities, in respect of the matters that are the subject of those judicial decisions.

 The legal standards are different, but the issues are similar.  It will be interesting to see how domestic courts and the WTO courts deal with the same measure, under different -- but at least somewhat related -- legal provisions.  And perhaps the U.S. court decision will play a role in the consideration at the WTO.

Trade Agreements and Policy Fragmentation

From a recent speech by WTO DG Pascal Lamy:

This morning I will address the multilateral trading system and regional economic cooperation. The title is well chosen in the sense that the multilateral reference is to trade, while at the regional level the title refers to economic cooperation. What this conveys is that we are not exactly comparing alternative approaches that have identical objectives. Regional initiatives are often broader and more encompassing than the more focused concerns of the WTO. 

...

Deep integration, global value chains and non-tariff measures

An analysis of the contents of the more far-reaching preferential trade agreements that have emerged in recent years would suggest a marked tendency for these agreements to go more deeply into policy areas that have been addressed less profoundly, or not addressed in the WTO. This relates both to a range of non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as product standards, and to other areas, such as investment and competition policy. 

...

The characteristics of NTMs and their motivations

If we understand preferential trade agreements, at least in some measure, as a desire to support and facilitate global value chains, and tariffs are not the real story behind them, we must then look towards non-tariff measures — NTMs — to analyse the significance of the relationship between multilateral and preferential approaches towards trade cooperation. 

NTMs encompass a very broad range of policies — simply any measure that is not a tariff. A broad distinction for our purposes is between NTMs that could be tariffs and NTMs that serve specific public policy objectives, such as health, safety or the quality of the environment. NTMs that simply replace tariffs are largely frowned upon by the WTO rules because they will often be protectionist in intent and they can largely be treated as a market access issue.

Those NTMs intended to address public policy matters raise altogether different considerations. Governments are obviously not going to eliminate such measures in the name of promoting international competition. On the contrary, they will consider the attainment of public policy objectives of paramount importance. The question then is how these measures are designed and how they are implemented. In effect, the danger from a trade policy perspective is that they may be designed or implemented in ways that unjustifiably restrict trade. When NTMs become dual purpose instruments in this manner, we are forced back to classic trade policy concerns about interventions that influence the conditions of competition within a market. 

The distinction between legitimate and less legitimate NTMs in trade policy discussions is highly complex and challenging. This is compounded by the reality that not all nations share the same priorities, either because of distinct social and cultural perspectives, or because different levels of income and development affect the capacity of countries to pursue particular objectives.  Whichever the reason, we are living in a world where diversity is a reality and we have to walk a fine line between respecting that diversity and trying to eliminate it. 

...

My concluding thought is this: as an international community, we must continue to fight protectionism, but in the WTO in particular, we must also fight policy fragmentation. 

I'm sure I've made this point before, but I'm going to make it again.  I don't think the distinction between "tariff measures" and "non-tariff measures" is a particularly important one.  To me, the key distinction is between discriminatory measures, on the one hand, and measures that do not discriminate, on the other.  Tariffs are one form of discriminatory measure, but not the only one.

Lamy hints at this when he refers to the distinction between "NTMs that could be tariffs and NTMs that serve specific public policy objectives" and between "legitimate and less legitimate NTMs."  But I just wanted to emphasize that the problem arises in part from treating non-tariff measures as a single category, which, in my view, they are not (or should not be, anyway).  And while I don't mean to suggest that the problem of distinguishing different kinds of NTMs is easy, I don't think it is as "highly complex and challenging" as he thinks.

In relation to "policy fragmentation," when trade agreement rules focus on rooting out discrimination, they do not do much policy-making at all.  However, when the rules expand beyond trying to catch discriminatory measures, they end up having a big impact on domestic policy-making.  In effect, policy-making gets pushed up to the international level.  And when different groups of countries push different policies, you get policy fragmentation.

But it's not regulation of "non-tariff measures" that are the cause of this.  It's the rules that go beyond non-discrimination, either through creating positive obligations or prohibiting measures that are not discriminatory.

That's my view, anyway.  Feel free to disagree in the comments.

The Potential Scope of Section 337

My Cato colleague Bill Watson has a new paper in which he argues for the repeal of Section 337.  Here is one part that I found particularly interesting:

... The ITC may soon become a vehicle for challenging extraterritorial conduct that is legal where it occurs but which would violate U.S. law if done within the United States. Common hypothetical examples include the use of child labor, environmental degradation, and bribery.  Regardless of whether one approves of such practices, the moral sufficiency of foreign laws or law enforcement should not be reviewed by the ITC at the behest of commercial competitors seeking to exclude their rivals’ products from the U.S. market. Such suits are unlikely to lead to improved conditions abroad, but almost certainly will result in protectionist trade diversion at the expense of American consumers. Fortunately, no such claims have yet been made, but there is currently no obvious impediment under Section 337 to doing so.

