International Economic Law and Policy Blog

The ECJ on Gambling Restrictions within the EU

Devotees of the US-Gambling case (not that any such devotees readily come to mind, Simon...) will enjoy mulling over this recent preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice. In Case C-42/07 Liga Portugesa de Futebol Profissional issued on September 8th, 2009, the ECJ found that the exclusivity granted to Jogos Casa Santa, a non profit that has held gambling concessions in Portugal since the end of the 18th century, are indeed restrictions on trade in Services within the EU, but are justified for reasons of public policy. This exclusivity - which is to the detriment of online providers, in this case one based in Gibraltar and Austria - was also found to be proportional, although frankly the analysis is typically rather thin. I found the insinuation in para. 71 particularly troubling and indeed gratuitous: the question was not whether this particular provider (BWin) could have been excluded, but whether the exclusivity granted to Casa Santa was justified.

It is also interesting that the Court rested its ruling entirely on the public policy logic, and side-stepped the other possible claim - that gambling services in Portugal are provided in the exercise of governmental authority under Article 45 EC and therefore carved out of the freedom of services provision. I can only speculate that the public policy path provides the Court with greater flexibility in dealing with future challenges to gambling regulation in other member states. I know nothing about gambling regulation in other European states but it is notable that several of them objected to the admissibility of the case as a preliminary ruling.

Hat tip: EU Law Blog.

T. 

SIEL 2010 Conference - Call for Papers

The Second Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), to be hosted by the University of Barcelona and its IELP Program (see http://www.ielpo.org/), will be held July 8-10, 2010.

The conference committee seeks proposals for paper presentations and conference panels under the following terms.

Conference Themes

Over the course of the last two decades, the communities of scholars, practitioners and others active in the area of international economic law have grown and diversified in ways that few could have predicted. The field of international economic law now includes a diverse array of participants and covers many new substantive issues. Inevitably, the term international economic law defies easy definition: it is at once a fully integrated part of public international law and an identifiable field in its own right.

This conference provides a venue for exploring many different faces of international economic law.  Given that the aim of the Society includes fostering research in the area of IEL and promoting cooperation among all parts within the field, the SIEL Global Conference offers a forum for those inside and outside academia to share pedagogical and research methods, as well as to explore greater cooperation among the many different constituencies of the field.           

We welcome proposals for papers and panels on any topic related to international economic law, including:

• the three traditional pillars of IEL: trade, investment, and monetary policies;
• the relationship between these pillars, and between these pillars and other branches of law;
• the influence of disciplines such as economics, political economy, and others on international economic law;
• comparative international economic law, focussing on how international economic law interacts with laws, institutions and actors at the domestic level;
• the geographies of international economic law, relating to the role of international economic law in different parts of the world;
• the roles that law and legal practices play within international economic governance;
• methods and trends in the teaching and learning of international economic law; and
• interactions between scholars, practitioners, government officials and civil society groups active in international economic law.

We are particularly interested in integrating new voices with more established figures in the field, and therefore welcome works in progress from young or new scholars.

There will be plenary and concurrent panels. Each panel will be moderated and may also have commentators on the papers presented.  We anticipate that many of the eminent members of the Founding Executive Council and members of the present Executive Council will attend the conference - as presenters, commentators, and as Key Note Speakers (see www.sielnet.org for a full listing).

Submission Procedure

Both paper and panel proposals are due by 15 December 2009.

Paper proposals should include a cover e-mail with full institutional affiliation and contact details, and a paper abstract of no longer than 300 words.

In evaluating proposals, please note that priority will be given to unpublished papers and works in progress. In your proposal, please note whether the paper has already been published, or has been accepted for publication.

Panel proposals should include a panel title, a description of the topics covered during the panel, and a list of suggested panelists (between 4 and 6), including information about the panelists and their specific contribution to the panel, in the form of a paper or presentation title. Suggested panelists must have been consulted by the proposer about the proposal.  They must have confirmed their interest in serving on such a panel if it were to be selected. Please take into account the diversity of speakers and opinions reflected in your panel proposal.

