I am happy to post the following announcement from Cambridge University Press:
The Limits of Leviathan
Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law
Robert E. Scott
Paul B. Stephan
Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by
independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction
among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation and a preference for
reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan
identifies the areas in international law where formal enforcement
provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation, and where
it does not. In particular it looks at the International Criminal Court, the
rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders
of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement
of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial
agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns.
This book explains how international law, like contract, depends
largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.
Table of Contents
Foreword; 1. Introduction; 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of
international law; 4. A model of optimal enforcement; 5. Patterns of
international law enforcement; 6. The choice between formal and
informal enforcement; 7. The future of international law enforcement;
Glossary; Table of authorities; Index.
To Be Published August 2006
Hardback 9780521858465
(ISBN-10: 0521858461)
USD 70.00
264 pages
For more details, please visit:
www.cambridge.org/0521858461