How broad could Section 337 become if some creative lawyers put their minds to it?

The Politics of China Trade: "Cheating" on Trade Commitments

From Mitt Romney's blog a couple days ago:

We're going to open up new markets for our goods and expand our reach into other parts of the world where other nations are now competing. I want to make sure our goods can go throughout the world. But I also want to make sure that if a nation cheats like China has cheated, we call them on the carpet and don't let it continue. And the cheating takes on a lot of different dimensions. I mean, cheating occurs if you hold down your currency. You might wonder, what in the world has that got to do with jobs here? Let me tell you: When China manipulates their currency by holding down the value of their currency compared to ours, what it does is makes their products in this country artificially cheap. And that then drives American manufacturers and American producers out of business and kills jobs. The President's had the chance year after year to label China a currency manipulator, but he hasn't done so. And I will label China the currency manipulator they are on the first day.

The Romney campaign is also running television ads along these lines.

Now, I know I shouldn't take campaign rhetoric too seriously.  But just like judges, politicians (usually) choose their words carefully, and I find many of the word choices interesting.

First off, the main allegation here is that China is "cheating."  But in what sense are they cheating?  Are they breaking some international trade rules?  Well, if they are, we should file a complaint against them.  Why isn't a complaint the focus, rather than this domestic "labelling China a currency manipulator" procedure (which I'm not sure would accomplish much)?

Perhaps the trade rules are too vague, as some have suggested, in which case a complaint won't help.  If that's the case, though, then shouldn't we try to get some rules in this area?  This has been pushed by some, but I haven't seen the U.S. government pursue it.  Would Romney pursue it?  If not, why not?  In order to determine whether someone is "cheating," don't we need some objective rules to examine?  We have that with subsidies (more on that later).  Why not with currency practices?

I also found it interesting that Romney doesn't accuse China of being "protectionist".  Why not?  Is it because we are protectionist, too?  Or is it because most people don't see "protectionism" as a bad thing?   Is "cheating" the preferred term because it is more negative, and because surely we wouldn't cheat?

One other thing that surprises me is why "manipulation" is such a focus here.  Doesn't everybody manipulate their currency?  Why is that word so prominent?

Finally, it's interesting that not too long after Romney's attacks on this issue, USTR has (today) announced a new WTO complaint against Chinese subsidies to the auto industry.  Do these subsidies also constitute "cheating"?  Not long ago, USTR announced a challenge to Chinese CVD actions against U.S. subsidies to the auto industry (the auto bailout).  So, we have subsidies, too.  Do our subsidies constitute "cheating"?

I'd love to see a clearer political debate about what's going on here, but I'm not holding my breath.  What is China doing on these matters?  What is the United States doing?  How are they different?  What types of government actions are we -- and should we be -- targeting?

Rob Howse: APEC Liberalization of Trade in Environmental Goods

From Rob Howse:

We witnessed last week another illustration of how progress in global trade liberalization has shifted from the WTO to other fora:  APEC agreed on a plan for liberalization of trade in environmental goods, by-passing negotiations in the WTO that have been going nowhere for years.  One of the key stumbling blocks in the WTO was the lack of imagination and negotiating flexibility to produce a list of green goods on which tariffs would be reduced.  APEC has solved it.   Here is the list:  http://apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2012/~/link.aspx?_id=357A0FFAFA184C278FC840F9F6E9DF36&_z=z  

Now that APEC has taken the lead, there is a strong case that this list should become an international standard and that non-APEC countries should step up to the plate and also agree to reduce their applied rates to 5% or less on these products within the same time frame.   No WTO negotiation is strictly speaking needed to multilaterize fully the APEC result.  Indeed, this could be an experiment in how we can achieve multilateral progress on trade without the WTO, which is rapidly becoming an anachronism as far as negotiating fora are concerned:  the WTO's comparative advantage is, clearly, dispute settlement and related monitoring and administration of the existing legal framework-crucial functions that are being done well but where the Organization needs to invest in certain  improvements, such as professionalizing the panels.  It is time to stop wasting time and money on the Doha agenda, which is outdated and a hopeless basis for a forward-looking accord that grapples with the issues of today and tomorrow. 

Postscript to the Asbestos Dispute

From the CBC:

Canada's asbestos industry is effectively and finally shut down, with Industry Minister Christian Paradis's announcement Friday that the Canadian government will no long oppose the listing of asbestos as a hazardous substance in the international Rotterdam Convention.