Paper and Panel Proposals must be submitted via email to [email protected], in WORD or PDF formats.  Please, write “SIEL 2010 Conference Call for Papers” in the subject of the email.

Results of the selection process are expected to be announced by the end of February 2010. Accepted papers must be submitted by 10 June 2010.

Conference fees and the costs associated with attending the conference will be kept as low as possible. The Society hopes to be in a position to provide a subsidy of the conference fee for some speakers on the basis of need, but at this time cannot make any guarantees.

Review and Selection Process

Every paper or panel proposal will be reviewed by at least two members of the conference committee, on a double blind and confidential basis.

Online Publication

Conference papers will be made available online prior to the conference. Papers from the Inaugural conference were published online as a working paper series on SSRN's Legal Scholarship Network (see http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-Conference.html).

Inquiries

Please submit inquiries to Colin Picker: Co-Executive Vice President, SIEL (Email: [email protected]).

About the SIEL

The Society of International Economic Law is a new organization for academics and academically-minded practitioners and officials in the field of International Economic Law. The Society is global and inclusive in terms of the expertise and interests of participants, and the many disciplines encompassed by IEL. Among other objectives, the Society also seeks to bring together its members in areas of common interest, as well as supporting academic activities in the field.

The SIEL’s Inaugural Conference, held in Geneva in the summer of 2008, included the presentation of almost 100 papers by IEL scholars, new and established, from around the world, covering the many different facets of the field.  For more information of the SIEL Inaugural Conference see http://www.sielnet.org/Default.aspx?pageId=108611

For more information about the SIEL, please go to: www.sielnet.org

 

 

 

Thoughts on Free Trade in Health Insurance

With the the U.S. health care reform debate heating up, I can't resist jumping in here with some thoughts on how "free trade" could play a role in improving health care.  I have two things in mind:  (1) free trade within the U.S. and (2) free trade globally. 

Two points at the outset, though.  First, hopefully this won't be my John Mackey moment.  Second, feel free to correct me on any factual details I get wrong -- I'm not an expert on health care, just an average consumer.

1.  Free trade in health insurance within the U.S.

As I understand it, the health insurance industry in the U.S. is characterized by separate and distinct state markets.  Generally speaking, you can only buy health insurance from a company licensed to sell in your state.  There may be some exceptions to this, but I think it is generally the case.  It was certainly the case for me when we moved from DC to Florida.  We had to give up the health plan we had in DC and shop around for a new plan down here.

This state-focused system with segmented markets has (at least) two problems.  First, when you move from one state to another, you have to re-apply for health insurance from a company in the new state.  When this happens, insurance companies get a chance to screen you for any "pre-existing conditions," which they can exclude from coverage (or even just not cover you at all).

Second, when you are shopping for health insurance, there are not many choices, as you are limited to those companies licensed in your state.  This was my own experience, and it has been reported that this is the case more generally.  It seems very likely that this limited competition results in higher insurance costs and lower overall quality of service.

A national health care market could help with both of these problems.  If you could keep your insurance when you moved to a new state, there would be no need to re-apply.  Also, competition would be enhanced if you could choose from any insurance plan offered anywhere in the country.

One objection is likely to be that particular states impose minimum standards on what must be covered, and allowing people to shop around out of state will undermine these standards.  If this is a concern, perhaps national standards could be used, or maybe the states just need to make it easier for out of state companies to offer insurance that complies with their standards.

Summing up, if we had free trade in health insurance within the U.S., the industry could perhaps be changed from a segmented, state-based system into a competitive national market.  (It almost seems as though each state has its own health insurance oligopoly.  This Tyler Cowen post suggests that health insurance profit margins are not particularly high, but some of the commenters on his post point out that return on equity is a better measure and shows a very different result). 

