From the latest JIEL, here are two articles on the Appellate Body by Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez:
The WTO Appellate Body's Decision-Making Process: A Perfect Model For International Adjudication?
The functioning of the Appellate Body (AB) is virtually perfect in terms of collegial decision-making. During its first 12 years, it has produced more than 70 reports dealing with controversial trade and non-trade issues with results that are astonishing. First of all, the AB has usually met the strict 90-day deadline to render its decisions, established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Second, despite the fact that the AB has dealt with issues of paramount domestic and international relevance, which could lead to internal divisions among AB Members, the collegial decision-making process of the AB has managed to decide all cases so far with only three separate opinions. And third, even though the AB decides by Divisions, its case law has been coherent through all of them. How has the AB's; collegial decision-making process been able to achieve these results? Former AB Members have provided some descriptions of the AB's; decision-making process. However, they face limitations on the scope of the disclosure of how the AB decides appeals and therefore can provide partial explanations for the success of the institution. This article seeks to fill in this gap using theoretical and comparative analyses to reveal the formal features and informal practices of the AB that allow it to achieve the aforementioned outcomes.
and:
The WTO Appellate Body's Exercise of Judicial Economy
The concept of judicial economy is well accepted in World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation, and it stands for the proposition that WTO panels do not need to rule on every single claim made by complaining parties, only on those required to settle the dispute in question. However, little has been discussed about the possibility of the Appellate Body's; exercising judicial economy itself. Article 17.12 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) seems to prevent the existence of judicial economy at the appeal level by providing that ‘the Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during appellate proceeding’. However, despite this understanding of the scope of Article 17.12, held by some of the original members, the Appellate Body began freeing itself from a strict reading of this provision, and in its report in United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, without any these members on the bench, made a clear statement in this regard. The article illustrates the types of judicial economy the Appellate Body is exerting, highlights its exceptional character and shows its implications for parties and for the adjudication of WTO disputes.
