Some in Australia are still skeptical of investor-state dispute settlement. This is from Chapter 14 of today's Productivity Commission report on bilateral and regional trade agreements:
It is the Commission’s assessment that although some of the risks and problems associated with ISDS can be ameliorated through the design of relevant provisions, significant risks would remain. Meanwhile, it seems doubtful that the inclusion of ISDS provisions within IIAs (including the relevant chapters of BRTAs) affords material benefits to Australia or partner countries. The Commission has also not received evidence to suggest that Australia’s systems for recognising and resolving investor disputes have significant shortcomings that should be rectified through the inclusion of ISDS in agreements with trading partners.
Against this background, the Commission considers that Australia should seek to avoid accepting ISDS provisions in trade agreements that confer additional substantive or procedural rights on foreign investors over and above those already provided by the Australian legal system. Nor, in the Commission’s assessment, is it advisable in trade negotiations for Australia to expend bargaining coin to seek such rights over foreign governments, as a means of managing investment risks inherent in investing in foreign countries. Other options are available to investors.
The Commission notes that, if perceptions of problems with a foreign country’s legal system are sufficient to discourage investment in that country, a bilateral arrangement with Australia to provide a ‘preferential legal system’ for Australian investors is unlikely to generate the same benefits for that country than if its legal system was developed on a domestic non-preferential basis. To the extent that secure legal systems facilitate investment in a similar way that customs and port procedures facilitate goods trade, there may be a role for developed nations to assist through legal capacity building to develop stable and transparent legal and judicial frameworks. While not an immediate solution, over time such capacity building goes towards addressing the underlying problem, and provides benefits not only for foreign investors (including Australian investors), but all participants in the domestic economy.
The recommendation:
The Australian Government should not include matters in bilateral and regional trade agreements that would serve to increase barriers to trade, raise costs or affect established social policies without a comprehensive review of the implications and available options for change. On specific matters, the Australian Government should:
...
c) seek to avoid the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in BRTAs that grant foreign investors in Australia substantive or procedural rights greater than those enjoyed by Australian investors.
Associate Commissioner Andy Stoler disagrees:
The Associate also disagrees with the Commission’s recommendation regarding the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in future Australian BRTAs. He notes that foreign direct investment is very important in the modern economy and that Australians have significant investments in other economies. He considers that where the Australian Government deems it appropriate to negotiate a BRTA with a partner, that agreement should promote and protect investment and where the legal system of a partner is judged as not sufficiently developed to effectively handle investment disputes, Australian negotiators should preserve the option of including ISDS in the agreement.
The report argues that Australia’s investors do not require this added protection and that, by including ISDS, the Australian Government is taking on a risk (of being sued by foreign investors). The Associate notes that the report suggests that the investors are able to protect their overseas interests by accessing a variety of insurance schemes. In the view of the Associate , this is analogous to arguing against the need for a fire department because homeowners can buy property insurance.
The Associate notes that those who oppose ISDS in BRTAs also tend to cite the risk of ‘regulatory chill’ for Australia — in other words, the Australian Government might elect not to proceed with certain policies or regulations because it may be afraid of being sued in the ICSID. Opponents of ISDS cite cases such as where governments may back off regulating cigarette packaging due to the threat of a suit by a foreign investor. In the Associate’s view, the appropriate response to these concerns is to ensure that the ISDS-related provisions of a BRTA are drafted carefully enough that they preclude challenges to those regulatory areas that Australia wants to ensure are protected (for example, health-related policies). In addition, in the Associate’s view, there is reason to believe that a little bit of ‘regulatory chill’ might be a good thing, even in Australia.
Finally, the Associate considers that it is not realistic to suggest, as in his view part (c) of the recommendation suggests and the report implies, that it might be possible to agree an ISDS provision in a BRTA that does not give foreigners rights not available to nationals, or that a BRTA partner might seek to offer ISDS to Australia without seeking a reciprocal grant of ISDS rights.
Earlier post on this here: http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2010/07/australia-productivity-commission-draft-report-on-bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements-.html