(As a side note, isn't there a possibility of a dormant commerce clause challenge to the current restrictions on purchasing health insurance from out of state?  It may depend in part on what these restrictions look like, e.g., how burdensome they are, which is something I'm not sure about.)

Now, I'm not expecting this idea to change the debate.  It has been proposed before, but has not gone anywhere.  But let's just assume for a moment that people like this suggestion.  If there are benefits to free trade within the U.S., how about moving on to a more controversial suggestion, which is ...

2. International free trade in health insurance

Elaborating on these two posts, if a little added competition from out of state companies is good, isn't competition from foreign companies even better?  My favorite health insurance company of all time is Van Breda & Co., the company the WTO used at the time I worked there.  Here's the way it worked.  I went to the doctor, submitted the bill to Van Breda, then got reimbursed.  Very simple, and very unlike many of my experiences in the U.S.  Of course, Van Breda might have acted this way because Swiss law required them to, but regardless, if I could choose any health insurance company, that's the one I would choose.  So why can't I?

I recognize that there may be a concern that people could be taken advantage of by disreputable companies who promise services that they do not ultimately deliver.  But that's a concern with U.S. companies, too, and I would think that regulation could deal with this issue.  We would just have to make sure that the foreign companies meet the same requirements as their U.S. counterparts.

********

So, those are my quick thoughts on free trade in health care.  They are not likely to make it into the final U.S. legislation (if any), but I feel better having gotten them out there!

Launch Aid and Compliance with the WTO Airbus Ruling

Reuters has some new details on the WTO Airbus ruling:

Picking apart the contrasting claims, two sources familiar with the case told Reuters the draft conclusions of a five-year WTO probe overwhelmingly backed U.S. charges that the dozen or so loans were "actionable" subsidies that harmed Boeing.

Washington won a partial victory on a second key claim: that most of the same loans further violated WTO rules by amounting to prohibited export subsidies, the sources said. The extent of the U.S. victory on this point remained unclear.

...

At least one of four loans given by European governments to help fund the A380 superjumbo was cleared of being a banned export subsidy, but the rest were found illegal, sources said.

Washington however lost a third claim: that the overall use of European loans was an invalid program of support in its own right, several sources familiar with the matter said.

The United States had not only attacked the individual loans but claimed they were part of a concerted and open-ended system in a bid to implicate future loans for Airbus's future A350, which fell outside the jurisdiction of the WTO complaint.

This last bit is the point I was getting at the other day, when I said:

For me, here's the big question about the ruling:  Can the findings on launch aid be used to bring launch aid not specifically challenged in this dispute within a DSU Article 21.5 compliance panel's jurisdiction as a "measure taken to comply"?  That is, is there a basis for the U.S. to argue that the grant of future launch aid means that the EU is not complying with the ruling?

Let me elaborate on this a bit.  One reason for the U.S. to make a claim against launch aid as a "program" or "measure" is so that future launch aid payments, perhaps even for aircraft (like the A350) not covered by the specific payments challenged in the complaint, would be within the jurisdiction of a DSU Article 21.5 "compliance" proceeding.

(For those who are new to these issues -- and my sense is that with the new school year, many students have just started reading this blog -- the significance of challenging future launch aid payments under Article 21.5 is the following.  If the U.S. has to challenge such payments through a new complaint, it would have to start this complaint from the beginning of the DSU process.  By contrast, if it can characterize future launch aid payments as being related to the original dispute, it can bring an Article 21.5 challenge against these payments, alleging that they are not in compliance with the original ruling.  If it succeeds on the Article 21.5 complaint, it can then request authorization to impose trade sanctions right away, which it could not do with a regular complaint).

So what I'm curious about is exactly how the WTO panel characterized its findings on launch aid, and whether, based on this characterization, there is room for the U.S. to argue that future launch aid falls within the scope of an Article 21.5 proceeding.  The Reuters article perhaps implies that the answer is no, but the panel's actual reasoning may make the issue more complicated.