Paradis also said the federal government will invest up to $50 million to help the country's last remaining asbestos mining region, in Quebec's Eastern Townships, to diversify into other areas of activity.

Asbestos production in Quebec has been de facto shut down for the last couple years, but the outgoing Liberal provincial government was loaning $58 million to a company to restart its mining and export operations.

The new Parti Québécois provincial government has promised to cancel the loan.

As recently as 2010, Canada was producing 150,000 tonnes of asbestos annually, all of it in Quebec, and exporting 90 per cent — worth about $90 million — to developing countries. More than 50 countries ban the mining and use of asbestos because it causes cancer, but Canada, traditionally a major exporter, has successfully lobbied in the past to keep it off the UN's Rotterdam Convention list of hazardous substances.

More on Registration and Use of Trademarks: All or Nothing

Yesterday I asked how a product ban compares with plain packaging, in terms of the impact on trademark rights.  After conversations with several people who saw a distinction between a product ban and plain packaging with regard to trademark rights, I had some additional thoughts.

It seems to me that the argument that a product ban does not violate the "right to use" a trademark, but a plain packaging ban does violate this right, is based on an "all or nothing" view of the situation.

According to those who see a distinction between product bans and plain packaging, if a government bans tobacco products entirely, that is permissible and does not violate trademark rights.  You can remove the product from the marketplace, and completely obliterate the value of any trademarks, and that's OK.  As long as you go all the way, you are fine.  You have not targeted the trademarks -- the impact on trademarks was just an incidental effect of the broader product ban.

By contrast, if you don't want to go as far as a ban, and instead take the more limited step of preventing the use of trademarks as a way to discourage smoking, that does violate trademark rights.  There's something about targeting the trademark rights, in this view, that makes plain packaging a trademark law problem.  A total ban does have an effect on the trademarks, but it also has a broader impact, and therefore is not a trademark issue.  Thus, taking a partial approach -- focusing on the trademarks -- to dealing with the problem is not permissible.

I'm still trying to digest this view.  I'm skeptical, but I haven't reached a conclusion yet.  But two points occur to me:

Does the distinction make sense from an IP policy perspective?  Is there something about the focus on trademark rights that makes plain packaging worse than a product ban (which, of couse, also takes away the value of the trademarks)?

Does the distinction make sense from a public health perspective?  A ban goes further towards reducing smoking, but presumably is more difficult to achieve politically.  Are we better off if we force governments to regulate only in the strictest way?

Registration and Use of Trademarks

There was one point of substance I wanted to mention from the TPP event.  I was talking with two people, one who thought plain packaging of cigarettes violates international IP rules and one thought it does not.  The guy who thought it was a violation made the argument that a ban on cigarettes would be fine under trade rules, but that plain packaging is not permissible because it interferes with the use of the trademark.  Later, the following thought occurred to me.

Let's say that a court finds that plain packaging does violate IP rules, on the basis that there is a right to use your trademark, and plain packaging takes away that right.  If that were the rule, then wouldn't a ban on a product also violate trademark rights on the same basis?  If a government were to ban cigarettes, that would mean that trademarks related to those cigarettes could not be used.  Thus, doesn't the same argument being made with plain packaging apply to bans as well?

The implication, I think, is that if there is a right to use trademarks (a right which, just to be clear, has not been established), a ban on a trademarked product violates those trademark rights.  Any thoughts from the international IP experts out there?

Brief Notes from the TPP Meeting

Yesterday, I went to the stakeholders engagement part of the latest TPP negotiating round.  (This is the 14th round of TPP negotiations. How many more will there be?  Another 14?)

This was the first time I've attended one of these.  Here are some impressions.  (But don't expect any great insights into the state of the negotiations -- for that you are better off with Inside U.S. Trade.)

There were three main parts to the stakeholders event.

The first part was a series of short presentations -- 11 minutes each -- on issues related to the TPP.  I think the presentations were mainly by TPP opponents, but there were some by supporters as well.  I went to two presentations on tobacco trade issues.  They were good, but it is hard to say much in 11 minutes, and there was no time for questions.  I left and went over to the second part.

The second part involved a big meeting room where stakeholders could set up tables, hand out materials, and mingle with each other.  My table was between an anti-tobacco group and some Australian cattlemen.  (I asked the cattlemen about free samples, and they told me they were having a barbeque later.  Unfortunately, they were just joking.)  It was a good opportunity to chat with people, either like-minded or ideological opponents.  In addition, a number of government delegates came through, and some seemed happy to chat.

