Phil Levy of AEI makes the case in relation to one aspect:
GM had recently informed Congress that it planned to produce roughly 50,000 subcompacts per year in China to sell in the U.S market in the near future. However, on Thursday, UAW President Ron Gettelfinger said that GM had agreed not to import the cars from China and to produce them in the United States instead as part of its deal with the UAW.
This change opens up an enormous set of problems for the United States that will stretch well beyond the automotive sector. The United States has commitments under the World Trade Organization for its tariffs on cars; it's supposed to avoid quantitative restrictions altogether. This latest policy switch looks very much like a government-mandated reduction in auto imports from China. A particularly sophistic trade lawyer might try to argue that this is just part of a labor deal, not an explicit U.S. government policy. But the UAW is currently receiving only what the Treasury Department decides it should get. Further, under current plans, the U.S. government will soon be a majority owner of GM. That will make it difficult for the government to dissociate itself from GM policies.
He alludes to the extent of the government involvement here, which would certainly be a key issue under GATT Article XI. In addition, there is the question of whether an investment decision of this kind has a close enough link to imports, throught its impact on potential future importation, to constitute an import restriction.
Of course, with the government taking a big stake in GM, Article XVII may turn out to be the focus.