One final point:  I think the issue may be more complex than simply whether the new launch aid is a "measure taken to comply," as I said in the quote above.  But it's a little too complex to explain quickly here.

Alice Amsden on the WTO and Development

I've said before on this blog (although I can't seem to track down where) that I think WTO rules allow developing countries a lot of flexibility to use protectionism (whether they should use it is a harder question).  Here's Alice Amsden of MIT making the case that WTO rules allow quite a large scope for industrial/development policy:

The rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) leave space for industrial policies, including use of subsidies, which developing countries can, should, and, in some cases do, exploit. This has been highlighted by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Economy Professor Alice Amsden.

Speaking in Pretoria on Wednesday, she pointed out that, under WTO rules, the entire environmental and energy sectors are not "adjudicated". That is, countries are free to employ a wide range of instruments to promote the development of these sectors, including those forbidden for other sectors under WTO rules.

She cited the example of China, which is able to use subsidies to support its automotive industry regarding the development and production of energy-saving vehicles. Similarly, East Asian countries are legally subsidising their railways, because railways save energy.

Another important fact about the WTO is that it does not forbid industrial policy at the provincial/state level. "Regional policies are kosher under WTO rules," said Amsden.

She cited the example of the State of Massachusetts in the US, which is subsidising the development of the biotechnology and film industries within its bounds. In the case of the film industry, this help comes in the form of cash handouts.

Likewise, Thailand purposely established the country's automotive industry in its poorest province, both to be able to provide it with WTO-compliant support and to bring development and increased prosperity to the region.

I don't know that I'd go quite as far as she does in terms of her specific examples, but I agree with the general idea that developing countries have a good deal of policy space to promote their development.

 

The WTO Airbus Ruling: Some Details

From the WSJ:

The Journal reported that the WTO in its interim ruling classified every launch aid package given for the A380 passenger jet as an illegal subsidy.

ADDED: Let the debate over what the ruling actually says commence.  From Reuters:

Comments that the World Trade Organization on Friday backed a U.S. complaint against European Union aid to plane maker Airbus are wrong and misleading, EU sources with knowledge of the WTO ruling said.

"The ruling is not a black-and-white case. It simply is not a great victory for the United States," one source told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

"The claim that the WTO ruled that subsidies given (by the EU) to Airbus for their A380 plane were illegal is wrong and misleading."

More from Reuters here:

The World Trade Organisation has held back from ruling that all aid for the Airbus A380 was illegal, a European source said on Friday, contradicting a report that the trade body had issued a sweeping rejection of government loans Airbus received to develop the superjumbo. 

The source indirectly indicated that some of the funding -- which the European Union calls 'reimbursable launch investment' and the United States regards as illegal 'launch aid' -- had fallen foul of a confidential ruling by the global trade body. 

However the source said the draft WTO report had dismissed 70 percent of U.S. claims over aircraft subsidies, which Washington believes damaged Boeing to the tune of $205 billion. 

'Contrary to media reports, the A380 reimbursable launch investment has not been judged a prohibited subsidiy in its totality,' the European source, who is familiar with the defence arguments used in the case, told Reuters. 

So launch aid is not a prohibited subsidy "in its totality."  Does that mean that only specific payments were found to be prohibited subsidies?

BACK TO THE U.S. SIDE:

From the Olympian:

"Not only did they rule the subsidies were illegal, they ruled they have caused material harm to Boeing," the source said.

That last bit sounds like an adverse effects finding under the actionable subsidies provisions.

THE BIG QUESTION:

For me, here's the big question about the ruling:  Can the findings on launch aid be used to bring launch aid not specifically challenged in this dispute within a DSU Article 21.5 compliance panel's jurisdiction as a "measure taken to comply"?  That is, is there a basis for the U.S. to argue that the grant of future launch aid means that the EU is not complying with the ruling?