The third part came later in the day.  In the same big meeting room, the chief negotiators for each delegation sat in the front of the room and took questions from the stakeholders.  I only stayed for four of these, as they all seemed to reflect the same theme:  Opponents of the TPP wanted to vent (about IP and investor-state in particular), and perhaps plant seeds of doubt in the minds of the developing country delegations. 

Overall, it was a useful exercise.  But I got the sense that if your goal is to influence trade policy, this stakeholder event is not really the place to do it.

(I was told there was a protest outside the venue at some point, but I couldn't hear it from the inside, possibly because I was trying to catch up on the NFL games going on at the time.)

SIEL/CUP Essay Prize

For you aspiring young scholars:

A prize has been established by the Society of International Economic Law and Cambridge University Press for the best essay submitted on any topic in any field of international economic law.

The competition is open to all current undergraduate and graduate students of any university or other tertiary education institution, and those who have graduated from a university or other tertiary education institution no earlier than five years before the submission deadline (ie those who graduated prior to 30 September 2006 are not eligible for the 2011 Prize). Members of the SIEL Executive Council may not submit entries. The essay must not have been previously published.

The prize consists of £200, as well as £300 of Cambridge University Press book vouchers and a three year subscription to the World Trade Review. The winning essay will be submitted to the World Trade Review for publication. Publication of the essay in the World Trade Review will be subject to the WTR’s normal review and decision procedure, but the WTR Editorial Board commits to expediting consideration with a view to early publication.

The prize will be awarded by the SIEL Executive Council on the recommendation of a Prize Committee drawn from its members and the Editorial Board of the World Trade Review. Decisions of the Prize Committee on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final and no correspondence will be entered into.

For clarification, essays with a focus on international commercial arbitration or EU law will not be considered for this Prize.

More details here:  http://www.sielnet.org/Default.aspx?pageId=1215443

A Lawsuit against the WTO in U.S. Court

Seriously.  Well, I don't know how serious it is.  It may just be a PR stunt.  The named defendants are the WTO, USTR Ron Kirk, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, and the United States of America. The complaint is here.  An excerpt:

plaintiffs seek a declaration that the World Trade Organization has no authority to override U.S. law and that its decision concerning the Country of Origin Labeling Act is void in the United States and throughout the world.

 

WTO Disputes: It's All About Argentina

For a while now, I've been saying that WTO dispute settlement is all about China.  But in recent months, it has been all about Argentina.  7 of the last 11 consultations requests have involved Argentina.  Let's look briefly at how this all transpired.

Back in September of 2011, The Economist reported on a new wave of Argentine protectionism, which was based on various kinds of measures, including import licensing and trade balancing.  In March of this year, the issue of Argentina's restrictions was discussed at the WTO's Council on Trade in Goods, with many WTO Members expressing concerns.  But no formal complaint was filed.

Then in mid-April, there was Argentina's decision to nationalize the Spanish-owned YPF oil company.  There was talk of a WTO complaint, but it became clear there were no good claims to make, so that never happened.  Instead, the EU made plans to challenge the various Argentine trade restrictions noted above in WTO dispute settlement.

There also was this reaction from Spain in late April:

Tensions continue to escalate between Spain and Argentina in the wake of Buenos Aires’ announcement last week that it would be nationalising the Spanish-owned Repsol YPF oil company. Madrid announced on Friday that it would be taking measures aimed at curtailing biodiesel imports from its South American trading partner, as EU officials also voiced their own frustration over the impact of the Argentine decision on Brussels-Buenos Aires trade relations.

At the time, Argentina said it did not plan on challenging the biodiesel measures at the WTO:

“If Spain’s government wants its own businesses to pay more for biodiesel, that’s a sovereign decision,” Kirchner said in response to the Spanish announcement. Buenos Aires can increase domestic demand for biodiesel to compensate, she added.

Argentina will not challenge such measures at the WTO, Kirchner said.

Then on May 25, the EU moved forward with the challenge to the trade restrictions imposed by Argentina, in DS438.  That must have caused Argentina to re-think its position on biodiesels, because on August 17 Argentina asked for WTO consultations in that case, in DS443.

At that point, the United States, Japan and Mexico piled on in the trade restrictions case against Argentina, requesting consultations in DS444, DS445, DS446.

Just recently, Argentina responded with complaints against the U.S. on alleged import restrictions on meat products and on lemon, in DS447 and DS448.

No word yet on whether complaints against Mexico and Japan will be coming, or if any further escalation from the U.S. and EU is in the works.

One other issue I have wondered about is whether Argentina would challenge the U.S. decision to suspend GSP benefits.  But no word there either.