MORE NEWS REPORTS:

From the FT:

While the WTO found that some of the €3bn in repayable launch aid – state funding to develop new aircraft – for the A380, the world’s biggest passenger jet, were tantamount to government subsidies, the panel also noted that launch aid can be a viable option for financing aircraft. This will be seen as a considerable victory for the European position.

One European source in Brussels said: “The draft report has dismissed 70 per cent of US claims about alleged EU subsidies to Airbus. It has also confirmed that repayable launch aid is a permissible way to partner with governments.”

I wonder what it means to say that launch aid is a "viable option" or is a "permissible way to partner with governments."  Does this just mean that the terms cannot be too favorable?

The WTO Airbus Ruling: No Leaks Yet

So far, the details of the Airbus ruling have not been leaked, so nothing to comment on in that regard.  However, I did have a quibble with this statement by the Economist:

Theoretically the WTO ruling, if confirmed and not over-turned on appeal, could cause a trade war between the European Union and America.

I suppose they mean that the trade sanctions that could eventually be authorized in response to a finding of violation would constitute a "trade war."  Another way to look at it, though, is that the current subsidies both companies receive are the "trade war," and the WTO dispute process will, hopefully, resolve things.

Call for Papers: "Risk, Science and Law in International Governance"

International Economic Law Interest Group (IEcLIG) of American Society of International Law (ASIL)

Call for Papers (Deadline Extended)

Risk, Science and Law in International Governance

International law in the 21st century has increasingly responded to and been challenged by domestic measures which aim to address various health risks. A number of different international organizations and instruments engage the intersection of science, risk and law. These include the World Health Organization, the Conference of Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization with its Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). It also includes the jurisprudence that the WTO has spurred, such as the EC-Hormones and EC-Biotech cases. Recent investment cases such as Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, under NAFTA’s investment chapter suggest that these issues extend to international investment and perhaps other areas. Scholars have accordingly studied the relation of risk regulation, science, law and international governance from various disciplinary perspectives, including political science, economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and law.

The International Economic Law Interest Group (IEcLIG) of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) will host a special Research Forum in early December 2009 to discuss the emerging complexities and interconnectedness of risk, science and law as they relate to international governance. The conference will take place at Chicago-Kent College of Law in Chicago, IL on December 5 (Saturday), 2009. We invite the submission of proposals in the form of abstracts of no more than 300 words which will address this topic. Here is an illustrative list of potential topics, although you should feel free to submit any paper topic relevant to this field of study.

- What is the role of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, International Plant Protection Commission, World Animal Health Organization and the WHO/FAO regarding risk regulation and the role of science? How do their processes work? How have they developed? What is the role of epistemic scientific communities?

- What role do transgovernmental regulatory networks play? How have they developed?

- How have concerns terrorism risks (such as through the use of biologic agents) affected domestic risk regulatory policy? How should they?

- What role can informal, soft-law oriented bodies play, such as the WTO SPS Committee or those provided by standard organizations, in resolving disputes?

- How should WTO adjudication be informed by risk science? What criteria are and should be used (if any)? What should be the role of the precautionary principle? How should one conceive it?

- How have international dispute settlement bodies used science to resolve regulatory disputes? What deference has and should be given to states?

- Does (and should) culture and ethics play a role in addressing risk disputes? For example, what should there role be when addressing disputes involving biotechnology, cloning or animal rights?

- What leverage do studies of the philosophy of science and science and technology provide us in addressing international governance issues regarding risk regulation? What insights does behavioral economics offer, such as regards availability heuristics and social cascades, in dealing with transnational risk disputes?

- How should we conceive of the issues of participation, accountability and administrative procedure regarding risk regulation in a globally interdependent world?

- What is the (desirable) role of civil society and NGOs in addressing risk disputes before international tribunals?

- How do "development" issue relate to disputes over risk regulation? What approaches have and should be considered to address development concerns?

- What linkages are there between trade, investment, anti-trust and any other regulatory areas on these issues?

- What causal mechanisms explain developments in international governance over risk regulation? What has been their impact within state practice? How should international governance over risk regulation be reformed?

Any other question of relevance to the subject.

Abstracts should be emailed to Sungjoon Cho at [email protected] by September 30, 2009 (New Deadline). Each submission should include the author’s name, institutional affiliation, contact information and e-mail address. Selected papers will be announced by October 15, 2009. Working drafts should be submitted by November 25, 2009 to be circulated among the forum participants. Presenters will be exempted from the forum fee. A limited number of partial stipends to help cover travel costs may be available to help defray travel and accommodation costs.

　

　

　

Trade Versus the Environment: Imported Toyota Hybrids

From Bloomberg:

Toyota Motor Corp., the world’s biggest seller of autos powered by a combination of gasoline and electricity, faces a patent-infringement claim that may result in a U.S. import ban on its Prius and other hybrid models.

Closely held Paice LLC filed a complaint yesterday with the U.S. International Trade Commission in Washington, claiming Toyota is infringing its patent. The company seeks an order to ban imports of Toyota products using its invention.

For those who aren't familiar with this type of case, it's a Section 337 investigation. (HT to a customslawblog tweet).

The WTO Cotton Dispute: Another Compliance Panel?

Not too many years ago, it was a bit unclear whether a respondent in a WTO dispute could go to DSU Article 21.5 and ask a panel to declare that it was in compliance, so as to put an end to the trade sanctions it was facing.  However, the Hormones Suspension decisions clarified this situation, finding that such an action was permitted, and that's just what some U.S. cotton and other farm groups want the U.S. to do in relation to the Cotton 22.6 arbitration decisions:

In response to the WTO Arbitration Panel decision on the USDA export credit guarantee (“GSM-102”) program released August 31, the North American Export Grain Association, National Cotton Council, CoBank, Farm Credit Council, US Rice Producers Association, and National Council of Farmer Cooperatives released the following statement:

We are very disappointed that the panel based its decision on the GSM program as it existed in 2005, and failed to recognize the significant changes that have been made to the GSM-102 program since 2005. As a result, we urge the U.S. government to request a new Compliance Panel to update this ruling to reflect the changes in the program made by Congress and the USDA since 2005.

The extent of the program changes is demonstrated in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2010. According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, in 2010 the GSM program will generate a positive return to the federal government of $54 million. In other words, the revenues from guarantee premiums charged to program participants more than offset the cost of program operations, including any credit losses. Under the WTO panel’s obsolete ruling, Brazil would be entitled to place tariffs or other import penalties on an amount of U.S. products based on the use, each year in the future, of a program that is clearly not a subsidy.

The WTO panel also failed to recognize the benefits that have accrued to Brazil’s banks as a result of their significant participation in the GSM-102 program. These benefits far outweigh the costs arrived at by the arbitration panel. Ironically, Brazil’s banks have been by far the largest users of the GSM-102 program since 2002 – the year in which Brazil initiated its WTO case against the United States. Since that time, Brazilian banks have taken more than $5.4 BILLION in loans under the GSM-102 program.

On July 1, 2005, USDA adopted measures to bring its three export credit guarantee programs into compliance with WTO obligations. USDA adopted risk-based guarantee premiums for the GSM-102 Program and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program and suspended the GSM-103 program.

The U.S. Congress made these changes permanent by enacting them into law as part of the 2008 Farm Bill. As part of that bill, Congress eliminated the GSM-103 program and abolished the statutory one percent “cap” on guarantee premiums that could be charged by USDA. Congress also eliminated the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, leaving GSM-102 as the sole remaining USDA export credit guarantee program. In addition, Congress included language in the Farm Bill requiring USDA to operate the GSM-102 program at no net cost to the government, thereby ensuring that the program would not be a subsidy and would comply with the WTO obligation that guarantee premiums received under the program would cover its operating costs and losses.

The panel’s decision to award Brazil retaliatory authority in amounts based on the future use of a program that is now compliant with WTO rules makes no sense. The panel’s award decision seems to punish the U.S. for its compliance efforts. The panel’s decision also is inconsistent with the WTO Doha trade negotiating text which permits export credit guarantee programs that have been subject to appropriate “disciplines.”

Notably, the $2 billion in GSM-102 loans taken by Brazil’s banks during the country’s 2002-2003 financial crisis constituted a vital source of foreign exchange liquidity at a time when Brazil was virtually cut off from the international credit and trade finance markets. In fact, the liquidity afforded by the GSM-102 program was instrumental in allowing Brazil to avert a collapse of its banking system, its balance of payments, and its economy as a whole. With the onset of the global credit crisis, Brazilian banks have again turned to the GSM-102 program as a source of vital trade finance liquidity, taking more than $1.1 billion in GSM-102 loans during FY08-FY09.

This response suggests that perhaps a quick negotiated settlement is not likely.  But they better hurry with the 21.5 request, because Brazil is busy preparing its sanctions list.

Trade Preferences and Human Rights: The Case of Sri Lanka

As a quick update on these two posts, the Economist reports that Sri Lanka is not likely to continue to benefit from the EU's GSP Plus tariff preference program:

The confidential 130-page report, which has been obtained by The Economist, concludes that Sri Lanka has failed to honour important human-rights commitments, and is ineligible for GSP Plus. Widespread police torture, abductions of journalists, politicised courts and uninvestigated disappearances have all played a part in creating a state of “complete or virtually complete impunity in Sri Lanka”. The internment of the Tamil displaced, which the government claims is necessary to weed out the last Tamil Tiger rebels and to protect them from munitions left in their fields, is “a novel form of unacknowledged detention”.

A final decision on GSP Plus is not due until October. The government, which barred the report’s authors from visiting Sri Lanka, called the study “outrageous” but seems resigned to losing the trade preference: a senior official in the trade ministry, S. Ranugge, admitted: “GSP Plus is very unlikely.”

The WTO Airbus Ruling: Some Non-Substantive Details

The WSJ says it's 1,000 pages:

Trade-law specialists say the 1,000-page document's wording will be ambiguous enough to allow the EU to appeal unfavorable findings

Here's another non-substantive question:  Will the document be leaked?  No doubt it will be leaked to someone, but I guess what I have in mind is whether it will be posted on somebody's web site (not ours!), as happened with the GMOs decision.

"Can a New Cast Save Global Trade Talks?"

From the headline of a NY Times article.  They say that India is now ready to move ahead, but they are less sure about the U.S.:

While there are signs that the host of this week’s session, India, has become more willing to bargain, negotiators are still trying to determine whether the administration of President Barack Obama is even paying attention yet.

The article quotes EU trade commissioner Catherine Ashton as saying that "[w]hat was needed ... was an “Obamaization” of Doha — “making it feel that this is a deal that this administration and this president feels comfortable with.”

ADDED:  The WSJ makes a similar point:

The Obama administration's first formal meeting with the world's trade ministers is likely to underscore how the U.S.'s reticence to pursue a free trade agenda in the face of domestic opposition has become the main obstacle to moving forward on global trade talks.

Obama Trade Policy Speech Coming Soon?

Washington Trade Daily just tweeted:

USTR Kirk just told reporters President Obama will deliver his long-awaited trade policy speech sometime before the G-20 meeting Sept 24.

"Long-awaited" is right.  I had been expecting to spend much of the past few months blogging about the new Obama trade policy, but there has not been much to blog about.  I wonder if Kirk and Obama talked about the speech during their golf outing yesterday.  It's good to hear that the top trade person has direct access to the President!

UPDATE: Sigh.  Washington Trade Daily has the following update:

USTR now says no Obama speech on trade soon. But will say something before the September 24 Pittsburgh G-20. A "tweet" maybe?